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ABSTRACT
The policy process emphasizes various stages of policy development and
implementation. Essential to the stages within the policy process are the individuals who
create, implement, and correct public policy. Employing three separate essays, I examine
the actions of legislators, street-level bureaucrats (teachers, law enforcement, and social
workers), and a policy entrepreneur in regards to child abuse prevention and education
policies. These three groups of actors play a valuable role within the policy process and
have various incentives which drive their actions in regards to a policy. Better
understanding the incentives and actions of these groups expands the policy research and
provides a practical application to policy design and implementation. With these essays, I
first investigate why legislators adopt mandatory child abuse reporting laws and
demonstrate if these laws meet their legislative objective. Second, I examine the reporting
laws from the perspective of street-level bureaucrats and reveal how these bureaucrats
respond to a top-down policy. Finally, I explore the factors of policy innovation and
diffusion in regards to a child abuse prevention and education policy. Significant to this
study is the role a policy entrepreneur plays in steering the policy through the innovation
and diffusion process. Employing various statistical models, I establish how each of these
groups of individuals significantly influences the policy process. Overall, the
contributions of these studies advance the public policy literature, particularly the
understanding of the policy process, and encourages further academic research.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
The Policy Process
The policy process is a fundamental concept of public policy research and has
been heavily examined by an assortment of scholars. Christopher Weible (2014) simply
defines the policy process as, “the study of the interactions over time between public
policy and its surrounding actors, events, and contexts, as well as the policy or policies’
outcomes” (p. 5). Taking the time to closely observe the actors within the policy process,
three sets of actors become abundantly clear. First, there are individuals or groups of
individuals who create policy, followed by agents or agencies who implement policy, and
completed with individuals who work to improve, alter, and diffuse policy. Identifying
these actors is important to the field of study, but understanding why they choose to do
what they do is central. Conducting three separate studies, I examine these various actors
and attempt to understand what motivates them in order to better illustrate their function
within the policy process. While the three studies that comprise this dissertation are
driven by separate and distinct research questions, each of these questions comes back to
understanding the role these individuals play within various parts of the policy process,
whether it is adoption, innovation and diffusion, or implementation. Together these
studies result in important theoretical and practical implications for the field of public
policy which further advances policy scholarship.
Policy studies and the policy process typically identify its roots with Harold
Lasswell (Smith & Larimer, 2013). Lasswell hoped to create and define a comprehensive
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theory that could easily define and measure the steps that lead to policy enactment
(Lasswell, 1971). Policy scholars attempted to build upon Lasswell’s vision and
described the policy process as it unfolded before them (Jones, 1970). One of the scholars
that answered Lasswell’s call for advanced exploration was James E. Anderson (1974),
who established the stages heuristic (Smith & Larimer, 2013). This heuristic provides a
simple way to analyze the steps of the policy process and includes the stages of agenda
formation, formulation, adoption, implementation, and evaluation. While the stages
heuristic is broad and generalizable, as a theory, it lacks predictive power (Sabatier, 2007;
Smith & Larimer, 2013). Moreover, the framework is accused of segregating the policy
literature and dissuading a unified theory of policy from being developed. Policy scholars
employ the stages heuristic to isolate parts of the process which then allows them to
concentrate on a certain topic. This separation allows for scholars to be more selective of
variables which demonstrate relationships in one stage, but fail to provide any meaning in
other stages (Greenberg, Miller, Morh, & Vladeck, 1977; Smith & Larimer, 2013;
Whitaker, Herian, Larimer, & Lang, 2012).
Deficient of predictive power and accused of theoretical segregation and
oversimplification, the stages heuristic serves as a relatively weak theory. Nonetheless, it
does function as a robust linear framework and provides a simple view of the policy
process examined throughout this dissertation. As Kevin Smith and Christopher Larimer
(2013) point out, the stages approach provides, “an intuitive and practical means of
conceptualizing and organizing the study of public policy” (p. 27). Examining the themes
of these studies, it makes intuitive sense to follow along the policy process to better
understand the role of the individual in the evolution of child abuse policies. This is

3
especially important as states move from mandatory reporting laws to a more complex
and rigorous policy such as Erin’s Law. Unlike typical academic articles, the
accumulation of these essays in this dissertation removes the distraction of separation but
allows for an evaluation of the process as a whole. Additionally, the combination of the
studies allows scholars to examine common variables across each study in an effort to
target those variables of greatest worth to the policy process. While the stages approach is
not used as a predictive theory within these essays, this heuristic does provide a simple
and clear approach in exploring the advancement of child abuse laws from mandatory
reporting policies to Erin’s Law. Furthermore, the combination of these studies within a
stages approach accounts for the multiple perspectives and incentives of people who
participate in the policy process.
Significant to the policy process is the study of implementation, which has
become increasingly more complicated since the foundational writings of Pressman and
Wildavsky’s book Implementation (1984). The complexity of policy implementation has
continued to increase as scholars delve into the political and bureaucratic actions that
have led to successful implementation. Within this dissertation, I do not intend to clarify
or explain the entirety of policy implementation research or even claim that there is a
simple account of the policy implementation process. Rather, in two essays, I hope to
expand upon the extant literature and investigate the motives that drive policy enactment
and implementation within a specific policy framework. Particularly, I reveal an
important narrative regarding the incentives that encourage the enactment and
implementation of a policy. These two studies are then followed by the final essay, which
examines a policy entrepreneur’s attempt to alter the currently weak child abuse policies
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through implementation and diffusion of a new preventative law. Employing the policy
process and the stages heuristic established by Anderson (1974), I use a linear framework
to define the process in which the actors within these studies function.
Child Abuse Policy as a Case Study
In order to evaluate the actors within the policy process, I acknowledge that
political context is extremely important. Each study is then driven by a similar policy
context in order to allow crossover between the examinations and to better describe the
policy process as a whole. Specifically, I analyze each study within the context of child
abuse policies. Child abuse policies in the United States (U.S.) continue to evolve and
expand, providing for a comprehensive case to investigate the various aspects and actors
within the policy process. In order to better understand the framework for each of these
studies, I provide a brief history of child abuse policy in the U.S.
Following the seminal publication of The Battered-child Syndrome (Kempe,
Silverman, Steele, Droegemueller, & Silver, 1962), child abuse was more clearly defined
which lead to better examining, understanding, and reporting by medical practitioners
(Kalichman, 1999). In response to the work of Kempe et al., (1962), legislation
throughout the U.S. was enacted. This new legislation began with mandatory reporting
laws targeting healthcare professionals who provided medical treatment to abused and
neglected children (Besharov, 1985; Nelson, 1984; Paulsen, Parker, & Adelman, 1965).
While initially limited to reporting within the medical field, mandatory reporting laws
diffused throughout the country, developing in scope and coverage. (Fischer, Schimmel,
& Stellman, 2003; Hogelin, 2013; Kalichman, 1999; Mathews & Kenny, 2008). This
spread of legislation was spurred further and continues to diffuse following such
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legislation as the 1974 federal legislation CAPTA (Child Abuse Prevention and
Treatment Act), which made federal funding available to states based on child abuse
prevention laws (Kalichman, 1991; 1999; Mathews & Kenny, 2008). As mandatory
reporting laws continued to expand across the states, so too did the categories of abuse, in
addition to physical abuse: emotional, sexual, psychological abuse and neglect were
included (Mathews & Kenny, 2008).
Depending on the state, categories of child abuse differ, which presents problems
for accurately reporting and comparing child abuse cases (Deisz, Doueck, George, &
Levine, 1996; Levi, Brown, & Erb, 2006; Levi & Loeben, 2004; Swain, 1998; 2000).
However, based on previous literature and because mandatory reporters are not required
to distinguish between the different types of abuse (Child Abuse Prevention and
Treatment Act [CAPTA] of 2010, 2016), I use “child abuse” broadly to cover any form
of child abuse and neglect required to be reported by mandatory reporters (Feng, Chen,
Fetzer, Feng, & Lin, 2012; Fischer et al., 2003; Kesner & Robinson, 2002). Furthermore,
I examine child abuse in all of its forms, but focus more heavily on the professional
groups or actors that are required to report and respond to child abuse policies.
Currently, all U.S. States, excluding New Jersey and Wyoming, enumerate
professional groups as mandatory reporters (Child Welfare Information Gateway, 2016).
Instead of specifying mandatory reporters, New Jersey and Wyoming require all persons
to report suspected child abuse to the proper authorities. Unfortunately, the scholarly
research on the effectiveness of mandatory reporting policies has not always followed
closely with the expansion of the law, especially in relation to the targeting of law
enforcement and social work professionals. Beyond mandatory reporting laws, additional
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policies which support reporting laws through required awareness education and training
have also begun to be established.
As will be examined in the third essay, child abuse education and prevention
policies, such as Erin’s Law, have been established to help train certain professional
groups on how to best recognize and report suspected abuse. The enactment of these laws
demonstrates that while mandatory reporting laws have been broadly adopted, they may
not be completely effective in diminishing child abuse. Because of this policy’s
weakness, additional policies have diffused across the U.S. to combat and prevent child
abuse and the potential consequences that may follow. The third essay plays a
culminating role in the policy process; specifically, it demonstrates how a policy
entrepreneur interacts with lawmakers and bureaucrats to provide greater protection to
children from abuse. Moreover, each essay provides an important narrative regarding the
current and future reporting activities of suspected child abuse while expanding the
theoretical foundation which explains why and how child abuse policies work within the
U.S.
Essay 1
In the first essay, I examine state lawmakers and their role surrounding the
enactment of mandatory child abuse reporting policies. As previously noted, child abuse
policies were introduced following the publication of The Battered-child Syndrome
(Kempe, Silverman, Steele, Droegemueller, & Silver, 1962) where child abuse was first
introduced in an academic setting. Immediately following the publication, it was obvious
that legislators and society as a whole were missing information in regards to what child
abuse looked like, how child abuse could be prevented, and the community consequences
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of raising abused children. To supplement for this lack of knowledge, state lawmakers
began to require healthcare officials to report suspected abuse (Hogelin, 2013;
Kalichman, 1999; Mathews & Kenny, 2008). Requiring this reporting, lawmakers could
more easily monitor cases of abuse reported from this professional group. Over time, it
became apparent that suspected child abuse was observed by other professional
organizations beyond healthcare professionals and legislators reacted accordingly.
Specifically, state legislatures began mandating reporting among education personnel,
social workers, and law enforcement officials and the list continues to grow. For
example, eight states enacted new legislation in 2016 to expand their mandatory reporting
laws to include additional professional organizations beyond those already listed
(National Conference of State Legislatures [NCSL], 2017). With the enactment of these
laws, two important questions arise: “Do these mandatory reporting laws actually work
toward controlling behavior?” and “Do these policies provide lawmakers with the
consistent easily monitored reporting they were hoping for?”
Investigating the enactment of mandatory reporting laws from the legislative
context and perspective as demonstrated with these research questions leads to valuable
practical and theoretical implications detailed below. First, these questions demonstrate
that legislators are faced with principal-agent uncertainty, especially in the case of child
abuse reporting. Second, legislators utilize administrative procedures or policies when
facing uncertainty, even if the legislators are not sure if the administrative procedure
actually works. Finally, it is expected that the results from this study will demonstrate
that administrative procedures allow for consistency and predictability in reporting. With

8
this consistency, legislators are then able to direct their attention away from child abuse
and focus on other legislation or policy alterations.
State lawmakers regularly face uncertainty within their work (Burden, 2003;
Downs, 1957; Potoski, 1999). A lot of this uncertainty manifests in asymmetric
information between lawmakers and various agencies. Research has identified the
existence of uncertainty within both the individual level and at group decision-making
levels (Jones, Talbert, & Potoski, 2003). In effect, the uncertainty revolves around how to
solve a problem when all of the information may not be available, such as in the case of
child abuse reporting. In the specific case of 1960 and 1970 healthcare officials, it was
apparent that these professionals were aware of the occurrence of child abuse and the
signs for abuse and yet chose not to report (Kalichman, 1999). To remove this
asymmetric information, legislators adopted mandated reporting for professional groups
who regularly interact with children. The scholarly literature is replete with examples of
legislators employing administrative procedures, such as mandated reporting, in order to
minimize uncertainty (Balla, 1998; McCubbins, Noll, & Weingast, 1987; Potoski, 1999).
However, for these administrative procedures to work, it is assumed that the bureaucracy
responds to bureaucratic control (Weingast and Moran 1983; Wood and Waterman 1994).
While bureaucratic control is debated, there is ample evidence supporting that legislative
action does influence the behavior of bureaucrats. This study provides an additional
example supporting the previous literature that bureaucrats do submit to administrative
procedures.
Scholars have frequently studied the principal-agent relationship and have noted
that principals attempt to minimize any uncertainty that arises from missing information
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(Potoski, 1999). Not having the appropriate information causes angst for legislators, and
lawmakers attempt to reduce this anxiety as much as possible. In an effort to reduce
legislative uncertainty, lawmakers enact legislative procedures with the intent of drawing
information and altering behavior (Balla, 1998). Specifically, legislators enact “firealarm” procedures. These procedures help legislators obtain the necessary information
from agents in order to enforce directives, reduce legislative uncertainty and transaction
costs while managing behavior (Macey, 1992; McCubbins & Schwartz, 1984; Potoski,
1999, p. 627). Examining this behavior within the scenario of mandatory reporting laws
demonstrates whether legislators are enacting a law which leads to their desired outcome
of more consistent reporting. If this is not the case, then from a practical standpoint this
study questions the need for and purpose of mandatory reporting laws.
The basis of this study determines whether the administrative procedures
established with mandatory reporting laws leads to the desired legislative outcome.
Current scholarship, as detailed above, demonstrates that administrative procedures are
utilized to control bureaucratic behavior and to reduce legislative uncertainty (Balla,
1998; McCubbins, Noll, & Weingast, 1987; Potoski, 1999). Nevertheless, little has been
done to demonstrate whether these procedures or policies work when they cross multiple
variables such as job categories, locations, or time. Employing mandatory reporting laws,
these variables can be accounted for while attempting to demonstrate whether
administrative procedures lead to reduced legislative uncertainty evidenced by more
consistent reporting. From a practical standpoint, the findings from this study could alter
the way legislators approach the regular enactment of mandatory reporting laws while
also enhancing the literature regarding legislative incentives and action. Beyond the
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practical application, the findings from this study also contribute to the theoretical
foundation regarding legislative uncertainty and administrative procedures. Clear
procedures and goals, such as those aligned with administrative procedures, lead to
increased motivation, unify the goals of the agency, and demonstrate political support
(Davis & Stazyk, 2014; Huber, Shipan, & Pfahler, 2001; Pandey & Wright 2006; Rizzo,
House, & Lirtzman 1970; Stazyk, Pandey, & Wright, 2011, p. 610; Wood & Bohte, 2004;
Wright 2004). This study aims to build on this literature, further analyzing whether the
effect of administrative procedures is constant across groups or if there are additional
variables that must be considered.
Overall, this particular study provides ample opportunity to contribute to the field
of study while also offering evidence of practical significance. Examining the influence
of mandatory reporting laws from a legislative perspective allows for a new outlook on
an established policy that continues to expand. Demonstrating whether these laws lead to
the desired legislative behavior while also evaluating the behavior of bureaucrats is a
worthwhile study with potentially far-reaching consequences.
Essay 2
The second essay continues with the examination of mandatory reporting laws.
However, this study moves away from the legislative perspective that dominated the first
essay and instead examines the bureaucratic perspective in regards to the law.
Specifically, this essay examines whether mandatory reporting laws incentivize streetlevel bureaucrats to action and attempts to address why bureaucratic action differs
among professional organizations. Concentrating on these two questions leads to both
practical and theoretical implications. First, being able to confidently reply to the above
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questions is imperative for policymakers and bureaucrats in supporting their efforts to
diminish child abuse and the social consequences that follow. Second, understanding how
policies incentivize bureaucrats’ behavior and implementation is essential to lawmakers
when writing actionable policy. Finally, this study expands the theoretical perspective
surrounding principal-agent relationships and incentive systems.
Previous research demonstrates that bureaucratic agents in various settings face
challenges associated with the decision to report child abuse (Abrahams, Casey, & Daro,
1992; Ainsworth, 2002; Kalichman, 1999; Kenny, 2001; Lamond, 1989). According to
Zellman (1990a), 92% of elementary principals surveyed had encountered and reported
suspected child abuse. Similar results can be found with both social workers and law
enforcement officers (Zellman, 1990a; 1990b). While the reporting percentage is
relatively high, it still demonstrates that some targeted professionals choose not to report
suspected cases of abuse. While the commitment to reporting is evident, the appropriate
actions do not always get carried out. In an effort to improve action, bureaucrats are
mandated to report suspected abuse. However, this mandate to report does not always
result in bureaucrats reporting suspected abuse. In the case of teachers, various fears exist
which prevent teachers from reporting (Abrahams, Casey, & Daro, 1992). For example,
scholars have demonstrated that teachers lack the ability to accurately recognize child
abuse (Besharov, 1990), are not typically comfortable with reporting policies (Besharov,
1990; Kenny, 2001), and fear legal ramifications or retaliation for reporting even though
reporting immunity may be in place (Abrahams, Casey, & Daro, 1992). Due to the
inefficiency of mandatory reporting laws, legislators should look for alternative methods
for capturing improved reporting of suspected abuse. Only when teachers or other
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professional agents feel comfortable reporting suspected abuse will they overcome the
challenges of reporting.
Incentives have always played an important role in the management literature. In
the early 1960’s, Peter Clark and James Wilson (1961) introduced an incentive typology.
As conceived by the authors, when incentives align with the incentive systems of an
agency, then a favorable action is more likely. While the literature concerning incentives
has existed for some time, lawmakers often fail to associate the appropriate policy
incentives with the incentive systems within an agency. This oversight has led to the
enactment of broadly stated policies that are generically placed across agencies, such as is
the case with mandatory reporting laws. Identifying the various incentive systems that
exist between agencies may allow legislators to draft laws that then target these incentive
systems and encourage increased action. For example, recognizing that law enforcement
agents are motivated by organizational resources, encourages incentive-based policies
that provide a police department with additional resources when officers comply. Being
able to target bureaucratic agents with greater impact demonstrates the practical benefit
associated with this study in both identifying and understanding the incentive systems
associated with the examined agencies.
Finally, the second essay further examines the principal-agent relationship
between state legislators and bureaucratic agents. As discussed above, bureaucratic
agents’ incentive systems differ across agencies; obviously, these incentive systems then
differ between state lawmakers and agents. Legislators want individuals associated with
professional organizations that interact regularly with children to report suspected abuse.
Working professionals want to maintain their jobs, perform their jobs as they determine
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best, and in the case of public servants, serve those entrusted in their care. While there is
a connection between what legislators want and bureaucratic agents want when it comes
to fighting child abuse, there is also a significant gap between the organizations on how
the work is accomplished. Accounting for this variance introduces a principal-agent
relationship that requires further examination. The research within this essay identifies
the disparity between legislators and bureaucrats. By employing incentive systems, I
suggest that lawmakers have an opportunity to close the gap between what they want and
what bureaucratic agents desire. In an effort to close this gap, the research demonstrates
that legislators need to be more clear in their policy goals and further encourages
lawmakers to know the goals and incentives of bureaucratic agencies. By writing a policy
that accounts for both legislative and bureaucratic goals, state legislators have a chance to
close the principal-agent imparity in the context of child abuse reporting, thus improving
the reporting that occurs.
Important practical and theoretical implications are addressed when answering the
research questions within this essay. Overall, this study encourages further examination
of the incentive systems that exist between bureaucratic agents. By accounting for these
incentive systems, state lawmakers are in a position to enact policies that will be
implemented with increased determination. Furthermore, the study encourages additional
investigation of bureaucratic values in an effort to improve principal-agent relationships
between state legislatures and the bureaucracy. Finally, in this study, I acknowledge that
more can be done to understand the role that managers and other actors play toward
aligning legislative policies with the agent’s incentives.
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Essay 3
The final essay addresses the innovation and diffusion process within the context
of a child sex abuse (CSA) education and prevention policy known as Erin’s Law.
Moreover, this study attempts to examine the role of the policy entrepreneur toward
encouraging the innovation and diffusion of the law. Examining this specific policy leads
to both practical and theoretical implications with regards to the policy process and
introduces an innovative way to examine the influence of the policy entrepreneur.
Moreover, this essay plays an important role in connecting and molding the evolution of
child abuse policies as evaluated in the previous studies under mandatory reporting laws.
Prior to Erin’s Law, educators were given stringent requirements to report suspected
abuse but were provided only a limited amount of training. Erin’s Law reverses this
course and provides educators with valuable resources regarding: what child abuse looks
like, how to report suspected abuse, and how to teach children to protect themselves and
others from abuse. The inventiveness of this policy provides for greater education and
training to mandated reporters and requires further consideration as an advanced policy
tool which benefits the work of bureaucratic agents. Examining the innovation and rapid
diffusion of this law speaks volumes about the issues with the previous child abuse
policies and the powerful role of the policy entrepreneur. Additionally, the implications
associated with this study examine the whole of Erin’s Law over time and provide the
following advances to the literature. First, investigating the policy entrepreneur
demonstrates the value of this particular actor within a specific policy context. Second,
this study reveals both external and internal factors that influence policy innovation and
diffusion. Finally, examining the function of the policy entrepreneur encourages further
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research regarding the characteristics and actions of specific policy entrepreneurs. The
accumulation of these implications demonstrates the value of this study toward
expanding the literature of the policy process.
The policy literature is replete with discussions concerning the value of the policy
entrepreneur (Anderson, 2014; Kingdon, 1984; Mintrom, 2013). However, an in-depth
examination of a single policy entrepreneur is missing from the literature. Scholars have
noted that within the Multiple Streams Approach (MSA), the investigation of the policy
entrepreneur is the most neglected (Jones, et al., 2016). This study advances on the
disparity in the literature and examines the role of a single policy entrepreneur toward
encouraging policy innovation and diffusion in a new and inventive way. Specifically,
this study investigates Erin Merryn, a policy entrepreneur, who advocated for the
development and the diffusion of Erin’s Law across the U.S. Merryn, a former social
worker and CSA survivor employed multiple mediums to initiate and encourage the
policy innovation and diffusion of the law. Her efforts began in 2008 when she started
writing her Illinois Congressman. She initially caught the attention of Illinois State
Senator, Tim Bivins, who agreed to help Merryn further develop the law. Merryn
continued her push by publishing multiple books regarding the horrors of abuse and the
benefits associated with appropriate education. Merryn also began speaking engagements
and tours that consisted of visiting 33 states over 7 years and participating in multiple
media outlets including CNN, Oprah, and Good Morning America. Each new speaking
event allowed Merryn to grow and develop her policy network in the state. By comparing
the states which Merryn visits and develops networks, it is expected that the likelihood
for the adoption of Erin’s Law increases. Such findings would demonstrate the value of
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the policy entrepreneur when encouraging innovation and diffusion. Furthermore, this
study advances the examination of the policy entrepreneur by not relying on survey
requests for identifying the policy entrepreneur, but rather follows the actions of a single
policy entrepreneur through the entire innovation and diffusion process.
In addition to examining the function of the policy entrepreneur, I observe in this
study the other internal and external factors that influence innovation and diffusion while
also accounting for the policy entrepreneur. Building on the previous work established by
Charles Shipan and Craig Volden (2006; 2008), I investigate how bordering states,
federal funding, legislative professionalism, and the prevalence of child abuse in a state
influences the diffusion of Erin’s Law. Each of these factors in prior studies demonstrated
an effect on innovation and diffusion, and it is significant to determine if the same effect
exists with the presence of a policy entrepreneur (Shipan & Volden, 2006; 2008).
Including these additional factors is also important to the study because it provides
valuable context to the policy for each state that has been missing in previous policy
entrepreneur studies. Furthermore, having these factors in place solidifies the importance
of the policy entrepreneur as an integral part of the policy process. This finding elevates
the current literature and provides for advanced analysis of the policy process while
encouraging future research of the policy entrepreneur. Finally, including these factors
improves the methodological analysis of the study allowing for Event History Analysis
that best describes the influence of the policy entrepreneur. This innovative way of
examining the effect and value of the policy entrepreneur is different from previous
policy examinations and opens up the door for a more in-depth examination of the policy
entrepreneur.
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Defining the function of the policy entrepreneur leads to additional research that
further advances the scholastic understanding of the policy process. Based on the findings
of this study, more can be done to understand the nuances of the policy entrepreneur.
Particularly, this study and previous research demonstrate that policy entrepreneurs act to
change the status quo of policy (Mintrom, 2000; 2013). Further research is needed to
examine why policy entrepreneurs are driven to enact policy change and the influence of
this drive toward encouraging policy transformation. Moreover, as policies continue to be
advocated by single policy entrepreneurs, such as evidenced by Erin’s Law, Marsy’s
Law, and the Clery Act, more must be done to investigate the narrative that surrounds
these policies and the role it plays in the innovation and diffusion of policy. For example,
in the case of Erin’s Law, Merryn is a CSA survivor turned social worker who personally
understood what CSA looks like in the home and how it can best be taught and prevented
(Merryn, n.d.). As Merryn continued to share her story across the country, she built a
large network and saw the advancement of her policy. Better understanding the types of
policies and legislators that may be influenced by such narratives is extremely important
to the policy literature, but must first be built on the foundation laid by this study.
Conceding that the current literature surrounding the policy entrepreneur is
lacking, encourages a study such as this third essay. Examining the function of the policy
entrepreneur within the policy process provides for important theoretical and practical
implications for the field of public policy. Among these implications is the value of the
policy entrepreneur toward encouraging policy innovation and diffusion, advancing the
effect of previously studied external and internal factors, and urging further investigation
of the nuances surrounding the policy entrepreneur. This final study completes the overall
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analysis of the policy process by examining those actors who alter or encourage a new
policy for the benefit of society while pushing for policy diffusion.
Progressing Forward
As previously noted, the policy process is an important part of policy studies and
provides for a linear analysis of a given policy (Weible, 2014). Studying the individual
actors that make up this process is key toward understanding the human element of
politics. Furthermore, it demonstrates the role individuals play toward enacting policy,
implementing policy, and helping policies to diffuse over time. Employing this
dissertation, I endeavor to shine a light on the actors of policy studies by examining three
separate research questions all within the framework of the policy process and within the
context of child abuse policies. Investigating the policy process in such a way provides
for an in-depth analysis of theoretical and practical applications necessary for the future
success of policy studies, including an innovative method for studying the effect of a
single policy entrepreneur on policy diffusion. Furthermore, these individual essays build
on the foundations of previous literature and expand the academic understanding of
individual actors and the policy process.
Beyond the implications associated with this collection of studies, there are also
certain limitations that must be examined for each essay. Specifically, the first study
investigates the principal-agent relationship between state lawmakers and street-level
bureaucrats. This study demonstrates that legislators attempt to control the relationship by
executing administrative procedures. However, little is known as to why legislators turn
their attention to administrative procedures for control. Not completely understanding
this mode of control introduces some minor gaps pertaining to the factors that may
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influence the principal-agent relationship and lawmaker’s policy goals for more
consistent reporting. The second essay suffers from a similar weakness since it is difficult
to classify all the incentives and variables that motivate street-level bureaucrats. While
categorizing all the incentive systems is challenging it does not negate the fact that
incentives drive street-level bureaucrat’s behavior. Finally, the last study lacks
generalizability across multiple policy topics. Nevertheless, the findings from this study
demonstrate the value of the policy entrepreneur and encourage further examination.
Clearly, each study has its particular limitations, these concerns are discussed in greater
detail in the individual studies and in the concluding chapter. Yet, even with these
limitations, these essays still contribute to the field and further advance policy studies.
Progressing forward, I walk through the following essays examining the evolution
of child abuse reporting and protection. Beginning with mandatory reporting laws
directed at professional groups, these laws perpetually expanded in scope and coverage.
Essentially, more states adopted reporting laws targeting more professional organizations,
but little was done to demonstrate if these laws were actually effective. The first two
studies demonstrate the legislative motives that lead to the enactment of the laws, and the
incentives which determined whether the mandated bureaucrats actually followed the
law. The final essay completes the examination of the reporting laws, by investigating a
single policy entrepreneur who recognized the failure of mandatory reporting laws within
the education system and pressed for a better policy. Conceding that the effects of child
abuse are harmful, in this dissertation, I provide a culmination of practical and theoretical
reasons to better examine the current child abuse policies and their structures for the
greater protection of children.
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CHAPTER TWO: ESSAY 1: REDUCING LEGISLATIVE UNCERTAINTY
Abstract
While tediously examined, multiple facets of child abuse protection remain
unclear, even after the explosion of recent child abuse scandals. From a legislative
perspective, the obscurity surrounding child abuse reporting does not diminish. Rather,
legislators manage the uncertainty, by implementing mandatory reporting laws. With the
law in place, legislators endeavor to control agent behavior and reduce uncertainty
regarding reporting. Exploring legislative uncertainty provides additional insight into the
motives of legislators. From their first enactment, mandatory reporting laws have yet to
be examined from this legislative perspective. By employing previous literature on
administrative procedures, I argue that mandatory reporting laws reduce legislative
uncertainty by encouraging consistent reporting from specified professional groups.
Examining panel data containing 18 years of state data from the National Data Archive
on Child Abuse and Neglect, I find that education personnel respond to mandatory
reporting laws which results in more consistent reporting. Law enforcement officials’
reporting is also more consistent following the enactment of mandatory reporting, but the
consistency comes with a diminished number of reports. Finally, social workers are not
influenced by the law. These findings demonstrate important implications concerning
legislative decisions to enact a mandatory reporting law or any administrative procedure,
in that the procedure may not lead to the legislative objective.
Keywords: uncertainty, administrative procedures, mandatory reporting
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Introduction
Within the United States (U.S.), the legal opportunity to protect children from
abuse lies with state lawmakers. Legislators desire greater child protection, but legislative
uncertainty exists regarding the appropriate mechanism for protection and control
(Overholser, 1991). To demonstrate this, immediately following the Michigan State
University Nassar scandal in 2018, Michigan State Legislators drafted over 30 bills in an
attempt to better control or handle suspected child sex abuse (Carter, 2018). The large
influx in bills provides a clear example of states lawmakers uncertainty regarding the best
way to prevent child abuse. Defining legislative uncertainty, Matthew Potoski (1999),
suggests there are multiple forms of uncertainty. In the context of this study, legislatures
are faced with principal-agent uncertainty. Or in other words, the inability to discern or
control the child abuse reporting behavior and responsibilities of professional groups
(Crenshaw, Crenshaw, & Lichtenberg, 1995). To manage this uncertainty and to more
suitably perceive the reporting behavior of professional groups, lawmakers enact a
mandatory reporting law.
Policy literature is replete with examples of legislatures gaining control of
bureaucratic behavior by employing statutory efforts, as is done with mandatory reporting
laws (Huber, Shipan, & Pfahler, 2001; McCubbins, Noll, & Weingast 1987; Moe, 1989,
1990; Wood & Waterman, 1991). However, this examination from the legislator’s
perspective provides greater insight into the legislator’s motives, while affording support
regarding the legislature’s ability to control the bureaucracy. The desire for bureaucratic
control is evident in branding professional groups as mandatory reporters, as legislators
hold street-level bureaucrats accountable for the protection of children while stipulating
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the liabilities for not reporting (National Conference of State Legislatures [NCSL], 2015).
Taking action, legislators reduce their uncertainty and demonstrate greater control. While
states continue to classify professional groups as mandatory reporters, this legislative
exploit introduces an important question. “Does the enactment of a mandatory reporting
law improve legislators’ ability to control the reporting behavior of professional groups
and reduce legislators’ uncertainty?”
Examining this question thoroughly provides important insight into the policies
enacted by state legislatures. Moreover, responding to the question demonstrates
lawmakers control and ability to predict bureaucrats’ behavior and furthers the discussion
on political control, uncertainty, and administrative procedures (Huber, Shipan, &
Pfahler, 2001; Potoski, 1999; Potoski & Woods, 2001; Wood & Bothe, 2004). For
example, directing a mandatory reporting law reduces legislators’ uncertainty by ensuring
that the yearly reporting behavior of professional groups is consistent and predictable
across time. To examine if this is the case, I investigate the reporting behavior of
education personnel, law enforcement, and social workers whose agencies account for the
largest reporting parties of suspected abuse (U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, 2014). If the mandatory reporting laws work, then the yearly reporting behavior
will become consistent among the various agencies and lawmakers will better predict the
reporting of these professionals.
At this time, state lawmakers must either be confident in the effect of mandatory
reporting laws toward controlling behavior or incentivized by the need for greater control
(Huber, Shipan, & Pfahler, 2001; Wood & Waterman, 1991). The confidence in the law
is evidenced by the spread of mandatory reporting across the U.S. and the expansion of
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the law targeting other professional groups. The legislative incentive is demonstrated by
the attempt to control for negative consequences associated with abuse; social, political,
and economical (Ainsworth, 2002; Garbarino, 1997). Unfortunately, the literature
supporting the policy decision to enact mandatory reporting laws has not followed closely
enough to demonstrate whether the cause for legislative confidence is warranted.
Researchers have only recently begun to measure the effectiveness of child abuse
prevention policies. As noted by Kalichman, (1999), “To date, Lamond (1989) has
published the only empirical study of the effect of mandatory reporting legislation on
professional reporting behavior in natural environments extending beyond a single
professional setting” (p. 178).
While Lamond’s work encourages future investigations, the examination of the
law toward political objectives is still lacking. This apparent gap in the literature suggests
that it would be worthwhile to conduct a study of how legislators act to reduce
uncertainty, control bureaucratic behavior, and improve data consistency and
predictability. To investigate this legislative behavior, I observe 18 years of child abuse
reporting data gathered from law enforcement, education, and social worker professionals
across the United States. Employing Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression on panel
data, I evaluate the child abuse reporting trends from these professional groups before
and after the enactment of a mandatory reporting law. Studying these trends, I can
examine whether the legislative action reduced uncertainty and led to more consistent
reporting from these agencies across time. Expanding upon this research provides
important practical insight into the actions taken by state legislators to reduce their
uncertainty and to obtain greater control over their agents.
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Legislative Uncertainty
One of the major assumptions of this paper is that bureaucracies respond to
political control (Weingast and Moran 1983; Wood and Waterman 1994).
Acknowledging that legislative controls are imperfect and bureaucracies may act
independently (Balla 1998; Krause 1996), legislators are faced with principal-agent
uncertainty, wherein they are unclear of bureaucrats’ behavior (Burden, 2003; Potoski,
1999). While other types of uncertainty exist (Burden, 2003; Mazmanian & Sabatier,
1981; Potoski, 1999), the principal-agent relationship between the bureaucracy and state
legislatures demonstrates a dynamic and changing relationship which is salient to this
study. Researchers, such as Anthony Downs (1957), observe that uncertainty influences
politician and bureaucrat behavior, and not accounting for uncertainty leaves scholarly
assumptions flawed or incomplete (Burden, 2003; Hinich & Munger, 1995). Considering
the significance of uncertainty within politics, scholarly literature advocates for
investigating how uncertainty influences the behavior of politicians and bureaucrats
(Burden, 2003; Cioffi-Reveilla, 1998). Further research into the management of
uncertainty and the various resources available to politicians to minimize uncertainty
would also be useful from a practical standpoint.
Examining uncertainty further, Barry Burden (2003) asserts that uncertainty
permeates politics. Because of the saturation of uncertainty. Legislators are motivated to
reduce uncertainty through various actions when the cost is low (Burden, 2003).
Mandatory reporting laws have minimal enactment costs and, as will be analyzed, reduce
uncertainty for legislators. As advocated by Stanley Bach and Steven Smith (1988),
certainty is synonymous with predictability. To deliver greater predictability in reporting
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suspected child abuse, a mandatory reporting law reduces uncertainty for legislators. The
examination of rules and procedures to increase predictability and reduce uncertainty is
not new to the literature (Sinclair, 1998), but demonstrates the need for further
examination within the context of mandatory reporting laws and the effort of legislatures
to mitigate their experience of uncertainty with child abuse reporting.
Beyond employing rules and procedures as tools for managing uncertainty,
previous scholarship shows that agencies serve as uncertainty minimizers (North, 1990).
Accepting that legislatures employ agencies for this purpose helps to vindicate
lawmakers’ willingness to impose administrative procedures, such as mandatory
reporting laws, on state agencies. With this perspective, the mission of agencies is
clarified and a greater understanding of the principal-agent relationship between
legislatures and bureaucrats is revealed. Specifically, legislatures manipulate agencies to
obtain more information, attain greater control, and manage their own experience with
uncertainty. As argued by Keith Krehbiel (1991), employing agencies as uncertainty
minimizers leads to efficiency maximization (Burden, 2003). This efficiency is made
available through greater predictability of bureaucratic behavior, allowing lawmakers to
focus their attention on concerns not as predictable or as easy to control. Legislators are,
therefore, more willing to enact such laws as mandatory reporting on an increasing
number of agencies to provide greater predictability in the reports of suspected child
abuse from each agency. The role of administrative procedures and uncertainty is more
thoroughly examined below and strengthens the value of this study and the role of
uncertainty when exploring the impact of mandatory reporting laws.

32
Mandatory Reporting
Following the publication of The Battered-Child Syndrome (Kempe, Silverman,
Steele, Droegemueller, & Silver, 1962), legislation throughout the United States was
introduced to mandate that health care professionals report suspected abuse (Besharov,
1985; Nelson, 1986; Paulsen, Parker, & Adelman, 1965). Initially limited to the medical
field, mandatory reporting laws diffused across the country and broadened in scope and
coverage. The rapid diffusion demonstrated legislators’ attempt to gain greater control of
behavior through statutory efforts. (Fischer, Schimmel, & Stellman, 2003; Hogelin, 2013;
Huber, Shipan, & Pfahler 2001; Kalichman, 1999; Mathews & Kenny, 2008). To date,
the literature on child abuse reporting is limited and little attention is directed to the
effectiveness of these laws in measuring and controlling behavior. Beyond filling this
void in the literature, the evaluation of this policy is significant as it provides greater
evidence concerning the influence administrative procedures have on controlling diverse
professional organizations while reducing legislative uncertainty (Huber, Shipan, &
Pfahler, 2001; Wood & Bohte, 2004).
In 2002, Frank Ainsworth examined the effectiveness of a mandatory reporting
law for two geographical areas within Australian schools and found that the law did little
to improve child abuse reporting behavior. However, Ainsworth did uncover a political
component associated with the law. Specifically, he observed that while the reporting did
not improve, the structure and the incentives surrounding the need to control the child
welfare system progressed with increased legislative oversight. Based on this finding,
Ainsworth suggests expanded investigation of the political component of the law.
Ainsworth’s findings mimic the description of uncertainty and transaction costs described
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by Potoski (1999), who showed that Australian lawmakers faced a tradeoff to enact a
policy either to allow for discretion or to allow for control. Evidently, the lawmakers
enacted an administrative procedure for greater control and predictability while reducing
uncertainty, failing to identify a more capable policy to increase overall reporting
behavior. Accepting Ainsworth’s call for further examination, this work assesses how
mandatory reporting laws serve a political purpose for state lawmakers. Particularly,
mandatory reporting laws statutorily offer greater control of bureaucratic behavior while
reducing state legislatures’ uncertainty regarding child abuse reporting. Advancing the
findings from this study will provide further insight into the legislative motives applied
when enacting policy.
Applying Theodore Lowi’s (1972) policy typology, mandatory reporting laws fall
under the definition of a regulatory policy. Lowi (1972) describes regulatory policies as
“one of several ways governments seek to control society and individual conduct” (p.
299). Recognizing that some professional groups interact regularly with children in the
community, state legislatures enact mandatory reporting policies to encourage consistent
reporting and reduce uncertainty (Ellis, Davis, & Rummery, 1999; Meyers & Vorsanger,
2007). When legislators choose not to implement mandatory reporting, states are left
without access to the networks and community relationships available through the streetlevel bureaucrats (Smith & Donovan, 2003; Weissert, 1994). Missing these relationships
amplifies uncertainty to a level not acceptable for state legislatures, thus incentivizing
legislators to limit bureaucratic discretion by mandating the reporting of suspected abuse
(Krehbiel, 1991). Additionally, not explicitly requiring certain professional groups to
report child abuse carries certain risks to state legislatures and the state, including limited
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accountability and liability for not reporting, adverse health effects, deleterious media or
publicity, and negative legal outcomes for the state (Aber, Allen, Carlson & Cicchetti,
1989; Glaser, 2000; Smith & Thornberry, 1995; Straus, 2001). Such risks incentivize
state legislators toward greater control over their agents’ reporting behavior. This study
then explores whether a mandatory reporting law provides the control sought by
lawmakers.
James Wilson (1980) observed that regulatory policies are enacted when a
particular governing body recognizes that the benefits of a policy are greater than the
associated economic and transactional costs (Wilson, 1989; Wood & Bohte, 2004).
Policies with significant reach are widely distributive in their costs and benefits to the
people of the state. As child abuse becomes more prevalent in the media, state
legislatures are encouraged to protect both the economic and non-economic status of the
state and its agencies (Lupia & McCubbin, 1994; Spence, 1997). To provide this
protection, legislatures are incentivized to control the bureaucracy. For example,
following the Jerry Sandusky scandal at Pennsylvania State University and the associated
$171.5 million loss in revenue, Pennsylvania lawmakers enacted mandatory reporting
policies targeting higher education professionals to mitigate future economic costs and
the loss of benefits to people within the state (CNN, 2015; Schackner, 2013). Ultimately,
state lawmakers want greater control and predictability over reporting behavior to reduce
asymmetrical information, having this assurance decreases legislative uncertainty and
reduces the associated costs (Huber, Shipan, & Pfahler, 2001). Whether mandatory
reporting offers the desired protection has yet to be determined; therefore, it is required to
investigate legislative uncertainty within the context of mandatory reporting laws.
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Theory and Hypotheses
Previous scholarship calls for a study of mandatory reporting policies and
uncertainty from various frameworks and within a political context (Ainsworth, 2002;
Anderson, 2014; Burden, 2003; Mathews & Kenny, 2008). Employing the theoretical
concepts of administrative procedures and political control, I investigate the efficacy of
mandatory reporting policies from the perspective of state lawmakers attempting to
reduce their uncertainty. I argue that legislators stipulate professional groups as
mandatory reporters, in order to introduce administrative procedures and encourage
individual bureaucrats toward more consistent reporting (Balla, 1998). Employing panel
data, I examine whether the legislative action taken through administrative procedures
leads to the preferred change. Further development of this theory affords greater insight
into the relationship between administrative procedures and the reduction of legislative
uncertainty through increased bureaucratic control.
Administrative Procedures
Public administration scholarship demonstrates that administrative procedures
typically lead to greater bureaucratic control (Balla, 1998; Bawn, 1995; Moe, 1989;
McCubbins, Noll, & Weingast, 1987; Potoski; 1999). Moreover, Dan Wood and John
Bohte (2004) suggest that administrative procedures are designed to maximize future
political benefits and minimize transaction costs. Within the context of this study,
mandatory reporting laws function as a case examination of administrative procedures’
capacity to mitigate legislative uncertainty and provide legislators greater control. The
type of administrative procedure applied by legislatures is dependent upon the type of
uncertainty or cost experienced by legislators (Banks & Weingast, 1992; Potoski, 1999;
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Wood & Waterman, 1994). According to Potoski’s (1999) categorization of
administrative procedures, mandatory reporting laws are labeled as “fire-alarm”
procedures (p. 627). Such procedures allow legislators to obtain key information or
outputs from agents to enforce directives and reduce legislative uncertainty and
transaction costs while managing behavior (McCubbins & Schwartz, 1984). When a
mandatory reporting law is directed at any professional group, legislatures have enacted a
fire-alarm procedure to better control the number of reports garnered by a specific agency
over time. The challenge of this study is to examine whether a mandatory reporting law
actually alters bureaucratic behavior and leads to the legislators’ desired outcome of more
consistent reporting. This paper measures the child abuse reporting data before and after
the enactment of a mandatory reporting law to reveal the effect of the law.
Furthermore, the literature suggests that administrative procedures serve as an
effective mechanism for acquiring key information which reduces asymmetry and
provides improved monitoring (Bawn, 1995; McCubbins, Noll, & Weingast; 1987;
McCubbins & Schwartz, 1984; Potoski, 1999). When bureaucrats choose not to report
suspected abuse, lawmakers are left without information leading to increased transaction
costs for legislators (Wood & Bohte, 2004). To mitigate the transaction costs associated
with the consequences of child abuse, legislators employ the administrative procedure of
mandatory reporting laws as a way to observe and predict the prevalence of suspected
abuse over time. With mandatory reporting policies in place, state legislators can monitor
the reports from each agency and threaten action when reports do not align with
expectations for a given year. By employing mandatory reporting policies, state
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legislators attempt to reduce their uncertainty regarding reporting behaviors and also
signal the policy goal that consistent and predictable reporting over time is expected.
The value of policy goals is not lost on the public sector or within public
administration scholarship (Brewer & Selden 2000; Rodgers & Hunter 1992; Wilk &
Redmon, 1990; Wright, 2004). Organizational theory has long suggested that clear goals
supported by administrative procedures enhance both organizational and individual
performance (Chun & Rainey 2005a, 2005b; Davis & Stazyk, 2014; Jung 2012, 2013;
Jung & Lee, 2013; Locke & Latham 2002; Pandey & Rainey 2006; Taylor 2013; Wright
2004). Public administration literature proposes that clear procedures and goals are
significant for at least three reasons. First, clearly defined goals, procedures, and statutes
serve as motivation for bureaucrats (Huber, Shipan, & Pfahler, 2001; Locke & Latham,
2002; Wood & Waterman, 1994). Second, goals unite the organization and the agent in a
common cause, helping the agent understand the legislatures’ expectations associated
with the procedure (Pandey & Wright 2006; Rizzo, House, & Lirtzman 1970; Stazyk,
Pandey, & Wright, 2011, p. 610; Wright 2004). Finally, clear goals demonstrate political
support, whereas goal ambiguity displays unsupportive political associations (Davis &
Stazyk, 2014; Stazyk, Pandey, & Wright 2011; Wright 2001, 2004). Investigating
legislative goals and procedures within the context of mandatory reporting, it is apparent
that reporting procedures for professional groups motivate, encourage, and support
bureaucrats. In addition to incentivizing the desired behavior, clear procedures may also
reduce principal-agent uncertainty by encouraging greater consistency in reporting
suspected child abuse each year.
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Lawmakers have demonstrated the capacity to employ political goals that
motivate or inspire bureaucratic action (Golden, 2000; Locke & Latham, 1990; Wood &
Waterman, 1994). These goals are particularly influential when bureaucrats are
committed to the goal (Wright, 2001). While the definition of commitment is in itself
unclear, the literature suggests that mandatory reporters demonstrate an obligation to
mandatory reporting policies and procedures. For example, Nadine Abrahams and
colleagues (1992) conducted a random sample of teachers and discovered that 90% of the
educators had reported suspected incidences of abuse and were committed to doing so
again. Additional studies demonstrated that 67% of human service professionals,
including social workers, supported or strongly supported current mandatory reporting
policies and that only 13% rejected these policies in favor of an alternative procedure
(Delaronde, King, Bendel, & Reece, 2000). While street-level bureaucrats may differ in
their implementation and perception of mandatory reporting, it is reassuring to witness
that bureaucrats within two of the three major reporting groups claim they are committed
to the policy. Utilizing this commitment to child abuse reporting, lawmakers employ
reporting policies to motivate bureaucratic action and mitigate legislative uncertainty
regarding reporting behaviors.
Applying mandatory reporting policies, state legislatures enact a strict top-down
procedure with the intention of reducing the legislative uncertainty associated with
reporting suspected abuse. Clarifying the policy, lawmakers send an unmistakable
message that they expect street-level bureaucrats to report. With this message, lawmakers
strengthen the bureaucrats’ commitment, as discussed above, while increasing outside
support for the procedure. As suggested by Matland (1995), “In top-down models, goal
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clarity is an important independent variable that directly affects policy success” (p. 157).
Enacting a policy in such a direct manner, state legislatures employ administrative
procedures to reduce principal-agent uncertainty while rallying support from beneficial
organizations or groups (Balla, 1998; Potoski, 1999). Having reduced principal-agent
uncertainty, legislators realize political success in the realm of mandatory reporting and
in obtaining greater bureaucratic control. Additionally, using stringent administrative
procedures, such as mandatory reporting policies, legislatures mitigate their transaction
costs and instead distribute these costs to the bureaucrats now responsible with
implementing the reporting procedure (Balla, 1998; Potoski, 1999; Wood & Bohte,
2004).
Finally, street-level bureaucrats and agencies rely on political support as a signal
of agency success and performance (Davis & Stazyk, 2014; Stazyk & Goerdel, 2010;
Stazyk, Pandey, & Wright, 2011). Clear legislative procedures regarding bureaucrats’
reporting responsibilities, I argue, demonstrates political support and direction for
bureaucrats. In addition to demonstrating support for the policy, the moral aspect of
mandatory reporting policies garners political unity between lawmakers and agents.
Employing “morality politics,” the literature advocates that legislatures encourage
specific directives and guidance for reducing their uncertainty (Meier, 1994, 1999; Sharp,
2005; Davis & Stazyk, 2014). In an effort to reduce uncertainty further and gain greater
political control, state lawmakers are incentivized to enact administrative procedures,
such as mandatory reporting laws. I argue that these administrative procedures alter
behavior and result in more predictable and consistent reporting from the various
professional groups. As discussed previously, having consistent and predictable reporting
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from bureaucratic agents’ functions as a political advantage for state lawmakers, since
mandatory reporting laws reduce legislators’ burdens associated with variability in child
abuse reporting, while also decreasing the attention directed at predicting and preventing
child abuse in a state. Based on the above, I hypothesize:
H1: Following the enactment of an administrative procedure (mandatory
reporting law), state legislatures receive more consistent reporting from Law
Enforcement Officers.
H2: Following the enactment of an administrative procedure (mandatory
reporting law), state legislatures receive more consistent reporting from Education
Professionals.
H3: Following the enactment of an administrative procedure (mandatory
reporting law) state legislatures receive more consistent reporting from Social Workers.
Methodology
Data Collection and Key Variables
The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services supports the National Data
Archive on Child Abuse and Neglect (NDACAN).2 This dataset contains the state child
abuse reporting dating from 1990 through 2008.3 By observing the reporting trend of
each professional group before and after the enactment of the administrative procedure, I

2

The analyses presented in this publication were based on data from the National Child Abuse and Neglect
Data System (NCANDS) State File. These data were provided by the National Data Archive on Child
Abuse and Neglect at Cornell University, and have been used with permission. The data were originally
collected under the auspices of the Children’s Bureau. Funding was provided by the Children’s Bureau,
Administration on Children, Youth and Families Administration for Children and Families, U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services. The collector of the original data, the funding agency,
NDACAN, Cornell University, and the agents or employees of these institutions bear no responsibility for
the analyses or interpretations presented here. The information and opinions expressed reflect solely the
opinions of the authors.
3
Excluding Maryland where reports are only available from 2000 to 2008.
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can examine the consistency of reporting that occurs by law enforcement, education
personnel, and social workers. When the reporting trend becomes more consistent or
predictable, legislative uncertainty regarding reporting decreases. I choose these three
professional groups for examination because these agencies account for 46% of all child
abuse reporting and are the three largest reporting parties typically targeted by mandatory
reporting laws. Specifically, law enforcement officials account for 18% of suspected
child abuse reports followed by education personnel at 17% and social workers at 11%
(U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2014, p. 9). Each of these professional
groups’ reports of suspected abuse serves as the dependent variable for the model
specified at their group. Effectively, if the number of reports by these specific agencies
becomes more consistent or predictable following the enactment of the law, then the
hypotheses are validated. Table 2.1 provides a summary of the data for these dependent
variables.
Table 2.1:
Descriptive Statistics of Reports by Law Enforcement, Education
Personnel, and Social Workers of Suspected Abuse Cases Per 100,000
Variable
Law
Enforcement

Observations

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

409.409

193.551

49.618

1805.073

Education
Personnel

855.000

439.192

175.295

4.739

1716.661

Social Workers

847.000

295.870

191.124

1.495

1322.492

854.000

Source: Compiled using the National Child Abuse and Neglect Data System State Level Data
(NCANDS) Summary Data Component, 1990-2008

The year in which each state enacted a specific mandatory reporting law is
accumulated using three sources. The Child Welfare Information Gateway (2016)
recently published all of the states which have mandatory reporting laws and the specific
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professions associated with the reports. This information is then compared to data
provided by the NCSL (2015) to ensure that there are no discrepancies concerning the
professionals who are defined as mandatory reporters. Conducting a Thomson Reuters
Westlaw database search, I discovered the year each state added either law enforcement
agents, school officials, or social workers to its mandatory reporting law.4 Employing the
year in which a mandatory reporting law is enacted, I am able to insert the intervention
into the model which serves as an interaction effect between the number of reports over
time and the year of the intervention. This interaction effectively demonstrates the change
in both the slope and intercept of the number of reports by the professional group
following the intervention or enactment of the law. By examining the change in slope
following the placement of the administrative procedures, I identify whether the reporting
becomes more consistent from year to year which reduces the legislative uncertainty
associated with child abuse reporting. Applying this methodology allows for a clean
examination of the stated hypotheses and clarifies the reporting consistency from each
group over time.
Panel Data and the Effect of an Event
To test my hypotheses, I employ panel data to estimate the effect of the event as
described by Paul Allison (1994). Analyzing the results, I determine if the enactment of
the mandatory reporting law leads to more consistent reporting. With more consistent
reporting, state legislators experience less uncertainty. Using panel data is relevant
because I can examine the effect of the event while reducing the limitations of
autocorrelation and multicollinearity evident in time-series examinations (Allison, 1994).

4

See Appendix A – Table A.1 State and Year of Mandatory Reporting Law Enactment
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In this case, the enactment of a mandatory reporting law is a punctuating event which is
expected to impact child abuse reporting following the intervention. I employ the
following linear notation with an interaction effect as recommended by Allison (1994):
Yit = μ0 + μ1Time + δ1Interventionit + δ2InterventionitTime + δ3wit + αi + ϵit
Where Yit is equal to the dependent variable of reported suspected child abuse
cases for a specific professional group (i) in each year (t). Employing μ, I establish the
slope and the intercept pre- the intervention. I then allow for a different intercept for each
point in time (μ1). I utilize a dummy variable (intervention) for the year in which the state
enacted the law. Doing so provides an estimate, (δ1), that exhibits the direct effect of the
intervention (enactment of the law) on the dependent variable, or the change in intercept
caused by the intervention, across the data. I then include an interaction term of time and
the intervention, where the estimate δ2 estimates the change in slope post-intervention.
This interaction, therefore, accounts for the change in the slope and the intercept
following the interruption. Together these interactions offer important detail concerning
the effect the mandatory reporting law has on the number of reports from one of the
specified professional groups. Moreover, varying the intercept and the slope, the standard
errors of the model are improved which accounts for a more accurate test of statistical
significance. As established in the equation, I assume a fixed-effects model, where αi
indicates fixed-effects at the state level. Introducing a varying slope and intercept model,
while accounting for random and fixed effects, offers an enhanced description of the
change in the intercept where the intervention has occurred while accounting for a change
in the slope pre and post the intervention. The model includes covariates, wit that are
defined below and vary for both state and time, while ϵ serves as the error term.
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Introducing control variables ensures that the relationship between the main independent
and dependent variables is appropriately isolated. This model is then estimated using
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. Using the statistical package Stata, I estimate the
model employing the defined equation. Conducting this procedure, I analyze the data in
order to respond to the stated hypotheses and determine whether mandatory reporting
laws ensure that the reporting behavior of street-level bureaucrats becomes more
predictable over time, therefore reducing legislative uncertainty.
Applying panel data as suggested by Allison may result in a more accurate model,
but there are inherent weaknesses with panel data. First, autocorrelation is a problem
when the model undertakes repeated events (Alison, 1994). However, this weakness is
also found in time series events (Lewis-Beck, 1986, p. 227). While not ignoring the issue,
the model I propose only accounts for a single event for each state, reducing the
likelihood of autocorrelation. Additionally, varying the slope and the intercept of the
model utilizes an interaction effect and alleviates the issues associated with
autocorrelation. Furthermore, introducing random and fixed effects alters the way the
standard errors are estimated and improves the model. While autocorrelation and
multicollinearity impact the estimation of the standard errors and the subsequent
coefficients, these influences are mitigated by correctly specifying the model based on
key variables. Finally, the interaction terms are likely to introduce multicollinearity, but
the result of this is an overestimation of the standard errors, making it a more difficult test
of the hypotheses and improving the validity of the model and the subsequent results.
Beyond the statistical limitations of the model described above there are
shortcomings with the design of the model. By observing the change in the slope of
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reports for all the states post the intervention the timing for successful implementation
may be in question. While 18 years of data are studied, some of the states which adopted
the law have only done so recently. This may exclude these states from having enough
time to implement the law and would result in a minimal effect post the adoption of the
law. To mitigate the issue a second model set is run for each professional group. For this
model, the change in reports is observed for those states which have always had the
mandatory reporting law in place compared to those states which have never had the law
in place. Examining the model, those states that have always had the law have had 18
years to implement the law. As hypothesized, states that have always had the law should
then have more consistent reporting where those who have never adopted the law should
have more extreme changes in reporting from year to year.
To ensure model accuracy and better understand the dependent variables’ effect
on reducing uncertainty, control variables are included. These variables remain constant
throughout the estimation of the model and isolate the effect of the mandatory reporting
law. Beyond serving a statistical purpose, the variables coincide with important top-down
assumptions, associated with administrative procedures and socioeconomic conditions. In
that, these socioeconomic conditions, “are some of the principal exogenous variables
affecting the policy outputs of implementation agencies and ultimately the attainment of
statutory objectives” (Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1981, p. 16). Acknowledging that
socioeconomic conditions affect reporting behaviors improves the model by
demonstrating the influence of the reporting law toward decreasing legislative uncertainty
and obtaining bureaucratic control.
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Socioeconomic variables examined include the violent crime rate per population
of each state. State violent crime rates are a proxy for local community violence which
influences a legislator’s perception of crime or abuse (Warr, 2000). Conversely, violent
crime may also serve as a cultural identity. As an established identity, legislators feel less
inclined toward protecting a particular group or ensuring that reports are received
(Dupuis, 1995). The legislator’s attention is turned to correcting the uncertainty
associated with violent crime rather than uncertainty regarding the reporting of child
abuse. Furthermore, Claudia Coulton and her associates (1995) find a relationship
between the minority population of a community and the prevalence of child abuse.
Because of the frequency of abuse among a particular race, street-level bureaucrats may
choose not to report abuse stemming from a certain race and, therefore, the law would do
little to control their behavior (Hampton & Newberger, 1985).
Beyond outside environmental influences, family factors within the home may
also affect whether a child is abused and if that abuse is eventually reported. For
example, Bill Gillham et al. (1998), find that there is a relationship between the poverty
rate (percent of individuals within the population of a state living below the federal
poverty line) and the number of child abuse cases in the community. The literature also
demonstrates that stressful situations such as unemployment typically leads to higher
levels of poverty and increases the likelihood that a child will experience abuse or neglect
(Gelles & Cavanaugh, 2009). In addition to unemployment, the actual make-up of the
home also influences child abuse and reporting. Research conducted by Jocelyn Brown,
Patricia Cohen, Jeffrey Johnson, and Suzanne Salzinger (1998) uncovers that children
born to teen mothers and mothers with less than a high school education are more
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susceptible to child abuse. While teen childbirth does not cause abuse, the hardships,
financial risks, and overall stress of being a teen parent cultivates an environment where
abuse and neglect may occur (Zuravin, 1988; Zuravin, 1989).
To the greatest extent possible, I want to isolate the effect of the mandatory
reporting law, and its influence toward controlling the behavior of street-level bureaucrats
(law enforcement, education personnel, and social workers) while holding all else
constant.5 Accounting for these controls, I can better examine variables which influence
my model while isolating the effect of my independent variable on the dependent
variables. This serves to limit the inference to more than a correlation between time and
any subsequent increase in reports.
Results
Conducting this study utilizing panel data, the model reveals the reporting trend
of various professional groups following the enactment of a mandatory reporting law.
Table 2.2 below and Table A.3 in the Appendix provide a summary of the final results for
each of the models.6 Examining the effect of a mandatory reporting law explicitly
directed toward law enforcement officials (Model 1), the results do support Hypothesis 1.
Over time, child abuse reports garnered by law enforcement agents continue to increase
on a steep incline (b = 29.12). Following the enactment of the law, the reporting
coefficient is negative and demonstrates that law enforcement reporting decreases with
the law’s enactment (b = -3.93, p < .105; R2 = .8943). More particularly, the trend of
reporting becomes flat as can be seen in Figure 2.1. The flattening of the reporting trend
demonstrates that when mandatory reporting is directed at law enforcement officers,

5
6

See Appendix A – Table A.2 Descriptive Statistics
See Appendix A – Table A.3
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these officers become more consistent or predictable in their reporting on a year to year
basis. Examining the model in Table A.3, the results are further supported. In that, states
which have always had the law in place remain constant in their reporting with minimal
change from year to year (b = 2.85, p > .10; R2 = .9051). However, those states which
have never adopted the law increase in reporting at a significant level each year (b =
19.069, p < .01; R2 = .8980). These findings further demonstrate that states which have
enacted the law reap the benefits of more consistent reporting. With consistent
bureaucratic behavior, lawmakers have a better understanding of the reporting tendencies
of these agents over time. Therefore, the legislative uncertainty associated with reporting
from this professional group is reduced as legislators have obtained greater control.

Figure 2.1:

Law Enforcement Mandatory Reporting Trends
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Evaluating education personnel (Model 2), the results suggest a similar effect to
that experienced by law enforcement but in a different direction. Historically, education
personnel have reduced their reporting of suspected cases of child abuse from year to
year (b = -39.70243, p < .10; R2 = .8938). However, with the enactment of the mandatory
reporting law directed at education personnel this decline is tempered (b = 4.28, p < .01).
While reporting continues to decline each year, the rate at which the reporting occurs is
more consistent with the mandatory reporting law in place. Therefore, Hypothesis 2 is
also supported, in that, the enactment of a mandatory reporting law reduces legislative
uncertainty regarding the number of reports garnered from education personnel.
Investigating those states which have always had the law or never had the law, the results
suggest a similar conclusion. Specifically, states which have always had the law
experience less of decline in reporting from year to year (b = -6.500, p < .01; R2 = .8431)
while states that never had the law decrease at a much more significant rate each year (b
= -14.630, p < .01; R2 = .9423). Having reduced legislative uncertainty, the mandatory
reporting policy fulfills its legislative purpose in garnering reports from education
personnel.
Observing the behavior of social workers (Model 3), the results suggest their
reporting behavior is not influenced by a mandatory reporting law or time (b = -0.993, p
> .10; R2 = .8511). Rather social workers with or without mandatory reporting policies
continue to reliably report a similar amount of cases each year (b = 2.594, p > .10).
Examining states which have always had the law or never had the law, the results are the
same (b = -1.617, p > .10; R2 = .8553; b = 6.925, p > .10; R2 = .8584). Therefore, state
legislators should have little uncertainty regarding the reporting behaviors of social
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workers as the procedure does not encourage any more consistency, but maintains
reporting at a fairly steady non-adjusting level from year to year. Because of this,
legislatures should be less inclined to enact a mandatory reporting law toward social
workers but do anyway in an attempt to demonstrate control. However, evaluating Table
2.2, it appears social workers are affected more heavily than the other professional groups
by socioeconomic factors in the state, this includes violent crime, teen pregnancy, high
school dropout, and unemployment rates. While these results do not support Hypothesis
3, they do deserve further examination, especially considering that each of the variables
may also influence a state legislator’s level of uncertainty regarding reporting behavior.
Table 2.2:

Reporting Behavior for All States
Number of reports
Number of reports
from Law
from Education
Enforcement Agents
Personnel - Model 1
Model 2
Change in Intercept
at point of
29.122
-39.702†
intervention δ1Xit
(46.574)
(21.672)
Slope Pre10.688**
-10.997**
Intervention μ1t1
(2.727)
(2.162)
Interaction: Change
in slope post
-3.926
4.283**
intervention δ2Xit
(2.954)
(1.103)
Violent Crime Rate
0.214*
-0.267**
(0.082)
(0.065)
Number of Reports
from Law
-0.557**
Enforcement
Officials
-(0.055)
Number of reports
0.114*
0.241**
from Social Workers
(0.047)
(0.056)

Number of reports
from Social
Workers - Model 3

1.547
(26.082)
-0.993
(3.454)
2.594
(1.696)
0.299**
(0.067)
0.170†
(0.081)
---
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Number of reports
from Education
Personnel

0.647**

--

0.437**

Teen Pregnancy Rate

(0.085)
-0.335
(1.654)

-4.389*
(1.797)

(0.104)
-3.474†
(1.945)

High School Dropout Rate

11.398*

0.042

-17.096**

(2.240)
-7.427†
(3.941)
-0.046
(0.109)
0.8938

(5.290)
12.416*
(4.826)
-0.056
(0.105)
0.8511

(3.950)
5.279
(4.214)
Victims Male
-0.184*
(0.082)
2
R
0.8943
Note: N = 488; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, † p < 0.10;
Standard errors in parenthesis
Fixed effects are included but not displayed
Unemployment Rate

Discussion
Following the explosion of child abuse scandals within the last decade, states
have been left reeling from the social and economic costs that are attached (Fang, Brown,
Florence, & Mercy, 2012; Wang & Holton, 2007). Beyond these costs, simply
understanding and defining child abuse has been challenging to all levels of government
(Cicchetti & Manly, 2001). Recognizing the negative impacts of child abuse, lawmakers
are confronted with the need to understand, control, and manage the problems associated
with child abuse. Because of the uncertainties attached to child abuse reporting,
lawmakers accumulate transaction costs. As defined, by Wood and Bohte (2004),
transaction costs are typically nonmonetary costs that arise with the challenges of
obtaining information, controlling the bureaucracy, or not being able to alter policy (p.
183). In light of this, I argue that mandatory reporting laws are established to reduce
transaction costs and legislative uncertainty regarding the number of reports received by
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certain professional groups. The fact that these laws are so broadly distributed to multiple
agencies without consideration for professional roles, makes this examination of
uncertainty and political control more significant.
Examining child abuse reporting data from 1990-2008, the results suggest that
mandatory reporting laws have a contrasting effect on the behaviors of street-level
bureaucrats. Investigating street-level bureaucrats’ response to the mandatory reporting
policy further provides for an illuminating set of findings for each professional group.
Specifically, a mandatory reporting law encourages education personnel to increase in
their reporting. However, educators on a yearly basis diminish in their reporting of
suspected abuse (Jones & Finkelhor, 2001). While the mandatory reporting law
attenuates this steep falloff, the law is not strong enough to reverse the decline and
encourage an increase in reporting. This finding suggests that more can be done to
encourage educators to increase reporting and to further reduce legislative uncertainty.
Conversely, law enforcement agents continue to increase in their reporting on a
yearly basis (Wang & Daro, 1998). While a mandatory reporting law provides greater
reporting consistency from law enforcement officers, the law also results in a decrease in
the number of reports received from this specific group. This adverse effect may lead to
potential cases of child abuse going unreported, which could cause greater harm to the
state (Fang, Brown, Florence, & Mercy, 2012; Wang & Holton, 2007). At this time, it is
not clear why the mandatory reporting law leads to a decrease in the yearly reports.
However, one possible explanation is discussed below.
A mandatory reporting law to some extent improves the reporting behavior of
teachers. Having increased the reporting from other professional groups, the potential
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reporting opportunities or the size of the reporting pie may have decreased. A closer look
at the data and it appears that reporting from law enforcement agents and education
personnel mirror each other since, reporting from education personnel decreases at a
similar rate that reporting from law enforcement officials is increasing. Additionally, the
increase in reporting that education personnel experience from a mandatory reporting law
mirrors the decrease experienced by law enforcement officials. This finding may imply
that the child abuse reporting is shared between law enforcement and education personnel
and that a mandatory reporting law wrestles some reports away from law enforcement
and manifests itself in reports by education personnel. While mandatory reporting laws
have decreased legislative uncertainty regarding the consistency of reports, in regards to
the actual reporting; all the law has done is slightly alter a small amount of reporting from
one professional group to another.
Finally, mandatory reporting laws do little to influence the consistency of
reporting by social workers. The social work literature reveals that choosing to become a
social worker serves as a way to reject the “value of everyday life” (Pearson, 1973, p.
223) or to work as a “political deviant” (Christie & Kruk, 1998, p. 22). In other words,
social workers are not influenced by the requests of legislative requirements. Rather
social workers perform based on their ability to achieve optimal service for the families
entrusted in their care (Fox & Dingwall, 1985) or because they enjoy the autonomy of
being able to work in a way they see as best for the client (Hackman & Lawler, 1971;
Vinzant, 1998). Choosing to report may disrupt a social worker’s ability to care for the
child in the way they perceive as optimal (Kalichman, 1999). A recent study found that
social workers do not respond well to statutory duties; specifically, the researchers
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uncovered that statutory mandates directed at social workers led to increased levels of
stress, burnout, and job dissatisfaction, undermining any inclination to obey the statutory
obligation (Evans, Huxley, Webber, Katona, Gately, Mears, ... & Kendall, 2005).
Moreover, the decision to report brings with it the added burden of a heavier caseload.
Research demonstrates that social workers are preoccupied with reducing their heavy
caseloads and with increasing their own autonomy (Zellman & Antler, 1990).
Minimizing their workload, social workers continue to report at a consistent level with no
incentive to increase their reporting behavior beyond what is already occurring.
This discovery of social worker shirking is supported by multiple theoretical
frameworks. As demonstrated by John Brehm and Scott Gates (1999) much of the
principal-agent dilemma is witnessed within social work. For example, the authors find
that social workers often participate in subordinate sabotage, where “bending the rules” is
considered acceptable in an effort to get the work done (p. 124). In the case of child
abuse reporting, it is considered suitable to not report the suspected abuse, if it is believed
that enhanced care can be provided without reporting. Furthermore, the incentive
structures for social workers often do not encourage additional reporting. As also
expressed by Brehm and Gates (1999), social workers believe that they are rewarded for
meeting the needs of the clients. If in their professional perspective, reporting does not
meet this requirement, then social workers are not likely to engage in the reporting of
suspected abuse.
As shown, lawmakers’ decision to enact a mandatory reporting law directed
toward a professional group does decrease legislators’ uncertainty regarding the reporting
behavior of some bureaucrats. However, these laws come with unintended consequences,
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and for some agencies they fail to make any change. If state lawmakers better understand
the reporting trends and effects of mandatory reporting laws on professional groups, they
may be able to tailor policies that reduce their transaction costs and uncertainty toward
reporting. In addition to reducing their own costs, with a clearer outlook on the effect of
their policymaking, state lawmakers may enact a change that has a greater influence
mitigating the consequences of child abuse.
Implications and Future Research
Mandatory reporting laws continue to evolve across the U.S. as state legislatures
employ these policies to reduce transaction costs and uncertainty. Using 18 years of child
abuse reporting data, I investigated from the perspective of state legislatures the reporting
behaviors of three professional groups. This examination led to two valuable conclusions
regarding reporting laws and uncertainty among legislators. First, mandatory reporting
laws do not universally result in the intended consequence that legislatures seek.
Examining the results of this study, it is evident that mandatory reporting laws only
reduce legislative uncertainty in some cases. The inclusion of the law encourages more
consistent reporting from both education and law enforcement professionals. However,
the reduction in reporting from law enforcement carries additional unintended
consequences. If law enforcement officers are not reporting as much abuse, this suggests
that cases of child abuse are going ignored or completely missed. Accepting these
findings, it is evident that the policy objectives of legislatures differ from the public
intent of the policy, since legislatures are enacting child abuse, sexual abuse, or other
reporting policies the legislative intent is not to prevent the deviant behavior or increase
the reporting, but instead, the intent is to encourage more predictable and controlled
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reporting behavior. Reducing the legislators’ transaction cost is the priority even though
there are future costs associated with missed cases of abuse that could potentially lead to
greater experiences or forms of uncertainty.
The second conclusion is that other incentives beyond mandates may influence a
street-level bureaucrat’s choice to report suspected child abuse. This finding implies at
least two future research questions. First, what professional factors or incentives
encourage policy compliance or implementation when reporting fails? Second, why does
a policy incentive, such as a mandatory reporting law, work for one group of street-level
bureaucrats and not another? For example, why do law enforcement agents report more
suspected cases of abuse than teachers when the same legal obligation exists. Examining
the data within this paper from the perspective of the street-level bureaucrats and their
incentives would provide important information concerning the bureaucratic response to
policy. Additionally, this type of investigation might indicate how policies can be molded
to better influence the actions of a particular professional group. Having a clearer
understanding of the reporting incentives might improve legislation and reduce legislative
uncertainty and transactions costs, all while increasing child abuse awareness and
prevention. Overall, future research addressing these questions could improve the
implementation process while guiding current and future policymakers.
While the effectiveness of mandatory reporting laws has been questioned in the
literature (Ainsworth, 2002; Bell & Tooman, 1994; Besharov, 1990; Lamond, 1989;
Mathews, & Kenny, 2008), little has been done to explore the political purpose of these
policies from a legislative perspective and within the framework of uncertainty and
administrative procedures. This study addresses this concern and demonstrates that
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mandatory reporting laws function as a method for reducing legislative uncertainty
regarding the reporting behavior of certain professional groups while demonstrating
political control. Acknowledging the importance of professional roles and incentives,
additional research must be conducted to identify what influences the policy
implementation efforts of street-level bureaucrats and how policymakers can employ this
information to their advantage in combatting the effects of child abuse in the U.S.
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CHATER THREE: ESSAY 2: INCENTIVES AND STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRATS
Abstract
Child abuse reporting policies continue to expand both in scope and practice.
With the diffusion of these laws, it is important to understand whether the mandatory
reporting laws work while analyzing how the response to these laws differs across
professions. Employing an incentive system typology, I determine if the incentive
systems of law enforcement, education personnel, and social workers align with the
policy incentives of a mandatory reporting law. These professional groups are important
to analyze because they account for the largest reporting groups in the U.S. and vary by
professional roles. Investigating 18 years of child reporting data from the National Data
Archive on Child Abuse and Neglect, I find that the reporting response of these
professional groups differs. Specifically, law enforcement and social workers do not
respond to the reporting law and continue to report on the same positive trend with or
without the law in place. Education personnel, on the other hand, do respond positively to
a reporting law since the law attenuates the negative decline of reporting currently
experienced by educators. These findings demonstrate the value in designing policies
which align with incentive systems of bureaucrats.

Keywords: incentive systems, bureaucrats, mandatory reporting
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Introduction
Child abuse prevention laws in the form of mandatory reporting have diffused
across the United States (U.S.) over the last 50 years. Often these laws target specific
professional groups to incentivize increased reporting behavior. The expansion of these
laws in scope introduces an important question. Do mandatory reporting laws increase
reporting from street-level bureaucrats (education personnel, law enforcement, and
social workers)? Furthermore, research consistently demonstrates a variance in the
reporting behavior and experiences of educators and social workers (Zellman, 1990a).
This inconsistency in reporting leads to additional questions worth examining. Why and
how do the reporting behaviors differ among the various bureaucrats? Confidently
replying to the above questions is imperative for policymakers in supporting their efforts
to diminish the effects of child abuse. Likewise, understanding how policies incentivize
bureaucratic behavior and implementation is essential to lawmakers when writing
actionable policy. Installing this study demonstrates that mandatory reporting laws may
or may not be working as intended.
Having identified these questions, I explore the theoretical perspectives which
illustrate the bureaucratic reporting behavior witnessed after the enactment of a
mandatory reporting law. Specifically, I employ an incentive typology to analyze the role
of incentives following prescriptive changes while also expanding the theoretical
understanding of incentives. Using 18 years of child abuse reporting data for each state, I
examine how law enforcement, education personnel, and social workers respond to
mandatory reporting laws. Moreover, I discuss why the behavior between these groups
diverges based on their differing incentive systems.
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Mandatory reporting laws have served as the main mechanisms for preventing
child abuse since the medical term “battered child syndrome” was introduced (Hutchison,
1993; Kempe, Silverman, Steele, Droegemueller, & Silver, 1962). Unfortunately, the
scholarly research on the effectiveness of mandatory reporting has not followed with the
expansion of the law, especially in relation to law enforcement and social work. While
the academic research is minimal, state legislators continue to push for the expansion of
these laws to better protect children.
State statutes concerning child abuse reporting consistently vary across state lines.
States diverge on which professional groups should be defined as mandatory reporters.
Of the 48 states which classify mandatory reporters, 44 states specifically mandate
education personnel, while only 42 states define social workers and law enforcement
officials (Child Welfare Information Gateway, 2016; National Conference of State
Legislatures [NCSL], 2015). I focus my attention on these three specific groups because
they account for 46% of all child abuse reporting and are the three largest reporting
parties (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2014, p. 9). Furthermore, these
agencies represent a diverse collection of professionals tasked with the same legal
mandate. Targeting these professional groups expands the current research on mandatory
reporting laws while providing theoretical and practical insight in regards to incentives,
incentive systems, and bureaucratic implementation of broadly enacted policies. Noting
the continued expansion of mandatory reporting laws across professional groups
enhances the relevancy of this research; given that all of these legislative changes may
not lead to the desired behavior of improved reporting.
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Furthermore, this study addresses the effectiveness of the law, by examining the
incentives, disincentives, and incentive systems that lead to action within each of the
agencies. To categorize the incentive systems of each professional group, I employ the
incentive typology established by Peter Clark and James Wilson (1961). As conceived by
the authors, agents are more likely to alter their behavior when the policy incentives align
with the incentive systems of their particular organization. With the enactment of a
mandatory reporting law, specific incentives become available to the agencies that
include immunity for reporters, potential resource acquisition, punishment avoidance, and
intrinsic awards associated with following the law. While these incentives are available,
they do not necessarily align with the incentive systems of each organization and result in
varying levels of performance when it comes to increasing the reports of suspected abuse.
Realizing the relationship between policy incentives and incentive systems helps
to determine whether the top-down efforts of legislatures are a suitable method for
controlling bureaucratic behavior. As demonstrated by Keiser & Meier (1996), studying
policy design is valuable, “because it can provide policymakers with the tools to increase
the likelihood that their legislative effort will be successful” (p. 339) (Deleon, 1988).
When lawmakers begin to consider the incentive systems that prevail in various agencies,
a greater effort can be made toward designing policies and policy incentives that
encourage preferred behaviors.
Theory and Hypotheses
Examining incentive systems dictates whether a mandatory reporting law
functions as an incentive toward increasing child abuse reporting. In 1961, Clark and
Wilson determined that the majority of activities or behaviors witnessed within an
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organization are the products of the incentive system in place. This notion was later
supported by others who then linked incentives with perceived public service efficacy
(Boardman & Sundquist, 2009; Perry & Wise, 1990). As part of Clark and Wilson’s
work, they categorized the different types of incentives. Specifically, they hypothesized
that “the incentive system may be regarded as the principal variable affecting
organizational behavior” (p.130). In other words, the behaviors of street-level bureaucrats
are influenced by the incentive system in place for their professional group. However,
there is no single incentive system that governs all behavior; rather, organizational
incentives are classified into three broad categories; material, solidary, and purposive (see
Table 3.1). Examining the prevalence of these systems within an organization may be
used to predict behavior (Clark & Wilson, 1961). Inspecting law enforcement, education
personnel, and social workers’ reporting behavior within the frame of these three
incentive categories, I assess the influence that mandatory reporting laws have toward
encouraging greater reporting from each professional group.
Table 3.1:

Incentive System Categorization

Clark & Wilson’s
Incentive Systems

Material
Tangible rewards often
monetary -- wages,
fringe benefits,
patronage

Solidary
Intangible rewards
from the act of
association -sociability, status,
identification

Purposive
Intangible rewards
related to the goals of
the organization

Material Incentives
Material incentives are those tangible monetary rewards which can be used to
benefit the organization or the people within the organization (Clark & Wilson, 1961).
Employing a monetary resource, such as increased resources, encourages action in
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accordance with a desired behavior for organizations which align with this incentive. The
criminal justice literature provides examples of law enforcement officers’ response to
material incentives. In 1982, President Ronald Reagan declared the “War on Drugs”;
however, the war for law enforcement agencies did not immediately begin. While drug
arrests continued to rise on a year to year basis, it was not until the Comprehensive Crime
Act of 1984 that drug arrests began to soar (Benson, Rasmussen, & Sollars, 1995). This
additional act clarified police organizations responsibilities for combatting drug crimes
and allowed for the sharing of resources and money between law enforcement agencies.
Having this monetary resource available, law enforcement agents increased their
enforcement of drug laws.
With the enactment of mandatory reporting laws, the policy clarified the
professional responsibility of law enforcement agents. In addition to clarifying the
mandatory reporting law, federal funding was also made available to states following the
1974 CAPTA (Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act) legislation (Kalichman, 1990;
Kalichman, 1991; Mathews & Kenny, 2008). While this funding may not directly go to
law enforcement, the opportunity to obtain department funding through improved
reporting is an additional motivation to encourage greater participation.
For education professionals, the literature suggests that a teacher’s decision to
report is motivated by their personal attitudes about the school, community, and the
likelihood that their report will be processed appropriately (Kesner & Robinson, 2002;
Tite, 1993). However, there are material deterrents which limit teachers from reporting,
these disincentives include fear of legal ramifications, consequences, and costs which
may lead them to lose their job (Abrahams, Casey, & Daro; 1992; Alvarez, Kenny,

74
Dononhue, & Carpin, 2004; Kenny, 2001a; Mathews & Kenny, 2008; Rosien, Helms, &
Wanat, 1993). The enactment of a mandatory reporting law is then to persuade education
personnel that it is in their own interest to report suspected abuse. Accompanying
mandatory reporting laws with legal immunity the above mentioned disincentives to
reporting are mitigated. Additionally, with a mandatory reporting law in place, educators
now face the consequence of potentially losing their teaching license by not reporting
(Abrahams et al., 1992; Kalichman, 1999). Thus, the threat of losing one’s position
serves as a material incentive for education personnel. By providing these material
incentives or threats with mandatory reporting, teachers are encouraged to improve their
reporting of suspected abuse following the enactment of the law.
Social workers face a variety of challenges. In addition to being perceptively
disliked, social workers complete the demanding job, while being paid poorly, managing
unreasonable expectations, and serving as witnesses to unimaginable suffering
(Bransford, 2005; Kim & Stoner, 2008; Vinzant, 1998). To combat this challenge, social
workers seek greater autonomy in their work. Nevertheless, choosing to report threatens
social workers’ autonomy by increasing their caseload. Already perceiving a strenuous
caseload, social workers regularly comment that resources are not available to handle
their work assignment (Vinzant, 1998). Scholars have demonstrated that social workers
are incentivized with lower caseloads and the autonomy to do the work according to their
own direction (Zellman & Antler, 1990). Due to the difficulty in monitoring social
worker behavior, social workers have greater command of how they manage their heavy
workload, which may include behaviors such as taking work home, fabricating or altering
paperwork, or bending the rules to meet client needs (Brehm & Gates, 1999; Kadushin,
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1992). Reporting suspected child abuse is viewed as an addition to the workload and
results in behavior that is counter to the mandatory reporting policy. What is more, social
worker pay is not based on the number of cases taken on or completed; which means,
social workers do not have any material incentive to report suspicions of child abuse.
Solidary Incentives
Solidary incentives move away from the tangible rewards and instead focus on
rewards that come from the act of association or adoption (Clark & Wilson, 1961). The
law enforcement literature provides prime examples of these solidary incentives. James
Q. Wilson (1978) observed that officer behavior is reliant on the culture established by
the police chief. Douglas Smith and Jody Klein (1983), furthering Wilson’s work, found
that most law enforcement departments adopted a culture of compliance to top-down
procedures and policies. Therefore, if a law is established, police officers are incentivized
to comply and enforce the policy. Furthermore, the literature suggests, patrol offices rely
heavily on colleagues for validation of appropriate behavior beyond what the
organization may offer (Bittner, 1971; Bhrem & Gates, 1999; Skolnick, 1966). Clark and
Wilson categorize this behavior within the solidary incentive, in that officers are
incentivized to perform to maintain their social status within the organization.
While officers are typically poised to be compliant, there are stipulations to this
overt acceptance of a policy. As noted in the criminal justice literature an officers’
willingness to follow rules is dependent on the prevalence of an us-versus-them mentality
(Haas, Van Craen, Skogan, & Fleitas, 2015; Wood, Davis, & Rouse, 2004). The stronger
the prevalence of this mentality the more likely officers are to exercise autonomy away
from top-down authority. Smith and Klein (1983) define the departments with a stronger
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us-versus-them mentality as fraternal and are depicted as less professional and
bureaucratic in their policing approaches. While fraternal departments are less likely to
be compliant, they are governed by a set of incentives that place greater value on the
brotherhood of policing. By not reporting, officers threaten their position within the law
enforcement fraternity and would therefore be encouraged to report suspected abuse.
Consequently, both top-down compliant departments and fraternal departments align
closely with solidary type of incentives.
From the educator’s perspective, having to report child abuse affects a teacher’s
relationship with students (Blasi, 1999; Gallagher‐Mackay, 2014; Maynard-Moody, &
Musheno, 2003). However, scholars have attempted to uncover whether education
personnel are resistant to sacrifice this relationship to report suspected abuse, and found
this not to be the case (Abrahams et al., 1992; Kenny, 2001b). While teachers do consider
the relationship, they are more concerned with the legal requirement and consequences
associated with not reporting (Walsh et al., 2012; Zellman, 1990b). Rather than having a
solidary incentive not to report associated with the loss in social relationships, educators
go to great efforts to maintain their own identity and social status as a teacher (Mayer,
1999; Walkington, 2005; Zeichner, 2005). Therefore, a mandatory reporting law serves
as a solidary incentive for teachers as they attempt to maintain their association as an
educator.
The social work literature claims that while social workers actively work against
the organization, they are incentivized by the opportunity to work with others who
possess similar beliefs (Uttley, 1981). This type of motivation aligns closely with a
solidary incentive system. However, examining this further, scholars find that agents
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want to work with others not necessarily for motivation, but as a mechanism for better
serving their clients (Fox & Dingwall, 1985). A study completed by O’Connor et al.
(1984) observed that social workers felt a sense of commitment to those they were tasked
with serving and were motivated by a deep desire to help (Vinzant, 1998). John Brehm
and Scott Gates (1999) specifically found social workers are motivated by the thrill of
helping or serving others.
While tangentially related to the solidary incentive system, social workers are
moved to action by the intrinsic rewards that come from providing optimal care (Fox &
Dingwall, 1985; Brehm & Gates, 1999, Vinzant, 1998). Unfortunately, providing optimal
care and reporting child abuse may not necessarily align. As previously illustrated,
choosing to report may disrupt a social worker’s ability to care for the child in a way the
agent perceives as ideal (Kalichman, 1999). If the social worker perceives that more
support can be provided to the family or child by not reporting, then the social workers’
incentive encourages noncompliance with the reporting policy. Brehm and Gates (1999),
observed that when social workers believe a policy hampers their ability to meet a
client’s needs, then the agent is likely to engage in “bending the rules” (p. 125). Again,
suggesting that social workers are incentivized by solidary incentives, but this incentive
does not always lead to compliance with the law. However, the desire to remain a social
worker may combat this impulse not to comply and persuades social workers to report.
Purposive Incentives
Purposive incentives are incentives that lead to intangible rewards for the
organization. To law enforcement agents, the preservation of the organization and the
profession of police work remains a top priority. While their behavior is governed by
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state and local policies, previous literatures suggests that department practices which
guard or strengthen the department greatly influence behavior (Brehm & Gates, 1999).
This type of behavior clearly lies within Clark and Wilson’s categorization of purposive
incentives. Law enforcement literature establishes that police officers respond to an
organizational culture of preservation. In harmony with organizational theory,
organizational factors have the greatest influence over police behavior and their response
to policies (Riksheim & Chermak, 1993). Accordingly, officers are inclined to apply their
discretion more positively to an established policy, such as mandatory reporting, to
comply with the norms of the organization and to maintain their social status.
A teacher’s decision to report is heavily influenced by their perception and
attitude of the school and community (Finkelhor, Gomes- Schwartz, & Horowitz, 1984;
Kesner & Robinson, 2002; Mason & Watts, 1986; Tite, 1993). If an education
personnel’s intent is to maintain a strong school and community, then the choice to report
suspected child abuse becomes complicated. Reporting child abuse may impact the
school and community in a negative manner. Conversely, choosing not to report puts the
school or organization at greater risk as demonstrated by recent child abuse scandals
where the organization was held liable for not reporting (Zellman & Bell, 1990). The
purposive incentive of protecting the organization, community and school, is heavily
considered by education professionals and serves as a valuable incentive when choosing
to report (Finkelhor et al., 1984; Kesner & Robinson, 2002; Walsh, Mathews, Rassafiani,
Farrell, & Butler, 2012; Zellman, 1990a). With this purposive incentive in place, I
suggest that mandatory reporting laws motivate reporting from teachers to protect the
organization and the community from harm.
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The early social work literature reveals that choosing to become a social worker
serves as a way to reject the “value of everyday life” (Pearson, 1973, p. 223) or to work
as a “political deviant” (Christie & Kruk, 1998, p. 22). While the social work literature
has advanced, it does not appear that this particular perspective has changed. As more
recently demonstrated by Janet Vinzant (1998), the organizational roles are a restraint to
the objectives of social workers and validates that a purposive incentive system is not
aligned with the attributes of social work. Recognizing the top-down nature of a
mandatory reporting law, the literature suggests that social workers object to the law and
push for a policy more closely affiliated with the allowance of greater personal
autonomy.
Based on the observations above and as demonstrated in the Table 3.2, I posit that
those professional groups with multiple incentive systems aligned with mandatory
reporting laws will increase their reporting behavior following the enactment of the law. I
hypothesize that:
H1: Law enforcement agents will increase the number of reports of suspected
child abuse following the enactment of a mandatory reporting law directed toward their
professional organization.
H2: Education personnel will increase the number of reports of suspected child
abuse following the enactment of a mandatory reporting law directed toward their
professional organization.
H3: Unlike the other professional groups, social workers will not be influenced by
the enactment of a mandatory reporting law directed toward their professional
organization.
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Table 3.2:

Mandatory reporting laws serve within professional incentive systems
Different Types of
LawEducationSocial
Incentives
Enforcement
Personnel
Workers
Material
X
X
Solidary

X

X

Purposive

X

X

X

Methodology
Data Collection and Key Variables
To test the effect of mandatory reporting laws on reporting behavior, I employ
data from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and the National Data
Archive on Child Abuse and Neglect (NDACAN).7 The NDACAN dataset segregates the
reporting data by professional groups and states while spanning from 1990 through
2008.8 To evaluate the influence of the mandatory reporting law, I investigate the
reporting behavior of law enforcement, education personnel, and social workers pre and
post the enactment of the law. Table 3.3 provides a summary of the reporting data for
each professional group examined.

7

The analyses presented in this publication were based on data from the National Child Abuse and Neglect
Data System (NCANDS) State File. These data were provided by the National Data Archive on Child
Abuse and Neglect at Cornell University, and have been used with permission. The data were originally
collected under the auspices of the Children’s Bureau. Funding was provided by the Children’s Bureau,
Administration on Children, Youth and Families Administration for Children and Families, U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services. The collector of the original data, the funding agency,
NDACAN, Cornell University, and the agents or employees of these institutions bear no responsibility for
the analyses or interpretations presented here. The information and opinions expressed reflect solely the
opinions of the authors.
8
Excluding Maryland where reports are only available from 2000 to 2008.
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Table 3.3:
Descriptive Statistics of Reports by Law Enforcement, Education
Personnel, and Social Workers of Suspected Abuse Cases Per 100,000
Variable
Law
Enforcement

Observations

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

409.409

193.551

49.618

1805.073

Education
Personnel

855.000

439.192

175.295

4.739

1716.661

Social Workers

847.000

295.870

191.124

1.495

1322.492

854.000

Source: Compiled using the National Child Abuse and Neglect Data System State Level Data
(NCANDS) Summary Data Component, 1990-2008

Essential to this study is the year each state mandated the reporting requirement
for the specific group. Utilizing data from the recently issued Child Welfare Information
Gateway (2016) publication, I analyzed each states mandatory reporting laws for the
professional groups which are listed. I then conducted a Thomson and Reuters Westlaw
database search, examining each states mandatory reporting laws and amendments for the
year each professional group was specified in the law.9 Having identified the year the
professional group was mandated to report serves as the intervention in the model.
Panel Data and the Effect of an Event
To test the hypotheses, I examine panel data created with the aforementioned
NDACAN data and descriptive data from the U.S. Census Bureau. Investigating panel
data while accounting for the effect of an event has been demonstrated in previous
scholarship as an operative way for measuring the influence of an event (Allison, 1994).
With this data, I establish two models for evaluation. The first model accounts for the
immediate change in the intercept following the enactment of a mandatory reporting law.
The second model examines the change in the slope and intercept to demonstrate the

9

See Appendix B – Table B.2 State and Year of Mandatory Reporting Law Enactment
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change in reporting overtime for a professional group following the enactment of the law
in a state. Employing these methods, I measure the effect of the law while reducing the
limitations of a time series examination (Allison, 1994). As demonstrated by Charles
Halaby (2004) “panel data are amply suited to the analytical problems that surround the
kinds of observational (i.e., non-randomized) data that are common in social research” (p.
2).
The reports of suspected abuse by each professional group serves as the
dependent variable of each model described above. In the first model, the enactment of
the law for each state serves as the intervention and main independent variable. A dummy
variable (intervention) is used to represent the year the state enacted the law. Specifically,
this variable demonstrates the change in the intercept following the enactment of a
mandatory reporting law in the state. In effect, by examining the change in intercept, this
variable demonstrates whether the professional groups where incentivized immediately to
alter their reporting behavior following the adoption of the law. To allow time for the
agencies to adapt to the new law, the dependent variable is examined as the year
following the year the law was enacted. By delaying this observation for a year it exhibits
the street-level bureaucrats’ response to having a full year of the new law in place and
demonstrates either the success or failure of the mandatory reporting law toward
incentivizing a change in the reporting behavior. Control variables known to influence
both the likelihood to report and the prevalence of abuse in a state where included and are
described below.
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Table 3.4:
Reports by Law Enforcement Officials, Education Personnel, and
Social Workers of Suspected Abuse Cases Per 100,000 -Model 1
Number of reports
Number of reports Number of reports
from Law
from Education
from Social
Enforcement Model 1 Personnel Model 1 Workers Model 1
Change in Intercept
(Intervention)
-9.534
27.906
-28.415
(33.257)
(33.835)
(33.076)
Time
8.945*
-5.851*
11.107*
(4.074)
(2.876)
(5.055)
Violent Crime Rate
0.232*
-0.156*
0.184†
(0.115)
(0.089)
(0.103)
Number of Reports
from Law
Enforcement Officials
-0.481**
-0.030
-(0.079)
(0.123)
Number of reports
from Social Workers
-0.030
0.298**
-(0.096)
(0.071)
-Number of reports
from Education
Personnel
0.615**
-0.484**
(0.105)
-(0.115)
Race
-0.039
-0.078
0.089
(0.062)
(0.070)
(0.079)
Teen Pregnancy Rate
-3.130†
2.240
-6.429**
(1.792)
(1.946)
(2.290)
High School Drop-out
Rate
-4.630
7.499
-9.552
(7.625)
(7.096)
(8.789)
Unemployment Rate
-29.868**
9.348
32.233**
(10.679)
(9.406)
(10.622)
Victims Female
0.159**
0.104
0.041
(0.070)
(0.081)
(0.095)
R2
0.5484
0.5818
0.4528
Note: N = 512; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, † p < 0.10;
Standard errors in parenthesis

Applying the second model, the dependent variable of reported suspected child
abuse cases for a specific professional group remains the same. Including an interaction, I
establish the slope and the intercept pre- the intervention. I also allow for a different
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intercept for each point in time. A dummy variable (intervention) is also used to represent
the year the state enacted the law. This provides an estimate that demonstrates the direct
effect of the intervention on the dependent variable. I also include an interaction term of
time and the intervention which approximates the change in slope post-intervention. This
interaction accounts for the change in the slope and the intercept following the
interruption. Together these interactions offer substantial detail concerning the effect the
mandatory reporting law has on the number of reports over time. Additionally, by
varying the intercept and the slope, the standard errors of the model are improved
delivering a more accurate test of statistical significance. I then assume a fixed-effects
model at the state level. The model includes covariates that are defined below and vary
for both state and time. Introducing these control variables for both models ensures that
the relationship between the main independent and dependent variables is appropriately
isolated. These models are then estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression.
Conducting this procedure, I analyze the data and determine whether mandatory reporting
laws do incentivize street-level bureaucrats toward improved reporting.
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Table 3.5:
Reports by Law Enforcement Officials, Education Personnel, and
Social Workers of Suspected Abuse Cases Per 100,000 -Model 2
Number of reports
from Law
Enforcement Agents
Model 2

Number of reports
from Education
Personnel Model 2

Number of reports
from Social
Workers Model 2

29.122

-39.702†

1.547

(46.574)

(21.672)

(26.082)

10.688**

-10.997**

-0.993

(2.727)

(2.162)

(3.454)

-3.926

4.283**

2.594

Violent Crime Rate

(2.954)
0.214*
(0.082)

(1.103)
-0.267**
(0.065)

(1.696)
0.299**
(0.067)

Number of Reports
from Law
Enforcement Officials

--

0.557**

0.170†

--

(0.055)

(0.081)

0.114*

0.241**

--

(0.047)

(0.056)

--

Number of reports
from Education
Personnel

0.647**

--

0.437**

Teen Pregnancy Rate

(0.085)
-0.335
(1.654)

-4.389*
(1.797)

(0.104)
-3.474†
(1.945)

High School Drop-out
Rate

11.398*

0.042

-17.096**

(2.240)
-7.427†
(3.941)
-0.046
(0.109)
0.8938

(5.290)
12.416*
(4.826)
-0.056
(0.105)
0.8511

Change in Intercept at
point of intervention

δ1Xit
Slope PreIntervention μ1t
Interaction: Change in
slope post-intervention

δ2Xit

Number of reports
from Social Workers

(3.950)
Unemployment Rate
5.279
(4.214)
Victims Male
-0.184*
(0.082)
R2
0.8943
Note: N = 488; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, † p < 0.10;
Standard errors in parenthesis
Fixed effects are included but not displayed
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Examining panel data with an interaction effect is not without its limitations.
First, if the model undertakes repeated events then autocorrelation can become
problematic (Alison, 1994). While not excusing the issue, this model will only account
for a single event in each state which reduces the likelihood of autocorrelation.
Additionally, varying the slope and the intercept of the model by utilizing an interaction
effect alleviates some of the issues associated with autocorrelation. Furthermore,
applying random and fixed effects to the second model alters the way the standard errors
are estimated and improves the model. For the first model, where fixed effects are not
included additional control variables are included for improved specification. Moreover,
the interaction terms are likely to introduce multicollinearity, but this results in an
overestimation of standard errors, affording a more difficult test of the hypotheses and
improving the validity of the model. To avoid this issue further, care is given to
theoretically specify the key variables in the model which reduces the effects of
autocorrelation and multicollinearity.
Control variables ensure that the model is more accurate and better demonstrates
the influence of a mandatory reporting law. These variables remain constant and isolate
the effect of the mandatory reporting law, strengthening the value of the results.
Additionally, the control variables correspond with top-down socioeconomic assumptions
that previous scholarship has coupled with altering bureaucratic behavior (Mazmanian &
Sabatier, 1981; Sabatier, 1986). Specifically, researchers identify these socioeconomic
conditions as, “some of the principal exogenous variables affecting the policy outputs of
implementation agencies and ultimately the attainment of statutory objectives”
(Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1981, p. 16). Employing these important socioeconomic
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conditions facilitates a better model to measure the effect a mandatory reporting law has
on reporting behavior.
Socioeconomic variables influence the perceptions of the community and the
likelihood of reporting. The violent crime rate per the population is particularly relevant
and demonstrates the impact violent crime may have on a bureaucrat’s decision to report
child abuse. This specific variable is a proxy for local community violence, because those
street-level bureaucrats which work in an area with a high crime rate may be more aware
of the challenges the children face and the potential of being abused (Warr, 2000; Lipsky,
2010). Conversely, teachers, law enforcement, or social workers operating in saturated
crime areas may identify the violence as a cultural identity, and relieve themselves from
the responsibility of reporting the suspected abuse (Dupuis, 1995). To examine the
influence of crime saturation, it is necessary to investigate the reporting behavior of all
professional groups. If the reporting from other agencies is high, it can be expected that
the reporting from the targeted groups would be lower. The targeted groups have less of a
need to report if another professional group is completing the requirement. Beyond
violent crime and the reporting of other professional groups, scholars consistently
demonstrate that race is also associated with the prevalence of child abuse (Coulton,
Korbin, Su, & Chow, 1995). Identifying that child abuse is prevalent among certain
minority races, street-level bureaucrats may choose not to report suspected abuse for a
certain race, negating the effect of the law (Hampton & Newberger, 1985).
While the environmental influences are valuable, they fail to account for internal
factors that influence the prevalence and reporting of abuse. One factor identified in the
previous literature is the relationship between the poverty rate (percent of individuals

88
within the population of a state living below the federal poverty line) and the number of
child abuse cases in the community (Gillham, Tanner, Cheyne, Freeman, Rooney, &
Lambie, 1998). Research reveals that added stress in the home, such as unemployment or
poverty, serves as a factor for potential abuse or neglect (Gelles & Cavanaugh, 2009).
While poverty does not cause child abuse, the additional strain increases the likelihood
for abuse. Beyond, unemployment and poverty, the social characteristics of the mother
may also predict child abuse. Scholars find that children born to teen mothers and
mothers with less than a high school education are more susceptible to abuse (Brown,
Cohen, Johnson, & Salzinger, 1998). The fact that a teen has a child does not inevitably
mean that the child will be abused. However, the hardships, financial risks, and overall
stress experienced by a teen parent cultivates an environment where abuse and neglect
may occur (Lee & Goerge, 1999; Zuravin, 1988; Zuravin, 1989). Moreover, gender plays
an important role when examining abuse. Girls are approximately 2.5 to 3 times more
likely to be abused than boys (Finkelhor, 1993; Putnam, 2003). Recognizing that girls are
more likely to be abused, mandatory reporters have an increased likelihood to witness
abuse among girls. Likewise, boys are underrepresented in psychiatric and social worker
samples demonstrating that social workers’ interactions with child abuse reporting would
also be influenced by gender (Lab, Feigenbaum, & De Silva, 2000).
The exogenous variables identified affect the validity of the model in a
multiplicity of ways. To account for the influence of these variables on the dependent
variable they must be controlled within the model. Failing to do so limits the value of the
information gleaned from this study, and reduces any confidence in determining if
mandatory reporting laws are effective in garnering additional reports of suspected child
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abuse. Having identified these variables, the findings from this study provide greater
consequence and increases the value of this study’s contribution to public policy.
Results
Exploring the results, each of the professional groups respond similarly following
the enactment of a mandatory reporting law but their reporting over time differs. The
findings suggest that a mandatory reporting law does not incentivize increased reporting
from law enforcement. The intercept for reporting the year after the law is enacted does
not significantly change for law enforcement offices, but may actually decrease with the
law (b = -9.534, p > .10; R2 = .5484). While the reporting law aligns with the incentive
systems in place for law enforcement, the law does very little to incentivize a change in
behavior. Observing this behavior over time within the second model, the slope of the
line flattens suggesting that law enforcement agents become slightly worse at reporting
with the enactment of the law (See Graph 1; b = -3.93, p < .105; R2 = .8943). While these
results teeter on statistical significance (p < 0.105), it is clear that mandatory reporting
laws do not increase reporting behavior, but rather, the reporting by law enforcement
agents is unchanged with the law in place. These results do not support Hypothesis 1 and
instead demonstrate that mandatory reporting laws do not incentivize greater reporting
from law enforcement.
Examining the effect of mandatory reporting laws on education professionals, the
initial outcome does not differ from law enforcement officers. The year after the law is
enacted the reporting behavior of teachers does not significantly change (b = 27.906, p >
.10; R2 = .5818). This finding also suggests that the law does not immediately incentivize
a change of behavior for educators. However, Model 2 exhibits that over time the
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reporting behavior of educators improves with the law (b = 4.283, p < .01; R2 =.8938).
Having a mandatory reporting law in place, the reporting behavior of education
professionals continues to decline, but teachers do report more cases than they would if
the law was not in place. This finding only somewhat supports Hypothesis 2, suggesting
that mandatory reporting does not immediately incentivize education professionals to
change, but over time the mandatory reporting laws diminish the rate of reporting
attrition. Based on the above, it is then necessary to better understand and examine the
factors which lead educators toward an annual decline in reporting of suspected abuse
with or without the law in place, but this endeavor is beyond the scope of this study.
As predicted, the results indicate that social workers are also not incentivized by
mandatory reporting laws (b = -28.415, p > .10; R2 = .4528). Interestingly, the reporting
of suspected abuse by social workers does not significantly change over time either (b = 0.993, p < .10; R2 = 85.11). Rather, social workers continue to report the same number of
cases of child abuse each year. This finding follows the literature presented and
demonstrates that social workers are not incentivized by a mandatory reporting law to
increase their reporting behavior which supports Hypothesis 3.10
Beyond the influence of the reporting law, various patterns arise among the
controls which impact reporting behaviors. Both models demonstrate that in the case of
law enforcement and social workers, as the violent crime rate for a state increases so does
the number of reports. However, in the case of education personnel, the opposite is true,
as the crime rate increases the number of reports decreases. These results suggest that
professional roles are important in regards to child abuse reporting, since law
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enforcement and social workers are more involved with crime, they are also exposed to
more cases of child abuse and their reporting increases. Conversely, education personnel
are not exposed to violent crime in direct relation to their position and are therefore not
influenced to increase their reporting.
In addition to violent crime, it is important to compare the reporting behaviors of
bureaucrats across multiple agencies. Examining each professional group, it is clear that
as the reporting behavior of educators increases the reporting of the other agencies also
increase (See Table 3.4 and Table 3.5). While the rate at which the reporting behavior
increases is different between the groups, it is clear that there is a relationship between
what these organizations do and the influence it has on other agents. Furthermore, these
agents are influenced by factors beyond the reporting behavior of others. Specifically,
there is a pattern between some of the economic and environmental variables and the
behavior of the three groups. Observing the findings, it appears that social workers and
education professionals are more likely to be affected by these social variables when
compared to law enforcement. For example, social workers’ and education professionals’
reporting is significantly influenced by the teen pregnancy rate, the high school dropout
rate, and unemployment in both models, whereas, law enforcement is either not
influenced by these variables or are not impacted as extensively.
Discussion
The enactment of mandatory reporting laws targeting professional groups
continues to be a broad-based policy decision. However, minimal research has been
completed to demonstrate the effectiveness of these laws toward incentivizing increased
reporting (Ainsworth, 2002; Lamond, 1989). The findings from this study demonstrate
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that a mandatory reporting law does not serve as a policy incentive for some professional
organizations, even when it appears that the policy is associated with the organization and
its agents’ incentive systems. I argue that when a policy aligns more closely with the
incentive systems of an agency, the bureaucrats will respond more positively to policy
enactment. Reviewing these professional groups’ incentive systems in light of the results
of this study provides a valuable discussion on the success of broad-based policies.
Law Enforcement
Law enforcement agents’ incentive system appears to align with the policy
objectives and incentives of mandatory reporting policies. However, the top-down
policies of mandatory reporting have little to no effect on the behavior of police officers.
Understanding why this policy fails to incentivize police behavior is critical to
determining the type of policies and factors that lead to greater conformance from law
enforcement. Acknowledging that the reporting behavior for officers has continued to
increase yearly, the enactment of a mandatory reporting law does not provide additional
incentives to increase this behavior. Rather, officers continue to increase their reporting
behavior, because reporting is aligned with their organizational norm of protecting the
community (Skolnick & Bayley, 1988a; 1988b). The enactment of the reporting policy
does little to alter the behavior from its current trend. As the organizational norm
surrounding law enforcement continues to envelop community policing and improved
interaction with the community (Greene, 2000), it can be expected that officers will
continue to increase their reporting on a year to year basis with or without a mandatory
reporting policy.
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Education Personnel
As these findings demonstrate, mandatory reporting laws improve educators’
reporting behavior over time; however, the change does not result in a positive increase
in reporting of suspected abuse from year to year. Teachers manage their reporting
responsibilities while being guided by what they deem to be best. Not only are they
maximizing their own self-interest, but they believe they are mitigating the costs
experienced by the student and family if they choose not to report. This decision to report
is then based on whether teachers perceive the benefits of reporting to be greater than the
potential costs to them and their way of doing work. Therefore, it may be that
maintaining their pedagogical autonomy and relationships is more important than any
perceived cost to the school or community, and results in the decreased reporting.
Additionally, teachers do not have the same organizational support or norms as
found within law enforcement. Investigating the difference between the two groups
incentive systems, it is interesting to note how the material incentive for education
professionals is linked more closely to the individual, while the material incentive for law
enforcement officers more closely aligns with the organization. Moreover, the literature
suggests that principals serve as “gatekeepers” and reinforce the costs and benefits of
reporting to the teacher, whereas law enforcement leaders serve more to encourage and
support reporting (Finkelhor et al., 1984; Mason & Watts, 1986). In order for a teacher to
report, they must then act outside of their professional role and consider the costs of
becoming a policy enforcer. However, their professional role dictates that they protect
themselves, the students, and the school. Mandatory reporting laws then help to
overcome some of the disincentives discussed above while strengthening the teachers’
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commitment to the law (Abrahams, Casey, & Daro, 1992; Zellman, 1990b). However,
when it comes to completely toppling the deterrents of not reporting, a mandatory
reporting policy falls well short and reporting continues to decline. The results of this
study reveal that a mandatory reporting law is better than nothing, but further research
and political action is required to encourage improved reporting of suspected abuse from
education professionals.
Social Workers
The findings from this study submit that social workers respond to mandatory
reporting laws as expected. Specifically, social workers do not react to the law, but
instead, report about the same number of cases each year. Conceding that mandatory
reporting laws do not alter the reporting behavior of social workers, leads to an important
discussion as to what will transform their behavior. The social work literature has long
called for a change to mandatory reporting laws and offers two directions for child abuse
reporting policies (Kalichman, 1999; Kalichman, 1990). The first proposition calls for a
complete overhaul of the child abuse reporting system (Besharov, 1986). The second
proposal suggests that rather than a sweeping child abuse reform, social workers be
provided with the resources necessary to accommodate their current cases of suspected
abuse (Kalichman, 1999; Krugman, 1997; Schene, 1998; U.S. Department of Health and
Human Service, 1990). Whether lawmakers choose one proposition over the other does
not matter unless the policy is tailored to meet the incentive systems of social workers.
A good example of these policy changes is supplied by Finkelhor and Zellman
(1991) who recommend that mandatory reporters be offered “registered levels of
discretionary reporting” (Kalichman, 1999, p. 197). This type of requirement encourages
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that greater resources be directed toward training and investigation (O’Toole, Webster,
O’Toole, & Lucal, 1999). The same authors also suggest that this method would
maximize social workers’ limited resources while providing for greater autonomy. While
increased discretion may lead to additional uncertainty for state legislatures, this doesn’t
have to be the case. There are plausible ways to keep the discretion in check. For
example, scholars recommend that with the allowance of greater discretion, intermediary
agencies be established as consultants to help the reporters determine if a formal report is
necessary (Delaronde, King, Bendel, & Reece, 2000). Having this type of process in
place provides social workers the autonomy they desire, but also affords them with the
knowledge and support necessary to deliver optimal care to their client. Additionally,
having a consulting agency would encourage greater dialogue that could be used to
substantiate suspected abuse. While none of these policy alternatives are perfect, they do
align more with the incentive systems of social workers, fostering a change in behavior.
Implications and Future Research
The findings from this study suggest that policies, such as mandatory reporting
laws, fail to alter behavior when enacted broadly across multiple agencies. Public
administration literature is filled with similar examples of policy failure due to the lack of
bureaucratic action (Keiser & Meier, 1996; Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1983; Wood &
Waterman, 1994). The failure of mandatory reporting policies substantiates the need for
improved policy design. Observing the results of this study, legislatures should be more
cautious when designing and enacting broad-based policies. Instead, to obtain improved
behavior, legislatures must tailor their policies to align with the rewards and punishments
of the incentive systems of each professional group. As a synopsis of effective policy
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design, Lael Keiser and Kenneth Meier (1996) state it best as a policy with, “clear,
coherent goals within an unambiguous context…[that] exploits preexisting bureaucratic
loyalties” (p. 338). While the current mandatory reporting policies have been designed to
better clarify the role of street-level bureaucrats (Mazmanian & Sabatier; 1983), they fail
to utilize those loyalties or incentives. As expressed by Michael Lipsky (2010),
bureaucratic values must be considered when designing a policy. As demonstrated in this
study, the current mandatory reporting policies disregard bureaucratic values and
consequently do not incentivize an increase in child abuse reporting.
Accounting for this policy failure, additional research is required to better
understand the bureaucratic values and incentives that could be manipulated to encourage
improved reporting of suspected child abuse. However, as demonstrated by Keiser and
Meier (1996) limiting the variables of policy design is extremely difficult and presents
challenges when providing guidance to legislative practitioners. While the findings from
this study suggest that the incentives are important and influence bureaucratic discretion,
providing lawmakers with a list of incentives for each bureaucratic agency could result in
pushback. Noting this challenge further exhibits the need to better understand and
develop the theoretical work surrounding incentives and bureaucrats. Additionally, this
research does not account for the part bureaucratic managers play toward encouraging
reporting behavior. It was briefly mentioned the principals serve as gatekeepers to
reporting and that law enforcement officials are persuaded by higher-ranking officials,
but more could be done to evaluate the role of managers in motivating reporting
behavior.
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Despite these limitations, this study does offer a thorough examination of
mandatory reporting law’s influence on garnering more reports of suspected abuse. After
analyzing the reporting trends of the major child abuse reporting professions, the results
suggest that mandatory reporting laws do little to alter behavior and acknowledges that
the failure may be attributed to the misalignment of incentives with the policy objective.
Recognizing the ineffective nature of mandatory reporting laws, additional research must
examine the design of these policies and provide lawmakers with a practical solution
toward combatting child abuse. Finally, this research contributes to policy scholarship in
demonstrating the value of incentive systems toward predicting and understanding
bureaucratic behavior. While categorizing a professional group’s incentives is
challenging and limited, it does provide for a greater appreciation of bureaucratic values
that contribute to the potential success or failure of a particular policy. Noting that other
factors may also be in play, the author extends the call for further research of bureaucratic
incentives and management toward influencing policy success.
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CHAPTER FOUR: ESSAY 3: THE ROLE OF THE POLICY ENTREPRENEUR
WITHIN THE INNOVATION AND DIFFUSION OF ERIN’S LAW
Abstract
What factors influence the likelihood that a state will adopt a policy? Previous
scholarship has examined economic, societal, and political factors, but has paid little
attention to the value of the policy entrepreneur. Exploring the policy literature, I argue
that the role of a policy entrepreneur is vital to policy innovation and eventual diffusion.
Going beyond multiple streams and garbage-cans, I inspect the role of the individual in
the innovation diffusion process while accounting for other known factors. Performing
Event History Analysis, and due to the availability of data, I investigate the factors which
lead 29 states from 2011 to 2017 to adopt Erin’s Law, a child abuse education policy. The
findings suggest that the states in which Erin Merryn, the policy entrepreneur, visited had
a greater likelihood of adopting Erin’s Law over states which were not visited.
Furthermore, previous factors attributed to successful innovation and diffusion are found
to have varying effects on the adoption of the law. This discovery not only demonstrates
the value of the policy entrepreneur but encourages further investigation of the policy
entrepreneur and her networks. Recognizing the role of a policy entrepreneur has
valuable implications for the innovation and diffusion literature going forward.

Keywords: policy innovation, diffusion, policy entrepreneur, child sex abuse
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Introduction
Between 2011 and 2018, 34 states adopted a Child Sex Abuse (CSA) policy
known as “Erin’s Law”. Each of these states enacted the law with the explicit goal of
training teachers and students how best to recognize, report, and cope with CSA. While
protecting children from abuse would appear to be a prerogative, 15 states have yet to
pass Erin’s Law or an equivalent. Recognizing that over a quarter of the United States
(U.S.) have chosen not to enact the law provides an opportunity to compare and contrast
factors that led to the policy being adopted. Among these factors is the role of the policy
entrepreneur, Erin Merryn, who serves as the face of Erin’s Law. Employing Erin’s Law
as a case of innovation and diffusion, I examine the function of the policy entrepreneur as
a fundamental aspect of the policy process.
Past public administration scholarship concentrated on the phenomenon of policy
innovation and diffusion across multiple areas and time. However, these preliminary
examinations were limited, restricting the innovation diffusion process to garbage can
models or multiple streams (Cohen, March, & Olsen, 1972; Kingdon, 1984). Realizing
the gap in the literature, Frances and William Berry (1990) introduced a diffusion process
that accounted for other internal factors (economic, societal, and political) that when
combined drive policy diffusion. These additional factors expanded the research beyond
the narrow categorization that had previously defined the field.
Following the introduction of these factors, scholars instigated an advanced
analysis of the many elements that influence the diffusion process (see Berry & Berry’s
Appendix 9.2 found in Sabatier and Weible’s Theories of the Policy Process, Third
Edition, 2014, p. 342-343). While the quest for the most important set of factors
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continues, limited scholarship goes beyond the economic, societal, and political factors to
examine the role of the individual in the diffusion process, or as coined by Kingdon, the
role of the policy entrepreneur (Jones et al., 2016; Kingdon, 1984, Mintrom, 1997).
Responding to Michael Mintrom’s (1997, 2013) call for further inquiry, I look to
examine the following question: How important is the policy entrepreneur in the
innovation and diffusion process? I employ the remainder of this essay to examine the
role of the policy entrepreneur in the diffusion process, while accounting for other known
diffusion factors.
Policy Entrepreneurs
Within the context of this paper, policy entrepreneurs are defined as “political
actors who seek policy changes that shift the status quo in given areas of public policy”
(Mintrom, 2013, p. 442). Furthermore, the policy entrepreneur is viewed as a broker or
activist with a vested interest in the passage of a particular policy (Oborn, Barrett, &
Exworthy, 2011; Mintrom & Norman, 2009; Roberts & King, 1991). While these
definitions differ slightly, there is a common thread, in that policy entrepreneurs are
individuals working to alter the “status quo” of a policy while influencing the innovation
and diffusion of the policy (Mintrom, 2013). In effect, policy entrepreneurs are actors
pushing legislative change to improve the policy process or correct current policy failures
(Mintrom, 2000).
With the introduction of Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Approach (MSA), policy
entrepreneurs were identified as influential to the innovation and diffusion process
(Kingdon, 1984). However, the value of the policy entrepreneur within this process
continues to be debated. In a recent examination of MSA, Jones, et al., (2016) find the
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study of the policy entrepreneur to be the most neglected component of the MSA
literature. Moreover, several scholars deem the exploration of the policy entrepreneur as
insufficient and encourage further examination, including a movement away from single
entrepreneurs to an assessment of entrepreneurship (Ackrill & Kay, 2011). While not
ignoring these appeals, this study demonstrates that even the actions of a single
entrepreneur influences policy innovation and diffusion across state lines.
The role of the policy entrepreneur is vast and includes various activities critical
to policy innovation and diffusion, such as defining the policy problem (Kingdon 1984;
Majone, 1988), networking and collaborating with other political actors (Braun, 2009;
Brouwer & Biermann, 2011; Mintrom, 1997; Mintrom & Vergari, 1996; Smith, 1993),
serving as the face of the policy (Mintrom, 1997, 2000), or manipulating the nature and
setting of the policy (Kelman, 1987; Mintrom, 1997; Riker, 1986; Zahariadis, 2008).
Specific examples of the policy entrepreneur’s action include the derailment of scheduled
debates and discussions (Zahariadis, 2003; 2008), the manipulation of policy narratives to
ensure increased palpability to political actors, and the identification of a policy villain
(Meijerink & Huitema, 2010; Shanahan, Jones, McBeth, 2011). Furthermore, academic
scholarship demonstrates that when a policy entrepreneur is involved, policy information
is more tightly controlled by the entrepreneur (Mintrom, 2000). Policy entrepreneurs also
affect the organizational arrangements which in turn influence the adoption of a policy
(Mintrom, 2000). Finally, Wilson (1989) notes that policy entrepreneurs successfully
affect change because they help others see the costs or benefits available with the
enactment of a policy (Hopkins, 2016; Mintrom 2000).
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While entrepreneurs are credited with these actions, it is not clear the value that
each activity provides toward driving the innovation and diffusion of a policy. However,
by examining a single policy entrepreneur, the culminating value of the policy
entrepreneur and their actions becomes more clear, especially when compared to other
legislative factors. Often the work of the policy entrepreneur is lost in legislative battles
and is masked by the efforts of the legislature (Mintrom, 1997, 2000). Accounting for
legislative elements delineates the worth of the policy entrepreneur’s actions within the
policy process. Understanding the value of the policy entrepreneur and her activities also
provides greater insight into the legislative process and the entrepreneur’s influence over
lawmakers’ actions.
In addition to the actions taken by the policy entrepreneur, it is equally important
to examine the qualities of the policy entrepreneur. Investigating the characteristics, I
separate what the entrepreneur does from who they are as an individual. Previous
literature has explored the characteristics of the policy entrepreneur and identified
qualities such as a high social acuity, (Christopoulos, 2006; Mintrom, 2000; Mintrom &
Norman, 2009; Zhu, 2012), determinedness (Beeson & Stone, 2013), persuasiveness
(Mackenzie, 2004), and creativeness (Mintrom, 2000; Schneider, Teske & Mintrom,
2011). While the list of features is impressive, scholars propose that it is not the
characteristics by themselves which equate to policy change. Instead, policy change is
dependent upon the policy entrepreneur’s ability to employ their talents within a political
context to overcome resistance and to persuade key decision makers (Mackenzie, 2004).
Understanding these characteristics within the context of a specific policy uncovers the
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policy entrepreneur’s capacity toward encouraging innovation and diffusion through
networks.
While preceding research effectively covers the actions and characteristics of the
policy entrepreneur, these studies come with certain limitations. First, as indicated by
Michael Mintrom and Phillipa Norman (2009), aforementioned studies fail to connect the
policy entrepreneur with a specific policy context. Second, it is not clear if all of the
listed entrepreneurial characteristics or actions are required (Zhu, 2012). In light of the
other contextual factors, some entrepreneurial attributes may not be necessary. For
example, when a policy entrepreneur is seeking a policy change from a non-professional
legislature, the need to network with major political actors, lobbyists, or legislators may
be limited. Whereas, an entrepreneur working within a professional legislature may be
required to have more attentive networking abilities. Acknowledging the development of
the policy entrepreneur literature and the limitations associated with current research, this
study provides an expanded perspective of the academic scholarship regarding the policy
entrepreneur.
Erin Merryn and Erin’s Law
Erin Merryn, a social worker from the State of Illinois, acknowledged that her
state had not done enough to protect child sex abuse (CSA) victims (Merryn, n.d.a).
Merryn faced this failure not only as a social worker, but as a CSA survivor.11 Following
2008, Merryn began to write legislators, encouraging them to do more to protect children
from CSA. Merryn, captured the attention of Illinois State Senator, Tim Bivins, who
agreed to sponsor her law, requiring children be taught in school the signs and dangers of

11

For more biographical information about Erin Merryn, please see her personal webpage at
http://www.erinmerryn.net/ or the Erin’s Law webpage at http://www.erinslaw.org/about-erin/
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CSA. In response, the Illinois State Senate, in 2010, worked with Merryn to draft and
introduce Erin’s Law (Anderson, 2014; Erin’s Law Task Force, 2012; National
Conference of State Legislature [NCSL], 2015). Illinois in 2014 then enacted Erin’s Law
with two main objectives: first, the state was to launch a task force to research and create
an evidenced based sexual abuse prevention program. Second, the law required public
schools to adopt a child abuse curriculum to educate teachers, students, and parents
concerning abuse (Anderson, 2014; NCSL 2015). While Erin’s Law is explored
throughout the course of this essay, the implications of the law are not reviewed. Instead,
Erin’s Law serves as a case study to examine the innovation and diffusion of a single
policy promoted by a single policy entrepreneur.
Merryn solidified her role as a policy entrepreneur based on her vast knowledge
of the harmful effects of CSA and her willingness to share this information with others,
including political actors in both oral and written communication. Following the
introduction of the law in Illinois, Erin Merryn traveled to 33 different states on speaking
engagements to discuss her work and to encourage the adoption of Erin’s Law. Examples
of this include, speaking arrangements with the governor and state legislators from the
State of Arkansas, serving as a guest speaker for state legislators in Mississippi, and
testifying of the benefits of Erin’s Law in front of state legislators at the Indiana State
Capital (Merryn, n.d.b). In addition to her engagements with state legislators, Merryn
partnered with state organizations impacted by the outcomes of Erin’s Law such as
various school districts, criminal and law enforcement agencies, and child advocacy
centers including state child protection agencies. Moreover, Merryn advanced these
speaking engagements into opportunities to increase her network and progress the work
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of Erin’s Law. Beyond speaking engagements and partnerships, Merryn pushed her
policy through various written modes of communication including publishing books,
articles, and online formats. While these formats encouraged Erin’s Law, her efforts
associated with networking and collaboration ensured that Erin’s Law diffused across the
U.S.
The effort to improve child abuse reporting and education has been increasingly
aimed at individuals within educational institutions, such as teachers, athletic coaches,
counselors, and school law enforcement officers. Furthermore, both Vermont and Texas
have enacted similar laws, but this has not prevented Texas from adopting Erin’s Law as
well. No other states have made efforts to enact a comparable law to improve reporting
and learning for education professionals. Although targeted with mandatory reporting
laws, educators still face tremendous obstacles and challenges in regards to reporting
suspected abuse (Abrahams, Casey, & Daro, 1992; Kenny, 2001). The reporting
challenges faced by mandatory reporters such as education professionals, is not a secret
to state legislators; however, not every state has taken the same steps to ensure that
children and teachers are educated concerning the signs of CSA. Based on this lack of
action to combat CSA, an important question arises as to what factors or actions
encourage or motivate the innovation and diffusion of Erin’s Law for states in the U.S.
Policy Entrepreneur’s Function within Innovation and Diffusion
A rich literature links policy networks, innovation diffusion, and policy
entrepreneurs (Berry, 1994; Braun, 2009; Mintrom, 1997; Mintrom, 2000; Mintrom &
Vergari, 1998; Shipan & Volden, 2008). While the policy network studies generally
focus on political actors, such as legislators and interest groups (Kapucu, Hu, & Khosa,
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2017), the research has expanded to include that of policy entrepreneurs (Arnold, Nguyen
Long, & Gottlieb, 2017; Braun, 2009; Mintrom, 1997; Mintrom & Vergari, 1998). As
previously examined, much of policy innovation is associated with external networks
where ideas are shared among policy entrepreneurs’ eager to attach solutions to issues
within their state or governmental entity (Arnold et al., 2017; Mintrom, 2000). However,
the work of the policy entrepreneur is not completed by simply capturing an idea and
sharing it with others. Rather, the value of a policy entrepreneur is determined by their
ability to attach an idea to an issue and then drive the policy through legislation. For this
step to occur, it is necessary that the policy entrepreneur employ their internal networks
(Mintrom, 2000).
Mintrom (2000) defines internal networks, as networks which, “comprise
individuals with established connections to the local policymaking community and who,
perhaps, have some connection to the broader external policy network relevant to the
issue domain they focus upon” (p. 214). Internal networks provide the policy
entrepreneur with a wealth of information including the viability of the policy, a strategy
for policy enactment, how to promote the policy, and how to best obtain support for the
policy (Burt, 2000; Mintrom, 2000; True and Mintrom, 2001; Mintrom & Norman,
2009). Without this support, a policy entrepreneur would likely fail in their innovation
and diffusion efforts and demonstrates the vitality of the internal networks. While these
networks are crucial to policy success, they are not haphazardly created, but are built on
trust, interpersonal contacts, credibility, and the reputation of the policy entrepreneur
(Berardo & Scholz, 2010; Mintrom, 2000; Mintrom & Norman, 2009; Mintrom &
Vergari, 1998).
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Studies demonstrate that internal networks are established for building credibility,
solving low risk issues, and coordinating efforts (Berardo & Scholz, 2010). However, for
the policy entrepreneur to build internal networks and to demonstrate these attributes, it
requires that the policy entrepreneur spend time with political actors within each state
where the policy is to be adopted. Spending time in the local area, a policy entrepreneur
is better able to understand, “the ideas, motives, and concerns” of others in the region
(Mintrom & Norman, 2009, p. 652). Strengthening this perception of compassion for the
individuals within a political area, the policy entrepreneur is more adapt to pushing their
policy through adoption. Examples of this are found in the dissemination of controversial
policies, such as stem cell research, where policy entrepreneurs spent time collaborating
with the public, promoting the benefits associated with the policy (Mintrom, 2013). In the
case of Erin’s Law, successful adoption is based on Merryn’s ability to build policy
relationships and networks within each of the state she visits.
Visiting the state, Merryn has the opportunity to collaborate with the key players
who help ensure the enactment of her policy and thus influence the diffusion of Erin’s
Law. Even if the visits are not made directly with legislators, Merryn can use these
opportunities to identify the general support for such legislation, increase her credibility
and trust with the people of the state, and share her narrative of this policy, thus
increasing overall support for Erin’s Law. Therefore, I hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 1: The likelihood that a state adopts Erin’s Law increases with each
visit Merryn makes to that state.
Acknowledging the connection between the network, diffusion and innovation
studies and the limitations of the current policy entrepreneur literature, this essay
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attempts to strengthen the relationship between these areas of research. By demonstrating
a relationship between visits (networking) and the innovation diffusion process, this study
fills in a gap in the literature. Essentially, the role of the policy entrepreneur is one of
managing networks and builds on the growing field of policy networks, established by
previous scholars (Braun, 2009; Meier & O’Toole, 2003; Mintrom & Vergari, 1998;
O’Toole & Meier, 2004). However, in addition to studying the policy entrepreneur’s
roles in the diffusion process, it is necessary to examine other factors that encourage the
innovation and diffusion of a single policy. Employing the current innovation and
diffusion literature, these others elements are examined against the policy entrepreneur.
Conducting this study provides a more complete understanding of the innovation
diffusion process and strengthens current theoretical models while investigating the role
of the policy entrepreneur and the value of networks.
While the policy networks and innovation diffusion research is abundant, it has
been mistakenly criticized in previous literature because of its overt focus on diffusion
between state-to-state processes (Mintrom, 2000). These scholars choose alternative
models to study networks and diffusion within states while ignoring policy diffusion that
crosses state lines. For example, Mintrom (2000) examines the adoption of school choice
policies within individual states, rather than looking at how a policy entrepreneur
encourages the innovation and diffusion of a policy within a state and across state lines.
Furthermore, Mintrom gathered policy entrepreneur data by surveying legislators who
then identified the entrepreneur for a specific policy in that state. In regards to Erin’s
Law, identifying the policy entrepreneur is not as limited and allows for an advanced
evaluation of the policy and diffusion activities within a single state and across multiple
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states. This type of investigation is then a more thorough exploration of the policy
entrepreneur participating in the innovation diffusion process.
Factors of Innovation and Diffusion
Berry and Berry (2014) explain the diffusion process as the “probability of
adoption of a policy by one governmental jurisdiction [being] influenced by the policy
choices of other governments in the system” (p. 310). As argued above, the policy
entrepreneur is an important but understudied factor influencing the probability of
adoption in one state, which in turn empowers other governments to action. While the
policy entrepreneur plays a vital role, there are additional factors which influence the
innovation and diffusion process. Defining these additional factors and accounting for the
policy entrepreneur, an unobstructed model is revealed that better explains policy
innovation and diffusion across the U.S.
State laws do not simply appear at the sudden desire of state legislators, but are
driven by some type of event, indication, or crisis. Specifically, Kingdon (1984) states,
“Policy makers consider a change in an indicator to be a change in the state of a system;
this they define as a problem” (p. 92). In the case of Erin’s Law, it is essential to
understand what indicators compel state legislators to recognize a problem, while then
motivating the legislators to attempt to solve the issue. Scholars faulted Kingdon for
relying on one singular event or problem as a motivation for innovation and diffusion
(Zahariadis, 2007). I posit that a collection of events or issues better equates to the
recognition of a problem that then leads to legislative action. Frank Baumgartner and
Bryan Jones (2010) demonstrate that greater attention to a problem typically leads to a
more negative assessment of a current policy, thereby, creating pressure on the dominant
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policy community (legislatures) to open up their policy making. I suggest that the
prevalence of child abuse and neglect in a state provides the drive necessary for a
legislature to act. The prevalence of child abuse and neglect is reported for each state by
the National Child Abuse and Neglect Data System (NCANDS)12. This data provides an
interesting narrative about the battle each state faces in combating child abuse.
Specifically, when state legislators recognize the prevalence of abuse in their state, it
serves as a conglomerate of “indicators” and potentially leads to action (Kingdon, 1984).
With this being the case, I posit the following hypothesis.
H2: As the cases of reported child abuse increase, so does the likelihood that a
state will adopt Erin’s Law.
Another influential factor encouraging diffusion is the actions of neighboring
states. The fact that Erin’s Law survived the review and approval of 34 state legislatures,
speaks volumes concerning the law’s perceived importance and the willingness of states
to enact the law. As hypothesized by Charles Shipan and Craig Volden (2006) “the
adoption of laws in neighboring states increases the likelihood that a state will adopt a
similar policy” (p. 828). Realizing that a bordering state successfully adopted a law eases
the burden on state lawmakers looking to also adopt a policy (Balla, 2001). Essentially, a
state more easily identifies the value of a policy when multiple governments have already
taken steps toward adopting the policy (Shipan & Volden, 2008). In the case of Erin’s
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The analyses presented in this publication were based on data from the National Child Abuse and
Neglect Data System (NCANDS) State File. These data were provided by the National Data Archive on
Child Abuse and Neglect at Cornell University, and have been used with permission. The data were
originally collected under the auspices of the Children’s Bureau. Funding was provided by the Children’s
Bureau, Administration on Children, Youth and Families Administration for Children and Families, U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services. The collector of the original data, the funding agency,
NDACAN, Cornell University, and the agents or employees of these institutions bear no responsibility for
the analyses or interpretations presented here. The information and opinions expressed reflect solely the
opinions of the authors.
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Law, the policy had already been written, implemented, and evaluated, all that was
required for most states was to follow the lead. As witnessed by Shipan & Voldan (2008),
states experience these trends of imitation, where they seek to emulate the states
surrounding them, mimicking their actions in order to be as attractive as the neighboring
state (Simmons, Dobbin, & Garrett 2006). The near presence of early adopters then
influences state legislatures to mimic the surrounding states with at least the introduction
of Erin’s Law. Considering the influence of bordering states in the adoption process, I
hypothesize the following.
H3: If one state is bordered by another state that has already adopted Erin’s Law,
then the likelihood that the state legislature would adopt the law increases.
As observed by Shipan and Volden (2006; 2008) the level of legislative
professionalism influences the innovation and diffusion of a policy. In their book, State
Legislatures Today, Peverill Squire and Gary Moncrief (2015) define legislative
professionalism as “a concept that assesses the capacity of both legislators and
legislatures to generate and digest information in the policymaking process” (p. 62). In
other words, legislators that pursue their legislative work on a full-time basis are
considered more professional when compared to legislators who serve for a few short
months each year and then return to other professional undertakings. Additionally, states
with professional legislatures can typically commit more time and resources to write and
understand policies and the consequences associated with them (Shipan & Volden, 2008;
Squire & Moncrief, 2015, p. 64). Moreover, professional legislators with additional
resources should be able to spend more time with Merryn improving the interaction and
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networking that occurs between the two. With this being the case, I posit the following
hypothesis.
H4: A state with a more professional legislature will have a greater likelihood to
enact Erin’s Law.
The literature indicates that policy diffusion is shaped by bottom-up and top-down
influences (Shipan & Volden, 2006; Squire & Moncrief, 2015). In the case of Erin’s Law,
the federal government, in 2015, passed a measure to provide funding in support of
state’s which have enacted the law. This form of coercion continues to be a popular mode
of motivation and is heavily examined within the comparative politics and policy
diffusion literature (Allen, Pettus, & Haider-Markel, 2004; Berry & Berry, 2014; Shipan
& Volden, 2006, 2008; Simmons et al., 2006). Essentially, this line of research
demonstrates that state and local governments are hesitant to pass up opportunities for
additional funding available from the national government. Previous examples of this
include the disbursement of federal highway funds, that were conditional on the
enactment of seat belt laws, or funds that were made available to states following the
enactment of mandatory child abuse reporting laws (Bae, Anderson, Silver, & Macinko,
2014; Felzen Johnson, 2002). While state and local governments may alter the policy to
fit better within their needs, these governments confirm that appropriate actions are taken
to secure the additional funding. With the enactment of federal provisions, states are
enticed to adopt Erin’s Law to avoid missing the opportunity for federal funds.
Acknowledging this coercive force, I suggest that the enticement for added funding is too
much for states, and I hypothesize the following:
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H5: Following the federal government’s 2015 legislation, states will react
positively to legislation and increase in likelihood of adopting Erin’s Law.
The enactment of legislation is political and of course is then influenced by
political forces. In examining the adoption of a state lottery, Berry and Berry (1990)
found that a unified government served as a political resource and enhanced the
likelihood that a state adopts a particular legislation. For the purpose of this paper, a
unified government is one in which the governor and both legislative houses are
controlled by the same political party (Berry & Berry, 1990). More recent literature has
also supported these findings, suggesting the having the same party in both houses of the
legislature and in the governorship allows for easier consensus among the groups and
prevents any barriers to adoption (Coleman, 1999). Due to the importance of accounting
for a political variable and the role that a unified government has played in previous
studies, I hypothesize the following:
H6: States with a unified government will have an increased likelihood of
adopting Erin’s Law.
Table 4.1:

Descriptive Statistics of Key Variables

Variable
Key Independent
Variables
Number of visits
by Erin Merryna
Total Reports of
Suspected Abuse
per 10,000 per
State populationb
Total Reports of
Suspected Abuse
by Education
Personnel per
10,000 per State
populationb

Observations

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Min

Max

267

0.341

0.655

0.000

4.000

242

65.166

22.553

4.107

125.448

242

11.133

4.481

0.000

25.248
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Percent of
Neighboring
States
Availability of
Federal Funding
Legislative
Professional
Scorec
Unified
Governmentd
State Variable
Number of Cases
Investigated per
10,000 per State
populationb
Number of Child
Abuse Reports for
White Childrenb
Number of Child
Abuse Reports for
non-White
Childrenb
Number of
Violent Crimes
per Populatione
Number of Teens
Births per
Populationf
Number of Teen
Drop Outs per
Populationg
Median Incomeh
Number of
unemployed per
Populationi
Number of People
Living in Poverty
per Populationj
Sources

267

0.209

0.251

0.000

1.000

267

0.307

0.462

0.000

1.000

267

0.225

0.101

0.048

0.629

267

0.689

0.464

0.000

1.000

219

95.772

41.050

0.005

246.808

209

10.354

6.062

1.074

34.541

208

10.517

6.476

0.447

31.266

267

31.270

15.440

0.000

73.064

217

8.865

3.091

3.150

18.012

243
243

23.884
56185.760

7.727
8955.829

7.561
33321.000

51.186
77216.000

267

6.140

2.064

0

243

14.219

3.040

0

2.00
13.000
8.00
22.700

a. Complied using http://www.erinmerryn.net/erins-law.html and
http://www.erinmerryn.net/speaking.html
b. Compiled using the National Child Abuse and Neglect Data System State Level Data (NCANDS)
Summary Data Component, 1990-2008
c. Squire, P., & Moncrief, G. (2015). State legislatures today: Politics under the domes. Rowman &
Littlefield.
d. National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL). (2018, October 9). State Partisan Composition.
Retrieved October 13, 2018, from http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/partisancomposition.aspx
e. United States Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation. (September 2012). Crime in the
United States, 2011. Retrieved October 2016, from https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2011/crime-inthe-u.s.-2011/violent-crime/violent-crime
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f. Compiled using the Kids Count Data Center. Retrieved October, 2016, from
https://datacenter.kidscount.org/data/tables/6053-total-teen-births?loc=1&loct=2#detailed/2/252/false/573,869,36,868,867/any/12721,12722
g. Population Reference Bureau, analysis of data from the U.S. Census Bureau, American Community
Survey.
These data were derived from American Fact Finder table B14005. Retrieved October, 2016, from
https://datacenter.kidscount.org/data/tables/73-teens-ages-16-to-19-not-in-school-and-not-high-schoolgraduates?loc=1&loct=2#detailed/2/2-53/false/871,870,573,869,36,868,867,133,38,35/any/380,381.
h. Compiled using U.S. Bureau of the Census, Median Household Income for each state. Retrieved
November 2016, from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series.
i. Complied using U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Unemployment Rate for each state. Retrieved
October 2016, from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series.
j. Compiled using the U.S. Bureau of the Census, Estimated Percent of People of All Ages in Poverty for
each state. Retrieved October, 2016, from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis;
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series.

Key Variables
To evaluate Hypothesis 1, I examined Merryn’s website and collected information
regarding her speaking engagements from 2010 through 201713. Specifically, I identified
the states she spoke in each year and how often she spoke in each state (See Table 4.2). I
suggest that states Erin Merryn has personally visited, to encourage adoption, will have a
greater likelihood of enacting the law. This continuous variable provides an important
opportunity to study the role of a single entrepreneur. As evidenced by the descriptive
statistics in Table 4.1, Merryn did not visit each state and the average visit per year is
low, but demonstrates the importance of her visits to each state. Analyzing this variable
provides an attuned understanding of the role and power of a policy entrepreneur.
Furthermore, it expands the research and provides a model for studying the influence of
the policy entrepreneur beyond the current examinations. Moreover, this study analyzes a
pre-determined policy entrepreneur rather than being limited to a subjectively chosen
entrepreneur.

13

The State of Illinois is excluded from the models, because it is Merryn’s home state and has a substantial number of
visits significantly exceeding most states.
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Table 4.2:
State

Number of visits for each state per year
Year

Alabama
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Colorado

2011
2015
2015
2015
2013
2014
2012
2013

Visits
per
year
1
2
1
1
2
1
1
1

Colorado
Connecticut
Florida

2015
2014
2015

2
1
1

Florida
Hawaii
Illinois
Illinois
Illinois
Illinois
Indiana
Indiana
Iowa

2016
2017
2011
2012
2013
2014
2011
2012
2011

2
1
3
3
3
7
1
1
1

Iowa

2014

1

Iowa

2015

1

Kansas

2013

3

Kansas
Kentucky

2014
2012

1
1

State

Year

Kentucky
Kentucky
Maryland
Maryland
Michigan
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi

2014
2017
2015
2016
2011
2012
2016
2012

Visits
per
year
1
1
1
1
1
3
1
2

State

Mississippi
Nevada
New
Hampshire
New Jersey
New Jersey
New Jersey
New Jersey
New Jersey
New York
New York
New York
North
Carolina
North
Carolina
North
Carolina
North
Carolina
Ohio
Ohio

2013
2013
2011

2
2
1

Ohio
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oklahoma
Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South
Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Tennessee

2011
2012
2015
2016
2017
2011
2012
2013
2012

1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1

2015

Year Visits
per
year
2016
1
2017
1
2014
1
2015
1
2011
1
2012
1
2014
1
2013
1
2016
2012
2014

1
1
2

Texas
Texas
Texas
Vermont
Virginia
Virginia
Virginia
Washington
Washington

2011
2015
2017
2014
2012
2013
2015
2011
2016

3
1
4
1
2
2
1
1
1

1

Washington

2017

1

2016

1

2013

1

2017

1

West
Virginia
Wisconsin

2013

1

2013
2015

1
2

Wisconsin

2016

1

The child abuse data through 2016 for each state is available through the
NCANDS database, and provides an easily accessible interval variable necessary for
testing Hypothesis 2 (See Table 4.1). Recognizing that Erin’s Law is targeted toward
education institutions, this hypothesis is studied using two variables. First, I examine the
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prevalence of child abuse within a state by utilizing the total number of reports of
suspected abuse for each state. On average, states generate approximately 42,000 child
abuse reports a year, but this can vary between 1,977 reports and 238,139 reports. I then
refine the model by investigating the prevalence of reported child abuse by education
personnel alone, where a state typically only receives about 7,000 reports a year. This
variable demonstrates if legislators are more inclined to adopt the policy when the
problem is associated with a professional group or if legislators focus more on general
reporting trends.
Hypothesis 3 is examined by employing the continuous variable of bordering
states. Following after Shipan and Volden (2006), the neighboring states are measured by
using the fraction of bordering states which have enacted the law each year. For example,
Alabama in 2015 is coded as .5, because 2 of the 4 states that border Alabama enacted the
law previous to 2015. Currently, Merryn’s website, erinmerryn.net, provides the month
and year for each state’s enactment of the law and provides the information necessary to
calculate the bordering states ratio (See Table 4.3).
To test Hypothesis 4, legislative professionalism is operationalized using the
Squire and Moncrief (2015) professional score. Utilizing this score, which ranges from 0
to 1 (1 being the most professional), provides a continuous variable that is analyzed on an
interval scale. The authors calculate this professionalization score “based on members
pay, number of days in session, and staff per member, all compared with those
characteristics in Congress during the same year” (p. 231). This professional score,
available in the authors book, provides the impetus necessary to understand the impact of
legislative professionalism and a state’s adoption of Erin’s Law. While previous literature
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has demonstrated that professionalism is impactful, for this study, it is more important to
understand how Merryn’s interaction with professional legislators is influenced. To study
the impact between Merryn’s visits and legislative professionalism, I will run a model
which interacts these variables together.
The presence of federal funding or top-down support serves as a basic
dichotomous variable, where all states are coded as a zero prior to the federal legislation
and then as one following the legislation. Coding the data as described allows for the
testing of Hypothesis 5. Erin Merryn’s website, erinmerryn.net and erinslaw.org,
discloses the month and year for each state’s enactment of the law, and provides the
information necessary to examine the impact of federal legislation on state enactment of
the law. This method of examining the top-down effect is supported by prior research
conducted by Shipan & Volden (2006) and offers additional validity to this study.
Employing the state data from the National Conference of State Legislature
(2018), I am able to analyze the partisan composition for each state from 2011 through
2017. Those states which a unified government or government run by the same party in
the governorship and both houses of legislation (or in the unicameral legislation) are
coded as a 1 while those states with a divided government are coded as a 0. Employing
this binary variable, I can examine whether states which serve in a divided government
suffer from increased barriers to enacting Erin’s Law or if states with a unified
government have an easier time adopting the law. Including this set of data allows me to
test Hypothesis 6 and better examine the political factors which influence innovation and
diffusion.
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Event History Analysis and Findings
To explain the diffusion process, multiple models have been developed such as a
National Interaction Model, a Regional Diffusion Model, or a Leader-Laggard Model.
Nonetheless, these models fall short in some fashion; typically, because of their reliance
on a single mechanism for diffusion. Rather than exploring diffusion and internal
determinants separately, scholars expanded the models to include both multiple factors in
a unified approach.14 I employ Event History Analysis (EHA) to examine the innovation
diffusion process while emphasizing the role Erin Merryn had on impacting the
“likelihood” that a state adopts the policy. An EHA model overcomes weaknesses
inherent in logit models and provides a sound methodology for examining the stated
hypothesis. Conducting an EHA model, the dependent variable is taken by accounting for
the year each state adopted Erin’s Law. For each state-year in the dataset, I include a
simple dichotomous variable. The variable is then set to zero and is given a one for the
year the law is enacted. Following the year of enactment, no more state-year data is
observed for that state. Because of the complex nature of an EHA model, it is imperative
that this model be conducted with caution, ensuring that the appropriate assumptions are
made.

14

Berry’s (1994) examination of each of these models found empirical evidence that the approaches were failing to
provide a complete explanation of the innovation and diffusion process. To fill in the gaps between the separate
models, Berry and Berry (1990) introduced Event History Analysis (EHA), which acknowledges the internal
determinants while accounting for the variables specified within interstate diffusion. The EHA process has expanded
from Berry and Berry’s initial examination to include recommendations by Beck, Katz, & Tucker (1998) and Buckley
& Westerland (2004) (Berry & Berry, 2014).
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Table 4.3:
State

State Adoption Year through 2018
Erin’s Law
State
Year
Alabama
2015
Montana
Alaska
2015
Nebraska
Arizona
Not Adopted
Nevada
Arkansas
2013
New Hampshire
California
2014
New Jersey
Colorado
2015
New Mexico
Connecticut
2014
New York
Delaware
2016
North Carolina
Florida
Not Adopted
North Dakota
Georgia
2018
Ohio
Hawaii
Not Adopted
Oklahoma
Idaho
Not Adopted
Oregon
Illinois
2014
Pennsylvania
Indiana
2012
Rhode Island
Iowa
Not Adopted
South Carolina
Kansas
Not Adopted
South Dakota
Kentucky
Not Adopted
Tennessee
Louisiana
2014
Texas
Maine
2012
Utah
Maryland
2016
Vermont
Massachusetts
Not Adopted
Virginia
Michigan
2013
Washington
Minnesota
2017
West Virginia
Mississippi
2013
Wisconsin
Missouri
2011
Wyoming

Erin’s Law
Year
2017
Not Adopted
2013
2014
Not Adopted
2014
Not Adopted
Not Adopted
2017
Not Adopted
2015
2015
2014
2014
2014
Not Adopted
2014
2017
2014
Not Adopted
2018
2018
2015
Not Adopted
2018

Applying an EHA model to examine the influence of a policy entrepreneur is not
unique, but has been completed in multiple studies and adds to the relevancy of its use
within this study (Mintrom, 1997, 2000; Mintrom & Norman, 2009; Mintrom & Vergari,
1998). However, the identification of the policy entrepreneur differs in this model.
Aforementioned studies have utilized surveys to distinguish possible policy entrepreneurs
and required that the researcher determine the leading entrepreneur. Identifying the policy
entrepreneur in this manner is convoluted and introduces bias. However, for this study,
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the policy entrepreneur has already been identified and removes the guess work behind
defining the entrepreneur. Having clearly identified the policy entrepreneur strengthens
the validity of the model and the associated results.
In conducting an EHA model, the first step is analyzing the year to year hazard
rate for each year during the enactment of Erin’s Law. The hazard rate is calculated by
accounting for the dichotomous value of state enactment of Erin’s Law (See Table 4.4).
Analyzing the dependent variable between 2011 and 2017, the diffusion pattern of Erin’s
Law becomes more clear. For example, 49 states are included in the data set over the
2011 and 2017-time frame of the study; however, in 2011 only 1 state had enacted the
law from the potential 267 total observations, resulting in a hazard rate in 2011 as .004.
As demonstrated in Table 4.4 below, the likelihood for adoption then increases each year
following the first enactment of Erin’s Law in 2011. Having examined the pattern of
growth, I then establish models that explain the variables which influence the likelihood
of a state adopting Erin’s Law.
Table 4.4:
Year

2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017

Hazard Ratios
Total
Number
Observations of States
Remaining
Adopted

267
218
170
124
82
50
24

1
2
4
10
6
2
4

Number Hazard
of
Ratio
States
Yet to
Adopt
48
0.004
46
0.013
42
0.036
32
0.114
26
0.179
24
0.212
20
0.343

Standard 95%
Error
Confidence
Interval
Low
0.004
0.007
0.014
0.027
0.036
0.041
0.069

0.001
0.004
0.017
0.072
0.120
0.143
0.227

95%
Confidence
Interval
High
0.026
0.040
0.075
0.179
0.261
0.306
0.496

To test my hypotheses, I establish two models. The first model employs the total
number of reported cases of child abuse in a state, while the second model only examines
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the reported cases of child abuse made by education personnel. It is important to separate
these two models to determine which variable captures the legislators’ attention as a
problem. Both of the models are run using a Gompertz Distribution, which provides the
best fit for the models and ensures more accurate results (Bayesian Information Criterion
[BIC] ≈ 101.503 or 102.559). However, each model is applied in two separate ways, first
the model is run while only accounting for the five key variables. Following this first
examination, the model is run again using the same distribution method with additional
descriptive variables (BIC ≈ 101.075 or 101.757). Isolating these additional variables is
an effective mechanism for observing factors, specific to the state, which influence the
adoption of the law.
Examining the first two complete models, the results are fairly similar (See Table
4.5 below), in that Hypotheses 1 is supported. The findings submit that state legislators
are more likely to adopt Erin’s Law when Merryn visits the state. As predicted, these
results suggest that the policy entrepreneur plays an important role in the policy
innovation and diffusion process (HR = 2.556, 2.15; p < .05, p < .10). When policy
entrepreneurs visit a state, they have the opportunity to build the necessary relationships
required for policy innovation. Without these relationships, it is difficult for the policy to
be adopted. This particular outcome supports the prior literature, demonstrating that
policy entrepreneurs have success when provided with an opportunity to develop their
social network (Mintrom, 2000, 2013; Mintrom & Vergari, 1998). These results advocate
that policy networks are developed when individuals can meet and establish relationships.
As noted by Mintrom (2000), when establishing networks, the entrepreneur has various
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goals; however, one of the top priorities for the entrepreneur is building relationships of
trust, which are more easily developed in a face-to-face setting.
Table 4.5:

Models of State Legislatures Likelihood of Erin's Law Adoption

Models

Model 1a:

Model 1b:

Model 2a:

Model 2b:

State Abuse Reports

State Abuse Reports
w/State Variables

Education Personnel
Reports

Education Personnel
Reports w/State
Variables

Hazard Ratios

Hazard Ratios

Hazard Ratios

Hazard Ratio

2.556**

2.152†

2.680**

2.204*

(0.688)

(0.846)

(0.707)

(0.873)

1.013

1.027

--

--

(0.009)

(0.033)

--

--

--

1.045

1.017

--

(0.051)

(0.099)

Independent
Variables
Hypothesis Variables
Number of visits by Erin
Merryn
Total Reports of Suspected
Abuse per 10,000

Total Reports of Suspected
Abuse by Education Personnel
per 10,000

Percent of Neighboring States
Availability of Federal Funding
Legislative Professional Score

Unified Government

0.178

0.047†

0.221

0.050†

(0.192)

(0.073)

(0.238)

(0.078)

0.011**

0.031**

0.010**

0.028**

(0.009)

(0.030)

(0.008)

(0.027)

4.993

2.290

3.439

4.300

(10.808)

(8.587)

(7.374)

(15.704)

0.657

1.427

0.637

1.188

(0.290)

(0.929)

(0.279)

(0.730)

--

0.986

--

0.995

State Variables
Number of Total Cases
Investigated

(0.014)
Number of Child Abuse Reports
for White Children

--

1.094†

(0.010)
--

(0.056)
Number of Child Abuse Reports
for non-White Children

--

0.898

(0.056)
--

(0.067)
Number of Violent Crimes per
10,000

--

1.012

--

1.201

0.933
(0.057)

--

(0.031)
Number of Teens Births per
10,000

1.104†

1.000
(0.027)

--

1.248

132
(0.261)
Number of Teen Drop Outs per
10,000

--

1.055

(0.262)
--

(0.049)
Median Income

--

1.000

(0.047)
--

(0.000)
Number of unemployed per
10,0000

--

2.733**

--

1.040

--

2.529**
(0.673)

--

(0.234)
Constant

1.000
(0.000)

(0.789)
Number of People Living in
Poverty per 10,0000

1.053

1.007
(0.235)

0.0000**

0.0000**

0.0000**

0.0000**

(0.0000)

(0.0000)

(0.0000)

(0.0000)

Number of Cases

242

208

242

208

BIC

101.503

101.075

102.559

101.757

Chi2

57.78 (6df)

68.13 (15df)

56.72 (6df)

67.45 (15df)

Summary Statistics

Note: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, † p < 0.10; Standard Errors in Parentheses

Surprisingly, both models did not support Hypotheses 2 through 6, and in the case
of Hypothesis 3 and 5, the findings were contrary to what had been predicted (see Table
4.5). The results indicate that when the percentage of neighboring states which adopted
the law increases, a state’s likelihood to adopt the law decreases (HR = .047, .050, p <
.10). While this finding is counter to the mainstream literature (Berry & Berry, 1990;
Mintrom, 1998, 2000; Mooney & Lee, 1995; Shipan & Volden, 2006), this is not the first
time that similar results have been discovered (Hays & Glick; 1997; Mooney, 2001). For
example, Christopher Mooney (2001) suggests, “that the regional diffusion effect may
not be consistently positive, contrary to the received wisdom” (p. 107). Furthermore,
these findings signify that the relationships between states may not be complete and
incites further discussion beyond what was hypothesized. Specifically, policy adoption
may be influenced by more than location, but is dependent on factors such as the
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diversity within a state, the political ideology, and other internal determinants. While
speculative, the findings encourage further research examining neighboring states and the
adoption of a policy.
Investigating the federal funding variable, the initial findings are unexpected.
However, due to the study time frame, the results exploring the top-down policy should
not be overly surprising (see Table 4.5). Federal legislators enacted Erin’s Law in 2015.
Prior to the enactment of the federal legislation, 18 of the 34 adopting states had already
taken action, with 11 of these states enacting Erin’s Law in 2014. Following the 2014
increase, the adoption trend significantly decreases to only 6 states the next year. While
the intent of the federal legislation was to encourage a steady increase in adoption by
states, this simply did not occur (HR = .031, .028, p < .01; Model 1b & 2b). However,
attributing the decrease solely to the enactment of the federal legislation would be unwise
and requires further examination while accounting for additional data points. The
ineffectiveness of this variable may be due to the fact that funding coupled with the law
was not released until late 2017 (Merryn, 2017). With the funding now in place, the
remaining states may be more inclined to enact the law. Moreover, prior research
demonstrates that federal funding is not always accepted by states and is not always used
within the intent of the law (Nicholson-Crotty, 2012). While the results suggest that the
federal funding has a negative effect on the diffusion of the law, this finding should be
viewed with caution accepting that there are extenuating circumstances surrounding the
funding and Erin’s Law.
Evaluating the first and second models, the results do not support Hypothesis 2.
Moreover, these findings demonstrate that state legislators do not pay attention to the
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evolution of child abuse reporting within the state (HR = 1.027, 1.017; p > .10). Instead,
lawmakers’ actions are based on alternative motives or indicators outside of the general
reporting patterns. These findings support the literature on the cognitive limitations of
lawmakers (Jones, 2002; Simon, 1947, 1957, 1995). In that, lawmakers are limited in
their attention of societal issues, such as the specific reporting habits of professional
organizations. But, these results suggest that legislators are influenced by some other
overarching experience or event which encourages the adoption of a law.
The results also do not support Hypothesis 4, in that, legislative professionalism
does not influence the adoption of Erin’s Law. This finding is also unexpected as it
appears to be more commonly supported by the literature (Huber & Shipan, 2002; Shipan
& Volden, 2006, 2008). While the results suggest that an increase in legislative
professionalism leads to an increase in the likelihood of adoption, this finding is not
statistically significant (HR = 4.993, p > .10). Exploring the results, it is evident that both
states with professional and non-professional legislatures chose to adopt this particular
policy. To examine this variable further, I ran a third model which allowed Merryn’s
number of visits to a state to interact with the professionalization scores. Interacting these
variables would not only demonstrate the value in Merryn’s visits to a state, but if these
visits were then influenced by the existence of a professional or non-professional
legislature. Exploring the results from Model 3 (see Table C.1 in Appendix C), it is again
apparent that legislative professionalism does not influence the likelihood that a state
adopts Erin’s Law (HR = 4.683, 44.010; p > .10). Acknowledging that the adoption of
Erin’s Law occurs without a professional legislature suggests important information
about the nature of the policy and the entrepreneur. Specifically, it demonstrates that
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Merryn’s entrepreneurial efforts encouraged non-professional legislatures to overcome
limited resources to adopt the policy.
Finally, examining the influence of a unified government, these results do not
support Hypothesis 6. While having a unified government may lead to an easier path for
adoption, Merryn’s Law was not impeded by states that did not have a unified
government (HR = 1.427, 1.188; p > .10). This finding may be more associated with the
type of policy, in that actions to combat child abuse are not typically separated by party
lines. Rather both parties tend to agree that child abuse needs to be prevented when
possible and Merryn’s Law appears to be a logical approach to the problem.
In addition to the hypothesized variables, supplementary variables impacting the
state are included in the model (see Table 4.5). While these additional variables may
appear as an over-specification of the model, a thorough examination demonstrates that
this is not the case. Observing the correlation coefficients, only one set of the variables
could be considered highly correlated, yet the coefficient r is still less than .9 and no other
correlation coefficient r is above .7. This demonstrates that the variables are explaining
the relationship between the dependent variable and not masking other relationships (see
Table C.2 in Appendix C). Furthermore, as the supplementary variables are included, any
errant variables would alter the relationship between the key variables, but this does not
appear to be the case.
Of particular significance is the influence that the victims race has on the
likelihood for adoption. For example, in Model 1b and 2b as the number of white victims
increases the likelihood of adoption increases (HR = 1.094, 1.104, p < .10). These
findings are congruent with critical race theory, in that whites in the U.S. typically have
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greater access to legislation providing for greater potential benefits that are not readily
available to those of other races (Delgado & Stefancic, 2001; Harper, Patton, & Wooden,
2009). While Erin’s Law does not discriminate and is available to children of all races,
these results suggest that legislatures are inclined to enact the law when the problem with
abuse appears to be associated with the abuse of white children.
The unemployment rate of a state is worth noting. In both models, as
unemployment increases so does the likelihood of a legislature adopting Erin’s Law (HR
= 2.733, 2.529, p < .01). The child abuse literature demonstrates a strong relationship
between poverty, unemployment, and the number of child abuse cases in a community
(Gillham, Tanner, Cheyne, Freeman, Rooney, & Lambie, 1998). For example, stressful
situations surrounding poverty and unemployment typically lead to a greater likelihood of
child abuse in the home (Bae, Solomon, Gelles, 2009). Likewise, research reveals that
poverty and unemployment factors overcome other variables of abuse, such as race, in
that abuse is more prevalent in the homes of impoverished white families than in black
families (Drake, Lee, & Jonson-Reid, 2009). While unemployment in a state may be
related to the actual prevalence of CSA, the consequences of CSA incentivizes legislators
to accept a law that dampens the effect of abuse.
Discussion and Implications
The findings are clear. When Merryn visits a state she improves her network and
significantly increases the likelihood that a state adopts the law (see Table 4.5). Based on
the results of these models, it is evident that the policy entrepreneur plays an important
role in the innovation and diffusion of a policy. Without the efforts of Merryn, the
diffusion of Erin’s Law is significantly limited. Employing EHA, the function and
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capabilities of a single policy entrepreneur are apparent in managing the adoption of a
single policy. Understanding that Merryn’s visits play a valuable role leads to an
increased need for future research beyond what was uncovered with this examination.
Specifically, this study needs to be replicated to identify if policy entrepreneurs
advocating various policies experience similar success. If policy entrepreneurs are having
similar success than it validates the importance of the policy entrepreneur in the
innovation diffusion process. However, if research demonstrates contradictory results,
then the agenda returns to better understanding Merryn’s characteristics and actions.
While it could be argued that Merryn was selective in her visits, only choosing to visit
states which already had a greater likelihood for adopting the law, there are multiple
examples which demonstrate this was not the case. For example, Merryn has visited
Florida multiple times over multiple years and yet Florida has still not enacted the law.
Both Ohio and New Jersey also fall within this category, where New Jersey has been
visited at least once each year for five of the seven years in this study. Accounting for this
possible endogeneity demonstrates that while Merryn may have targeted her visits toward
states already inclined to adopt the law, this did not prevent her from visiting multiple
states multiple times which have still not adopted the law.
Furthermore, scholars must investigate policy entrepreneurs’ motivations “to
explain their dedication to a particular policy idea, to review the context in which they
operate…” (Zhu, 2012, p. 192; Mintrom & Normon, 2009) and discovering the deeper
intricacies of the policy entrepreneur. Obviously, more can be done to understand the
nuances surrounding the policy entrepreneur; however, this study demonstrates that in the
case of Erin’s Law, a policy entrepreneur plays a vital role in the innovation and diffusion
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of policy. Moreover, this research reveals a new way to study the function of the policy
entrepreneur and encourages further research on the topic.
In conjunction with the policy entrepreneur, political actors operate when a
problem is brought to their attention, typically in the form of focusing or triggering
events (Kingdon, 1984). However, scholars observe that defining the triggering event is
challenging and, therefore, makes it difficult to predict when a problem will occur (Smith
& Larimer, 2013). Because of this obstacle, a branch of public policy scholarship has
evolved which investigates agenda setting (Baumgartner & Jones, 2010; Jones &
Baumgartner, 2005). While Kingdon’s work is a key foundation for these scholars, they
diverge and demonstrate that focusing events are best defined by activities which capture
political actors’ selective attention (Jones & Baumgartner, 2005). With this study, I
demonstrate the challenges with identifying the activities which capture political actors’
attention. While it was assumed that the prevalence of abuse would serve as an effective
predictor of action this was not the case and encourages further development and research
on the topic.
As demonstrated above, it was discovered that the neighboring states variable
works counter to the diffusion process. In that, as the number of neighboring states which
adopt the policy increases, the likelihood that the state enacts the law decreases. While
this finding is not particularly new, it does encourage a call for further research.
Supporting this call for additional investigation, Christopher Mooney (2001) indicates
that the findings from a study such as this is not that uncommon, but tend to occur
approximately 50% of the time in EHA analysis. Noting that the role of a bordering state
can be determined as successfully as the flip of a coin, suggests more must be done to
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examine the relationship between states and the adoption of a policy. One consideration
worth noting may be the type of policy being diffused across states. For example, a
policy that provides an economic advantage or spillover (Shipan & Voldan, 2006)
between states may be a better determining factor of whether the neighboring state
chooses to adopt a policy. Specifically, if a state legislator is concerned that people,
businesses, or resources may walk away from the state based on the policy innovation of
a bordering state, then the legislator may be more likely to encourage the adoption of the
law in their state. Overall, when the economic concerns of a state are influenced by a
policy then there may be a relationship between the policy and diffusion across
neighboring states. In the case of Erin’s law, the adoption of the policy does not offer
much of an economic threat to a bordering state and, therefore, does not encourage the
diffusion of the law.
Delving into the economic context further, Shipan and Volden (2006) investigated
the diffusion of anti-smoking policies and observed a positive relationship between
neighboring states and the adoption of the law. However, the researchers suggested that
the states were acting not because they were afraid of missing an economic benefit, but
that the action of a neighboring government provided encouragement to forgo the
perceived economic benefits associated with more lenient anti-smoking laws. In either
example, the economic component associated with the policy appears to play a role in
whether a policy diffuses across state or local governments. While the relationship
between the type of policy, economic spillover, and neighboring states is purely
exploratory, it does provide an avenue for future research.

140
Finally, the lack of a relationship between legislative professionalism and policy
adoption is particularly interesting. Erin’s Law is adopted by states classified as having a
professional and non-professional legislature. This finding leads to two important
questions investigating the type of policy entrepreneur and the way that the policy is
shared with legislatures. The first question examines whether the type of policy
entrepreneur advancing the policy influences less professional legislatures more than
highly professional legislatures. As demonstrated by previous research, professionalized
legislatures are more insulated from their constituents and their associated networks
(Hickok & Sedgwick, 1992; Luttbeg 1992; Maestas, 2000; Opheim, 1994; Weber 1999).
Therefore, a policy entrepreneur from outside the political world would find more
networking success with a less professionalized legislature. This finding could potentially
demonstrate that Merryn’s visits to these less professionalized states are more beneficial
because of easier access to the legislators or their networks.
The second question regards the type of policy being advanced. Just as a policy
entrepreneur may have greater access to less professionalized legislators, the type of
policy being pursued may also be more savory to a particular legislator. In the case of
Erin’s Law, a less-professional legislature may be more inclined to adopt this policy as a
way to demonstrate their legitimacy as a legislature. Some policies then offer greater
validity than other policies and encourage diffusion across less-professional legislatures.
While the type of policies and the innovation and diffusion process has been analyzed, I
posit that more can be done to categorize types of policies and the legitimacy provided
with the adoption of a policy.
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Conclusion
Overall, this research demonstrates that the innovation and diffusion of Erin’s
Law is influenced by the actions of a single policy entrepreneur. While much more can be
done to examine the role, motivations, and narrative of the policy entrepreneur (Zhu,
2012), this study demonstrates that a policy entrepreneur is effective when given the
opportunity to visit and network with political actors across government. Furthermore,
the findings from this study demonstrate that bordering states and federal legislation does
not always encourage policy innovation and diffusion. While these particular findings are
not new, they encourage further examination. Finally, as described above, the results
from this study regarding legislative professionalism are counter to earlier findings
(Huber & Shipan, 2002; Shipan & Volden, 2006, 2008), but introduces additional
questions worth investigating. Recognizing the value of these implications, this study has
provided an expansion of knowledge within the academic field and urges that more
research be done to examine the policy entrepreneur.
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION
Each of the essays contained in this dissertation encompass a separate research
question which covers the spectrum of child abuse reporting and prevention policies. As a
whole, the essays provide a clearer picture of the policy process and the individuals that
work within the process. Specifically, these essays exhibit the evolution of child abuse
policies in the U.S., demonstrating that mandatory reporting laws were first enacted by
state legislators with the expectation that street-level bureaucrats would report suspected
abuse. When practitioners then began to question the effectiveness of these laws, a single
policy entrepreneur advocated for an improved education based policy. This legislation
has since diffused across 34 states and looks to alter child abuse prevention policies.
Altogether, there are important implications and limitations in conducting these studies.
Reviewing each individual study better demonstrates the intricacies of the limitations and
implications associated with this dissertation. Following the reexamination of the essays,
I conclude by expounding on the findings and explain their relevance in regards to the
policy process and child abuse policies as a whole.
Moving onward, it is crucial to reemphasize the theoretical and practical
implications uncovered with each research question. Examining these questions leads to
greater insight in regards to the policy process and the motivations and incentives of the
people who work within this process. Particularly, the first essay observes that state
legislatures regularly face uncertainty and attempt to reduce this uncertainty by
controlling bureaucratic behavior. The second essay reviews the bureaucrats’ response to
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legislative control and the role incentives play in driving a specific response. Finally, the
last essay investigates the role of the policy entrepreneur in relation to the innovation and
diffusion of a specific policy. To conclude, for each essay, I review a brief summary of
the findings and the associated implications, the limitations of each study, and future
research stemming from this work. The culmination of these essays expands the current
research and contributes to the growth of the field of public policy scholarship.
Essay 1
Reviewing the results from this essay, it is apparent that the mandatory reporting
legislation enacted by state lawmakers does serve as an effective mechanism in garnering
more consistent reporting. Having more consistent reporting in place, legislators can
better understand the behavior of bureaucrats in regards to reporting suspected child
abuse and better predict the number of reports in a given year. With this consistency,
legislators experience less uncertainty and demonstrate greater control over the
bureaucracy. These findings are important from both a practical and theoretical
perspective. First, this study supports the earlier literature regarding legislators’ ability to
employ administrative procedures in an effort to reduce uncertainty (McCubbins, Noll, &
Weingast, 1987; Potoski; 1999). Second, the findings demonstrate an additional example
of the bureaucratic response to legislative control (Huber, Shipan, & Pfahler, 2001; Wood
& Waterman, 1994). Finally, the results of this study reveal that while the legislative
action may reduce uncertainty, the enactment of a law may lead to unintended
consequences for various professional groups. The accumulation of these findings
demonstrate the significant role legislators play within the policy process. Recognizing
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that legislators manipulate the political process for their own good provides invaluable
insight into the motivation and agenda-setting priorities of lawmakers.
While I am confident in the results, there are particular limitations to this study
that need to be reiterated. First, while this study acknowledges that lawmakers employ
administrative procedures to deal with principal-agent uncertainty, the literature remains
relatively quiet in regards to why legislators turn to mandatory reporting laws as their
mechanism for control. Missing this piece of information limits the variables which can
be used to evaluate lawmakers’ decisions and reasoning for employing specific
administrative procedures and the extent of their legislative uncertainty. For example, the
enactment of a mandatory reporting law is a low-cost potential solution to the lack of
child abuse reporting. The cost mechanism is an important variable missing from this
analysis. A particular weakness of this study is that legislators’ responses are based on
managing the accumulation of transaction costs (Potoski, 1999), but this research does
not account for anything beyond principal-agent uncertainty. While not ignoring the
importance of various types of uncertainty, the purpose of this study focuses on the
bureaucratic response best uncovered through an analysis of principal-agent uncertainty
and validates the approach taken. Recognizing this limitation provides an opportunity for
further research as discussed below.
Furthermore, this study provides another example of bureaucracies being
responsive to political control. However, there are multiple scholarly examples of
bureaucrats choosing not to respond to legislative efforts of control (Balla, 1998; Potoski,
1999). This particular study does little to demonstrate why bureaucrats choose political
dependency over independence. But, it is not difficult to fathom a scenario where
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bureaucrats choose not to respond to mandatory reporting laws and alter the direction of
this study. In order then to understand the bureaucratic organization’s decision for
political freedom, more must be done to examine the variables that influence
responsiveness or the lack thereof. As addressed in the second essay, bureaucratic action
or inaction is associated with the professional incentive systems in place for each
bureaucracy (Clark & Wilson, 1961). Finding a way to better account for these incentive
systems in regards to legislative uncertainty provides for a more robust study while
demonstrating the relationship between incentive systems and bureaucratic control.
Finally, there are particular limitations accompanying the use of panel data as
previously discussed within this first study. Using panel data while accounting for
multiple events or interruptions in the data, such as the enactment of a law, introduces
autocorrelation into the model (Alison, 1994). Previous scholars have noted this same
weakness inherent in time-series models (Lewis-Beck, 1986, p. 227). Not ignoring this
concern, the model used in this study only accounts for a single event within each state,
reducing the likelihood of autocorrelation. Furthermore, varying the slope and the
intercept by including an interaction effect reduces some of the concerns related to
autocorrelation. Additionally, incorporating both random and fixed effects alters the way
the standard errors are estimated and results in an improved model. Finally, the
interaction terms are likely to introduce multicollinearity; the result of this is an
overestimation of the standard errors, which makes for a more difficult test of the
hypotheses and serves to improve the validity of the model and the subsequent results.
Beyond the limitations of this study, there are many opportunities to advance this
research. Particularly, the findings suggest that mandatory reporting laws do lead to more
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consistent reporting among bureaucrats, but this consistency comes at the sacrifice of
increased reporting from some of the professional groups. Accepting that mandatory
reporting laws do not always increase the reporting of suspected cases of abuse supports
the conclusion that legislatures are acting to reduce their own uncertainty and not
operating necessarily for the purpose of fighting child abuse. This observation incites the
need for further research regarding legislators’ perception of mandatory reporting laws.
For example, are legislators confident that mandatory reporting laws work or are at least
effective in garnering reports? Overall, more must be done to examine the intricacies of
legislative uncertainty. The findings suggest that simply having more consistent reporting
is sufficient for legislators, but do legislators perceive that more can be done or should be
done to effectively combat child abuse?
In addition to exploring the legislators’ perception or view of mandatory reporting
laws, there are other factors that influence whether a street-level bureaucrat chooses to
report suspected child abuse. The purpose then of the second essay is to help address how
mandatory reporting policies influence the behavior of bureaucrats and why that behavior
may differ. Moreover, this type of investigation demonstrates how policies can be molded
to influence both legislative and bureaucratic action. Currently, there is a misalignment of
incentives between the policies written by state legislators and the incentives which
motivate bureaucratic action. Due to the distance between the policy incentives and
bureaucratic incentive systems, more research is necessary to reduce this gap which could
eventually lead to more effective policies. For example, better comprehending the
incentives of bureaucrats could facilitate an improved alliance between lawmakers and
bureaucrats, which then encourages legislators to design policies that take into account
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the incentives of the bureaucracy. For this to happen, legislators must understand more
about the bureaucratic agency, agents, and the issues faced by bureaucrats. Being aware
of these issues, lawmakers are then more inclined to develop policies that serve to help
the bureaucrats meet specific community needs. Employing theoretical frameworks, such
as the Advocacy Coalition Framework, can then be used to identify where legislators and
street-level bureaucrats converge toward improving child abuse reporting policies.
In summary, this study demonstrates the consequences associated with the
enactment of mandatory reporting laws. Rather than always encouraging increased
reporting, the enactment of these laws are used, instead, to reduce legislative uncertainty.
While some professional groups do respond positively to mandatory reporting laws with
improved reporting, there are some professional groups that respond by reporting less
following the enactment of the law. However, in multiple cases, bureaucrats appear to
report on a trend more aligned with their professional roles. Acknowledging the
importance of professional roles and incentives, additional research must be conducted to
identify what influences the policy implementation efforts of street-level bureaucrats and
how policymakers can employ this information to their advantage to combat the effects
of child abuse in the U.S.
Essay 2
Examining the results from this essay, it is clear that the child abuse reporting
behavior of street-level bureaucrats (law enforcement, education personnel, and social
workers) differs whether or not a mandatory reporting law is in place. This particular
behavior is especially noticeable when examining law enforcement officers and education
personnel. Prior to the enactment of a mandatory reporting law, education professionals’
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reporting of suspected abuse significantly declines from the preceding year. Following
the enactment of the law, teachers’ reporting continues to decline, but over time this
occurs on a less significant yearly trend. This finding indicates that the mandatory
reporting law has a mitigating influence on the educators’ digression of reported cases of
abuse over time. Observing law enforcement personnel, the exact opposite experience of
educators is true. In that, police officers continue to report more cases of child abuse
across states each year. However, following the enactment of the mandatory reporting
law, the reporting behavior of police officers does not significantly change and officers
report on the same positive trend they had been previous to the law’s enactment.
Understanding the theoretical and practical implications associated with this study
and findings is important for a few reasons. First, this study demonstrates that mandatory
reporting laws fail to alter behavior when enacted broadly across multiple agencies or
professional groups. Second, it serves as a caution to legislators when considering the
enactment of such broad-based policies. Finally, this research supports and expands the
earlier research concerning incentive systems and motivating behavior (Boardman &
Sundquist, 2009; Clark & Wilson, 1961; Perry & Wise, 1990). Specifically, this study
reveals that successful policy implementation is dependent on the complete alignment
between policy incentives and the organizational incentive systems of bureaucratic
agencies. However, when the incentive systems do not align with the policy, then
bureaucrats do not follow the policy and, in some cases, respond contrary to the aims of a
policy.
While this research is built upon an established theoretical framework and
employs a sound methodology, there are still inherent weaknesses. First, prior scholarship
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demonstrates that categorizing or listing all of the potential incentives of a particular
bureaucratic agency or department is extremely difficult to do (Keiser & Meier, 1996).
Furthermore, providing legislators with a list of incentives for each bureaucracy may do
very little when attempting to encourage lawmakers to utilize incentives in their policy
decisions. While Peter Clark and James Wilson (1961) provide a typology for
categorizing incentives, I recognize that not all of the behaviors or incentives of the
various bureaucrats can be neatly organized within each category. Not being able to
categorize each behavior within a specific incentive system then reduces the predictive
power intended with the theoretical framework. Although it is challenging to categorize
the type of incentive associated with various behaviors, it does not negate the fact that
there is an incentive that drives the bureaucrats’ action. Acknowledging then the role of
incentives as identified within this study, legislatures are encouraged to be cognizant to
the influence a particular policy may have on a group of bureaucrats.
One additional limitation not accounted for within Clark and Wilson’s incentive
typology is the potential for varying strength associated with the different incentive
systems. For example, in this study, I identify that a mandatory reporting law provides an
incentive for law enforcement officers within each of the categorized incentive systems;
however, these incentives still did not result in the desired behavior of increased reporting
with the enactment of a reporting law. This finding leads to the question, do some
incentive systems have a greater influence on various bureaucrats or do incentive systems
differ in strength? If the incentive systems do vary in strength, then the typology fails to
predict how the various systems influence behavior when a particular category is missing
or only addresses a portion of the incentive. Exploring this in regards to law enforcement
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personnel, one possible reason for these agents’ failure to perform relates to the fact that
mandatory reporting laws do little to influence the individual material incentives of law
enforcement agents. Instead, only the material needs of the organization were being met,
and this was still conditional on the federal funding actually being directed to law
enforcement agencies. Therefore, the material incentive system may have a greater
influence than purposive or solidary incentives combined when it is either more clearly
tied to the organization or the individuals within the organization. Although the varying
strengths of incentive systems are purely speculative, I suggest further inquiry.
Furthermore, this apparent weakness does not necessarily negate the findings associated
with this study. In fact, it demonstrates that obtaining a better understanding of the
specific incentive systems of each agency is more valuable to legislators and policies
must be designed in a way to account for the specific incentives of bureaucrats.
Finally, as discussed in the previous essay, there are weaknesses associated with
conducting a study using panel data. Particularly, autocorrelation is prevalent when
employing panel data. To account for this methodological weakness, fixed and random
effects are introduced in the model which alters the way the standard errors are estimated
and provides for improved examination. Multicollinearity is also a concern due to the
interaction terms, but this results in an overestimation of the standard errors making the
test of the hypothesis more difficult and strengthens the validity of the results. Also,
running multiple models with and without an interactive effect, while finding consistent
results, supports the methodological approach examined within this study.
As reviewed above, there are several limitations in regards to the chosen
theoretical framework. Specifically, the Clark and Wilson (1961) incentive typology is
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heavily reliant on broad categories of incentives. Recognizing this constraint provides an
opportunity to further study the incentive typology and the value of each category.
Performing such a study would demonstrate whether one incentive category is of greater
value to bureaucrats or if a combination of incentives is required when motivating agents
within an organization. Examining the results from this second essay, it is evident that for
education personnel to respond to the mandatory reporting law, all three incentive
categories must be in place and the incentives directly targeted to the individual.
However, law enforcement officials had all of the incentive categories in place and yet,
did not respond to the reporting law. It is not clear whether law enforcement personnel
would have responded to the mandatory reporting law had the material incentive been
directly applied to the individual officer. However, the potential for this finding reveals
the need for further examination and the expansion of the theory. Understanding the
value of each incentive system and how it targets the individual is extremely important
and would supply legislators with a greater influence in regards to designing a policy that
aligns with a bureaucratic agency’s incentive system.
Beyond incentive systems, little attention is directed to the influence of managers
outside of organizational roles. For example, in the case of education personnel,
principals typically serve as gatekeepers for reporting (Finkelhor et al., 1984; Mason &
Watts, 1986). Law enforcement officials are also heavily influenced by the objectives
provided by their direct supervisors (Wilson, 1978). While principals’ attitudes toward
reporting have been heavily examined (Kenny, & McEachern, 2002; Zellman, 1990),
scholars have yet to look at police chiefs and their attitudes toward reporting.
Understanding the managerial support, or the lack thereof would be crucial to fully
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comprehend law enforcement officers’ failure to respond to mandatory reporting laws.
Besides law enforcement officials and education personnel, social workers are also
continually studied and identified as individuals that prefer to work with greater
autonomy and minimal oversight (Zellman & Antler, 1990). Acknowledging that social
work is a fairly autonomous profession introduces important questions regarding the
management of social workers. While wanting to maintain that autonomous workplace,
social work managers are faced with the challenge of balancing employee autonomy
while ensuring that legislative controls or constraints are met. Taking the opportunity to
observe the managers of education personnel, law enforcement agents, and social
workers, in regards to mandatory reporting laws, has the possibility of enhancing the
literature further while demonstrating the value of management within a bureaucracy.
In review, this study demonstrates that street-level bureaucrats do not always
respond to broad-based policies, but are typically driven to action based on the incentive
systems in place. Specifically, I look at law enforcement, educators, and social workers,
and find that based on their incentive systems, only education personnel respond
positively to mandatory reporting laws and improve their reporting behavior following
the enactment of the law. Due to the broad categorization of incentives, there are some
limitations to this study. However, these limitations do not take away from the findings
that incentives or disincentives associated with a policy influence bureaucratic action.
Finally, there are many opportunities for further research, but of particular importance is
the role that a bureaucrat’s manager plays toward encouraging compliance with child
abuse reporting laws.
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Essay 3
The third essay steps away from mandatory reporting policies and explores the
innovation and diffusion of a child abuse education and prevention policy, known as
Erin’s Law. Acknowledging that mandatory reporting laws play an important role in
mitigating state lawmakers uncertainty, it is not surprising to witness the quick
dissemination of Erin’s Law as a more effective way for educating teachers and
improving child abuse reporting while also reducing legislative uncertainty. Examining
the innovation and diffusion of Erin’s Law, I observe the valuable role a policy
entrepreneur plays toward encouraging legislators to adopt a law. Specifically, I find that
as the policy entrepreneur, Erin Merryn, visits individual states and establishes a network,
then the likelihood that the state adopts her policy increases significantly. The theoretical
and practical implications surrounding this finding are vast because it supports the work
of John Kingdon (1984) and validates the role of the policy entrepreneur within the
multiple streams approach. Additionally, these results reinforce and expand the policy
network scholarship, and demonstrate the further use of networks within the policy
process. Finally, this study reveals that more can be done to comprehend the measurable
value of entrepreneurial support and narratives which increases the likelihood of the law
being adopted.
Accounting for additional legislative variables beyond that of the policy
entrepreneur, the results suggest that lawmakers have finite attention and direct that
interest in solving the biggest problem (Jones & Baumgartner, 2005). While this finding
is not new, it does support years of research focusing on legislative attention.
Furthermore, I examine lawmakers’ responses to top-down pressure in the form of
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available funding and find that, in the case of Erin’s Law, the federal funding does not
influence the likelihood of adoption. Beyond the federal pressure for enactment, the
actions of neighboring states do not increase the likelihood of adoption, but instead, serve
to discourage enactment of the law. While this finding may be due to a limitation of the
data, it is still worth noting. Finally, I observe that legislative professionalism does not
increase the likelihood that legislators will enact Erin’s Law. But instead, I witness that
adoption occurs in states with both professional and non-professional legislatures.
The major limitation of this study is due to the narrow nature of the selected case.
While the findings are extremely important, they are hard to extrapolate beyond the
experience of Erin Merryn and Erin’s Law. This particular study demonstrates that
Merryn, through regular speaking opportunities, is able to convey the importance of her
message while building important networks who push for the adoption of her law. Will
this experience be the same for every policy? The theoretical principals which support
this study suggest that they should be, but with any study where people are involved there
is always a chance that the theoretical principals may not hold true. While this particular
limitation does not negate from the value of the findings of this study, it does encourage
further research to examine multiple policy entrepreneurs, across multiple policy types,
and within multiple settings. Expanding this research further advances the value and
importance of the policy entrepreneur.
Beyond the constraints associated with only using Erin’s Law, this study is also
limited in the number of data points available for review. Due to the rapid diffusion of
Erin’s Law, only seven years of data are available for observation. Having these limited
observations may influence the data in unexpected ways. For example, when
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investigating the effect of top-down legislation and federal funding, the impact may be
understated due to the timing of the federal legislation. The federal law and funding
supporting Erin’s Law was not enacted until 2015, providing only two years of
observation data to measure the effect of this variable. This is significant because a
majority of the states which had adopted the law occurred prior to the federal legislation
even taking place. Furthermore, the actual funding associated with the law was not
released until 2017, and therefore may not have had the time to influence other states to
adopt as hypothesized. While the findings from this study are accurate at this point in
time, it is necessary to examine if the impact of federal legislation and funding becomes
more important over time as the remaining states contemplate the enactment of Erin’s
Law. It is possible that the federal legislation may convince the remaining states to enact
Erin’s Law, but this is not guaranteed. As argued in the third essay, there are studies in
place which demonstrate that states regularly ignore federal funding due to either political
differences or simply an unwillingness to insert additional regulatory processes on the
bureaucracy within the state (Nicholson-Crotty, 2012). As time progresses and more data
becomes available it will be important to re-examine how the effect of the selected
variables change.
As previously discussed, additional research is necessary in order to demonstrate
if the case of Erin Merryn and Erin’s Law is a one-time event or if policy entrepreneurs
advocating for policies within other political contexts would experience similar success.
As legislation continues to progress under the guidance of a policy entrepreneur, the need
to better understand the narratives, impetus, and motivation directing the entrepreneur is
crucial. It must be determined whether policy entrepreneurs have some advantage in the
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political world when promoting a particular policy. If this is the case, then legislators
hoping to advance a particular policy to adoption could find more success by attaching
that policy to an entrepreneur with a powerful narrative. It is obvious that studying the
nuances of the policy entrepreneur and the implications associated with having an
entrepreneur committed to a policy is crucial toward comprehending the policy process.
In brief, the findings from this study demonstrate the policy entrepreneur has a
beneficial role to play within the policy process. Examining the actual value of the policy
entrepreneur within the context of policy innovation and diffusion expands the theoretical
lens regarding the policy entrepreneur and invites continued exploration. Moreover, it
reveals to practitioners the importance of the individual, the narrative, and the network in
regards to pushing a policy forward for adoption. As legislators approach a particular
issue, the political push might be better accepted if presented by a policy entrepreneur
from outside the typical policy world. Furthermore, the study validates previous literature
in regards to the limited attention of legislators and the need to better understand the
triggering events which best grab the lawmakers’ attention (Jones & Baumgartner, 2005).
While it is not clear what determines the best metric, in the case of Erin’s Law, it appears
that legislators are focusing on broad metrics encompassing child abuse and are not as
focused on the nuanced details of suspected reporting. Finally, this study employs Event
History Analysis to better understand the variables that influence innovation and
diffusion within the policy process.
Recapitulation
In conclusion, the three essays that constitute this dissertation offer a clearer
understanding of the policy process and the role that the individual plays within that
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process. The first essay examines the efforts legislators make to reduce their uncertainty
while attempting to increase their control of the bureaucracy. By enacting mandatory
reporting laws, state lawmakers effectively reduce their uncertainty by achieving more
consistent reporting from the various street-level bureaucrats. However, the change in
bureaucratic behavior also results in unsavory responses to child abuse reporting laws and
develops into reduced reporting from certain bureaucratic bodies. This study advances the
theoretical understanding behind the principal-agent relationship while playing an
important role in encouraging state lawmakers to be more aware of the adverse effects of
their policies. Furthermore, the research encourages legislators to consider the incentives
and motivations that not only drive their behavior but the behavior of bureaucrats.
The second essay provides greater insight into the incentives and motivations of
street-level bureaucrats. More specifically, it demonstrates that the incentives which
govern bureaucratic behavior differ across agencies and that each professional group has
a particular incentive system that defines the organization. Based on the variation in
incentive systems, the findings reveal that bureaucrats respond best to a policy when the
incentives associated with the policy align with the incentive system of the bureaucrat’s
organization. This study progresses the theoretical understanding of incentives and the
role incentives play toward predicting behavior. From a practical standpoint, it is also
clear that broad-based policies across agencies fail in some cases to alter bureaucratic
behavior and in some situations may lead to behavior that is contrary to the intention of a
policy. Advanced research is required to better define and understand the incentive
systems that exist between organizations and the value of specific incentives.
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The final essay explores the role of the policy entrepreneur within the innovation
and diffusion of a particular policy. The findings from this study demonstrate that the
policy entrepreneur plays an important part in advocating and advancing a policy through
adoption. The results reveal that a policy entrepreneur who actually visits states and
builds networks will have success in promoting their policy. Beyond the policy
entrepreneur, I witness that other factors also influence the innovation and diffusion of a
policy. Of particular interest is the observation that lawmakers, whether they are
professional or unprofessional, choose to adopt Erin’s Law. While this finding is contrary
to current findings on the topic, it does demonstrate that there may be more to understand
in regards to legislative professionalism. Particularly, are there types of policies or laws
that work to the advantage of non-professional legislatures? For example, are some types
of policies more readily adopted by non-professional legislatures as a way to demonstrate
legitimacy as a legislative body? Moreover, identifying that both professional and nonprofessional legislatures adopted Erin’s Law further demonstrates the value of the policy
entrepreneur toward encouraging adoption in either case. Based on these findings, I
encourage additional examination of the policy entrepreneur within the innovation
diffusion process.
Each of these essays contributes richly to the field of public policy. Reviewing the
theoretical frameworks, findings, and subsequent implications offers greater insight into
the policy process and encourages further study. Moreover, these studies provide for
important practical implications which, if applied, could benefit the legislator’s in the
fight against child abuse. Furthermore, this research serves to improve the theoretical
understanding of policy incentives and motivation among various groups of individuals.
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While each study is subject to certain limitations, these limitations do not overtly negate
the significance of the findings but encourage future research in the hope of advancing
the scholarly field of study. As stated in the Introduction, the goal of this study is to better
understand the role of the individual within the policy process. Reviewing each of these
essays, I am confident that this goal has been met, but recognize that additional research
is necessary to further the work presented within this dissertation.
Overall Implications and Limitations
Examining the entire dissertation as a whole, prominent implications and
limitations arise beyond what is visible with the individual essays. First, with a more
complete view of the policy process in place, greater assertions can be made about the
process for practitioners and scholars. Second, piecing all the essays together, the
generalizability of the entire dissertation is strengthened. Finally, combining the essays
introduces certain limitations regarding the policy process and provides an opportunity
for more detailed future research. Addressing these three points offers greater substance
concerning the theoretical and practical contributions available from this study.
The policy process was established in order to provide a comprehensive
framework that could more easily define and measure the steps that lead to the adoption
and successful implementation of a policy (Lasswell, 1971). The three studies together
walk through this process and demonstrate important findings regarding the incentives
surrounding adoption and implementation. Nevertheless, it is not until the studies are
brought together that valuable information is gleaned regarding the actions of the policy
players. For example, with the first study, it is evident that state legislators are willing to
enact a policy if they can foresee the immediate benefit to themselves and the state.
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However, once the state lawmakers receive the desired benefit, in this case reduced
uncertainty, then their motivation to evaluate and improve the law dwindles. This
explains that while mandatory reporting laws are only mildly successful in garnering
additional reports, lawmakers continue to implement and push them onto professional
organizations and agencies. It was not until three decades had passed that a policy
entrepreneur, heralding from a mandated reporting position, called legislators’ attention
to their faulty policy and encouraged an improved change.
The collection of these studies further demonstrate that street-level bureaucrats
can play an important role as policy entrepreneurs. Tasked with the implementation of
policies, street-level bureaucrats experience the intimate costs and benefits of the policy.
Calling upon their professional experience, the culmination of these studies demonstrate
that street-level bureaucrats can affect the outcome of a policy in two ways. First,
bureaucrats influence a policy simply by their willingness and ability to implement the
policy. Second, bureaucrats can employ their experience with the policy to advocate for a
policy change, as in the case of Erin’s Law. Combining the findings from the second and
third essay, it is abundantly clear that bureaucrats are a powerful group within the policy
process. While previous studies have demonstrated that bureaucrats are responsive to
political control (Weingast & Moran 1983; Wood & Waterman 1994), these studies
demonstrate that bureaucrats are only responsive to political control when the policy
aligns with their incentives. However, when the policy does not align with the incentives,
Erin’s Law reveals that street-level bureaucrats can induce change based on their
experience, networks, and narrative.
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Limiting the final analysis to only an examination of each individual essay
prevents this study from expanding to a more complete review of the policy process.
Specifically, the generalizability of each study is restricted when viewing the study on its
own. That is, these studies are limited to only mandatory reporting policies and Erin’s
Law. However, investigating both legislative acts and the results from these findings,
some interesting patterns emerge which can be generalized across multiple child abuse
policy studies. For example, in all three studies, the unemployment rate within a state was
found to be statistically significant. By itself, this finding only offers a narrow
explanation of the impact of unemployment on mandatory reporting policies or Erin’s
Law. Nevertheless, when explored together, it provides a more significant finding of the
role unemployment plays across the adoption and implementation of multiple policies. It
also encourages further discussion of unemployment as a driver for policy change both
from a legislative perspective and from a street-level perspective.
Beyond unemployment, the combination of these studies demonstrates the
relationships between the street-level bureaucrats. Erin’s Law, a child abuse education
policy, was developed by a social worker with the intent of helping school children and
their teachers better combat suspected child abuse. As revealed in the first and second
study, the reporting behavior of the street-level bureaucrats was highly dependent on the
reporting behavior of the other professional organizations. Looking at the culmination of
these studies, it is not surprising then to see a social worker develop a policy that
influences the behavior and actions of education personnel or other street-level
bureaucrats. Identifying these results across multiple studies speaks volumes about the
generalizability of the studies in regards to understanding the behavior of street-level
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bureaucrats. More specifically, it demonstrates that bureaucrats may be better attuned to
the needs and incentives of other street-level bureaucrats within different agencies.
Finally, exploring the culmination of these studies introduces limitations and
implications not necessarily recognizable when an essay is studied by itself. For instance,
the first study relies so heavily on the perception of state lawmakers that little attention is
directed to the role that the street-level bureaucrats play. Nevertheless, when the streetlevel bureaucrats are included in the second essay, a clearer picture begins to evolve
behind not only the intent of the policy but how the policy is received and implemented.
Furthermore, the second essay better demonstrates why legislators turn to mandatory
reporting laws in order to encourage improved reporting. Specifically, the second essay
demonstrates the fear and apprehensions associated with reporting suspected abuse.
Lawmakers utilize the mandatory reporting laws not only as a mode for more consistent
reporting, but to entice street-level bureaucrats to overcome these reservations of
reporting. It is not until both essays are examined that the relationship and actions of both
bureaucrats and politicians become more obvious.
Having analyzed all three essays, the next phase of these studies is to progress
with a deeper examination of the impact of Erin’s Law on child abuse reporting. Based
on these studies, it is evident that mandatory reporting laws do reduce uncertainty, but
having greater certainty does not necessarily equate to improved reporting or reduced
instances of child abuse. Furthermore, Erin’s Law has been enacted to help solve the
issues or gaps that exist with mandatory reporting laws. However, this research has yet to
demonstrate whether Erin’s Law works or improves the child abuse reporting situation
better than the previously enacted mandatory reporting laws. Acknowledging this to be
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the case, the next step forward is to identify if states that have adopted Erin’s Law have
demonstrated any improvement in either the reporting of suspected abuse or a decrease in
the occurrence of abuse. Identifying the effectiveness of this law would complete the
evaluation of the policy process and demonstrates a policy evaluation stage not
necessarily emphasized within these three studies. Concluding with this logical step
forward promotes further research beyond that already discussed within each essay.
However, this progression only succeeds based on the contribution these essays make to
the field of public policy and administration, which I believe to be sizable especially if
actions are taken which improve the protection for children susceptible to abuse.
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Table A.1:

State and Year of Mandatory Reporting Law Enactment

State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon

Year Education
Personnel
Enacted in Law
2000
2013
1989
1990
2000
2010
1992
1999
1998
2014
2006
1995
1980
1997
1994
2006
1988
1988
2003
2011
2008
1978
1984
1998
2003
1991
2005
2001
1979
Not Defined
1993
1983
Not Defined
1975
1969
Not Defined
1993

Year Law
Enforcement
Officials Enacted
in Law
2000
2013
1985
1990
1991
2010
1977
1999
1998
2014
1967
1995
1980
1997
1994
2006
1988
1988
2003
2011
2008
1970
1984
1998
2003
1991
Not Defined
2001
1979
Not Defined
1993
1983
Not Defined
1975
Not Defined
Not Defined
1993

Year Social Workers
Enacted in Law
2000
Not Defined
1989
1990
2000
2010
1977
1999
1998
2014
1967
1995
1980
1997
1994
2006
1988
1988
2003
2011
1990
1970
1986
2006
2003
1991
2005
2001
1979
Not Defined
1993
2002
Not Defined
1975
1996
Not Defined
1993
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Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

2006
Not Defined
2010
1976
2001
1995
Not Defined
1981
1975
1969
1965
1965
Not Defined

2006
Not Defined
2010
1976
2001
1995
Not Defined
1981
1975
1975
1965
1965
Not Defined

2006
Not Defined
2010
1976
2001
Not Defined
Not Defined
1981
1975
1971
1965
1965
Not Defined
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Table A.2:

Descriptive Statistics

Control Variables

Observations Mean

Standard
Deviation
235.715

Min

Max

65.400

1244.300

Violent Crime Rate
Per 100,000a
Victims Whiteb

950

839 742.143

436.514

80.984

2,927.587

Victims Non-Whiteb

888 587.632

448.920

7.519

5704.663

Poverty Ratec

750 12.379

3.194

5.600

24.600

Teen Pregnancy
Rated
High School Drop
Out Ratee
Investigations
substantiatedb
Unemployment
Ratef
Male Victimsb

950 22.958

9.584

5.400

57.500

622 4.608

1.797

1.700

13.700

899 1,021.365

561.552

9.191

4,095.358

950 5.129

1.381

2.300

11.300

886 605.227

358.514

51.521

4,185.875

Female Victimsb

886 660.696

364.274

95.293

4,205.347

State Child
Populationb
Sources

950

469.760

1404017.000 1,587,064.000 121,073.000 9,432,170.000

a. United States Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation. (September 2012). Crime in the United
States, 2011. Retrieved October 2016, from https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2011/crime-in-the-u.s.2011/violent-crime/violent-crime
b. Compiled using the National Child Abuse and Neglect Data System State Level Data (NCANDS) Summary
Data Component, 1990-2008
c. Compiled using the U.S. Bureau of the Census, Estimated Percent of People of All Ages in Poverty for each
state. Retrieved October, 2016, from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis;
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series.
d. Compiled using the Kids Count Data Center. Retrieved October, 2016, from
https://datacenter.kidscount.org/data/tables/6053-total-teen-births?loc=1&loct=2#detailed/2/252/false/573,869,36,868,867/any/12721,12722
e. Population Reference Bureau, analysis of data from the U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey.
These data were derived from American Fact Finder table B14005. Retrieved October, 2016, from
https://datacenter.kidscount.org/data/tables/73-teens-ages-16-to-19-not-in-school-and-not-high-schoolgraduates?loc=1&loct=2#detailed/2/2-53/false/871,870,573,869,36,868,867,133,38,35/any/380,381.
f. Complied using U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Unemployment Rate for each state. Retrieved October 2016,
from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series.
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Table A.3:

Reporting Behavior for States That Always or Never Had the Law

Time (Year)

Violent Crime Rate

Number of Reports
from Law
Enforcement Officials

Number of reports
from Social Workers

Number of reports
from Education
Personnel

Teen Pregnancy Rate

High School Drop-out
Rate

Unemployment Rate

Victims Male

R-Squared

Number of reports from
Law Enforcement
Agents - Model 1

Number of reports from
Education Personnel Model 2

Number of reports from
Social Workers - Model
3

With the
Law

Without the
Law

With the
Law

Without the
Law

With the
Law

Without
the Law

2.852

19.069**

-6.500**

-14.630**

-1.617

6.925

(2.070)

(5.233)

(2.114)

(4.485)

(2.656)

(7.232)

0.045

0.206

-0.059

-0.257†

0.153†

0.333

(0.068)

(0.160)

(0.071)

(0.135)

(0.086)

(0.211)

--

--

0.751**

0.544**

0.232*

0.169

--

--

(0.056)

(0.056)

(0.098)

(0.113)

0.142†

0.097

0.034

0.271**

--

--

(0.060)

(0.064)

(0.064)

(0.050)

--

--

0.689**

0.754**

--

--

0.051

0.658**

(0.052)

(0.077)

--

--

(0.095)

(0.121)

-0.785

-6.621†

5.739**

8.649**

0.444

-12.676*

(1.971)

(3.855)

(2.010)

(3.226)

(2.519)

(5.041)

-1.161

20.777†

2.419

-1.820

-4.348

-45.901**

(4.534)

(8.216)

(4.731)

(7.140)

(5.783)

(10.407)

3.141

14.539*

-5.519

-17.675**

5.440

22.508*

(5.937)

(7.944)

(6.190)

(6.661)

(7.578)

(10.466)

-0.040

0.022†

0.019

0.059**

0.174

-0.012

(0.030)

(0.024)

(0.032)

(0.020)

(0.037)

(0.032)

0.905

0.898

0.843

0.942

0.855*

0.858

Note: N = 189; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, † p < 0.10;
Standard errors in parenthesis
Fixed effects are included but not displayed
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Figure A.1:

Education Personnel Mandatory Reporting Trends
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Figure A.2:

Social Worker Reporting Trends
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Table B.1:
State and Year of Mandatory Reporting Law Enactment for
Education Personnel, Law Enforcement Officials, and Social Workers
State

Year Education
Personnel
Enacted in Law

Year Law
Enforcement
Officials Enacted
in Law
2000
2013
1985
1990
1991
2010
1977
1999
1998
2014
1967
1995
1980
1997
1994
2006
1988
1988
2003
2011
2008
1970
1984
1998
2003
1991
Not Defined
2001

Year Social Workers
Enacted in Law

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada

2000
2013
1989
1990
2000
2010
1992
1999
1998
2014
2006
1995
1980
1997
1994
2006
1988
1988
2003
2011
2008
1978
1984
1998
2003
1991
2005
2001

2000
Not Defined
1989
1990
2000
2010
1977
1999
1998
2014
1967
1995
1980
1997
1994
2006
1988
1988
2003
2011
1990
1970
1986
2006
2003
1991
2005
2001

New Hampshire

1979

1979

1979

New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma

Not Defined
1993
1983
Not Defined
1975
1969
Not Defined

Not Defined
1993
1983
Not Defined
1975
Not Defined
Not Defined

Not Defined
1993
2002
Not Defined
1975
1996
Not Defined
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Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

1993
2006
Not Defined
2010
1976
2001
1995
Not Defined
1981
1975
1969
1965
1965
Not Defined

1993
2006
Not Defined
2010
1976
2001
1995
Not Defined
1981
1975
1975
1965
1965
Not Defined

1993
2006
Not Defined
2010
1976
2001
Not Defined
Not Defined
1981
1975
1971
1965
1965
Not Defined
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Table B.2

Descriptive Statistics

Control Variables

Observations Mean

Standard
Deviation
235.715

Min

Max

65.400

1244.300

Violent Crime Rate Per 100,000a

950

Victims Whiteb

839 742.143

436.514

80.984

2927.587

Victims Non-Whiteb

888 587.632

448.920

7.519

5704.663

Poverty Ratec

750 12.379

3.194

5.600

24.600

Teen Pregnancy Rated

950 22.958

9.584

5.400

57.500

High School Drop Out Ratee

622 4.608

1.797

1.700

13.700

Investigations substantiatedb

899 1021.365

561.552

9.191

4095.358

Unemployment Ratef

950 5.129

1.381

2.300

11.300

Male Victimsb

886 605.227

358.514

51.521

4185.875

Female Victimsb

886 660.696

364.274

95.293

4205.347

469.760

Sources
a. United States Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation. (September 2012). Crime in the United
States, 2011. Retrieved October 2016, from https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2011/crime-in-the-u.s.2011/violent-crime/violent-crime
b. Compiled using the National Child Abuse and Neglect Data System State Level Data (NCANDS) Summary
Data Component, 1990-2008
c. Compiled using the U.S. Bureau of the Census, Estimated Percent of People of All Ages in Poverty for each
state. Retrieved October, 2016, from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series.
d. Compiled using the Kids Count Data Center. Retrieved October, 2016, from
https://datacenter.kidscount.org/data/tables/6053-total-teen-births?loc=1&loct=2#detailed/2/252/false/573,869,36,868,867/any/12721,12722
e. Population Reference Bureau, analysis of data from the U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey.
These data were derived from American Fact Finder table B14005. Retrieved October, 2016, from
https://datacenter.kidscount.org/data/tables/73-teens-ages-16-to-19-not-in-school-and-not-high-schoolgraduates?loc=1&loct=2#detailed/2/2-53/false/871,870,573,869,36,868,867,133,38,35/any/380,381.
f. Complied using U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Unemployment Rate for each state. Retrieved October 2016,
from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series.
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Figure B.1:

Law Enforcement Officials Mandatory Reporting Trends
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Figure B.2:

Education Personnel Mandatory Reporting Trends
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Figure B.3:

Social Worker Reporting Trends
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Table C.1: Models of State Legislatures Likelihood of Erin's Law Adoption With
Interaction Effect
Models
Independent
Variables

Model 3a:

Model 3b:

State Abuse Reports

State Abuse Reports w/State
Variables

Hazard Ratios

Hazard Ratios

Hypothesis Variables
Number of visits by Erin Merryn
Legislative Professional Score
Interaction (Professional Score *
Number of Visits)
Total Reports of Suspected Abuse per
10,000
Percent of Neighboring States
Availability of Federal Funding
Unified Government

1.840

0.855

(1.165)
1.840

(0.794)
0.092

(5.177)

(0.458)

4.683

44.010

(12.423)

(150.377)

1.013

1.036

(0.009)

(0.035)

0.175

0.040

(0.187)

(0.064)

0.011**

0.029**

(0.009)

(0.028)

0.664

1.569

(0.294)

(1.049)

--

0.980

State Variables
Number of Total Cases Investigated

(0.015)
Number of Child Abuse Reports for
White Children

--

1.095†
(0.056)

Number of Child Abuse Reports for
non-White Children

--

0.883

(0.070)
Number of Violent Crimes per 10,000

--

1.015
(0.032)

Number of Teens Births per 10,000

--

1.268
(0.289)

Number of Teen Drop Outs per 10,000

--

1.044
(0.048)

Median Income

--

1.000

189
(0.000)
Number of unemployed per 10,0000

--

3.095**
(0.989)

Number of People Living in Poverty
per 10,0000

--

1.049
(0.236)

0.0000**

0.0000**

(0.0000)

(0.0000)
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BIC

106.669

105.250

Chi2

58.10 (7df)

69.29 (16df)

Constant
Summary Statistics
Number of Cases

Note: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, † p < 0.10; Standard Errors in Parentheses

Table C.2:

Total
Reports of
Suspected
Abuse by
Education
Personnel
per 10,000
1.0000

Percent of
Neighboring
States

Number
of visits
by Erin
Merryn

Legislative
Professional
Score

Number
of Total
Cases
Investigat
ed

Number of
Child
Abuse
Reports for
White
Children

Number of
Child
Abuse
Reports for
non-White
Children

0.1569

1.0000

0.1245

0.1744

1.0000

-0.0378

0.1076

0.1393

1.0000

0.5939

0.1132

0.0606

0.0021

1.0000

0.3431

0.1153

0.0526

0.0737

0.5531

1.0000

0.1765

0.0283

0.0213

0.4665

0.2757

.2326

1.0000

0.0946

0.0366

0.0528

0.2290

0.3163

0.0767

0.5727

Number
of
Violent
Crimes
per
10,000

Number
of Teens
Births
per
10,000

Number
of Teen
Drop Outs
per
10,000

Median
Income

Number
of
unemploy
ed per
10,0000

Number
of People
Living in
Poverty
per
10,0000

1.0000
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Total
Reports of
Suspected
Abuse by
Education
Personnel
per 10,000
Percent of
Neighborin
g States
Number of
visits by
Erin
Merryn
Legislative
Professiona
l Score
Number of
Total Cases
Investigate
d
Number of
Child
Abuse
Reports for
White
Children
Number of
Child
Abuse
Reports for
non-White
Children
Number of
Violent
Crimes per
10,000

Correlation of Coefficients

Number of
Teens
Births per
10,000
Number of
Teen Drop
Outs per
10,000
Median
Income
Number of
unemploye
d per
10,0000
Number of
People
Living in
Poverty per
10,0000

0.0617

0.1297

0.0337

-0.2208

0.3581

0.2291

0.1711

0.4115

1.0000

-0.0641

0.0979

0.0415

-0.1702

0.1506

0.1188

0.2442

0.4417

0.6725

1.0000

-0.1274

0.0447

0.0768

0.2122

-0.4493

-0.3661

-0.0110

-0.2377

-0.6930

-0.5124

1.0000

0.1366

0.2835

0.1760

0.1165

0.2639

0.3538

0.3335

0.3106

-0.3177

1.0000

0.0960

0.0502

0.4168

0.3286

0.1539

0.3006

0.6730

0.5293

-0.8445

0.2904

0.0333

0.3185

0.0670

0.2344

1.0000
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